Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, September 24, 1964, 3 p.m.

650. Cabot-Wang Talks. Reference: Embtel 645.² Comments and recommendations following 122 meeting.

1. This was one of longest and on Chinese side by far most vitriolic meeting in many months. Wang was loud, tendentious, impolite and arrogant, virtually spitting out his accusations, often with finger wagging. We were subject to lengthy lectures delivered from an offensively professorial height. He almost invariably referred to me as “you,” whereas long habit in the talks had been use “Mister Ambassador” or “Your Excellency.” He used such phrases as “I want to tell you.” He called not only me, but USG “liars.” He expressed cocky contempt for our allegedly unavailing efforts in SEA, and made clear he thought we were seeing beginning of end for us there. After I pointed out that while he objected to use of word “regime” as applied to Peiping, he used it re SVN and “Chiang clique” for GRC, he seemed to take pleasure in using those terms more frequently. On side rustled papers quite unnecessarily while I was talking.

2. There was a “Panmunjom” flavor to this meeting. Repetitious sermons, full of invective and pompous Communist “axioms” were delivered with no regard for factor logic, in a spirit of contemptuous one-upmanship seemingly designed to arouse anger. I answered firmly but not provocatively, and was careful not to let my anger show. Wang obviously wanted to prolong the meeting and engaged in lengthy ad libs before and after his prepared papers ran out—one of which he used twice. We believe he hoped I would leave the meeting with angry or at least glum mien. I therefore emerged to meet the larger than usual number of newsmen with relaxed, smiling aspect. Last evening one reporter told Narding press consensus based on length meeting and aspect two principals on emergence was that we had read riot act to Chinese due Tonkin Gulf incidents, and had derived satisfaction from meeting.

3. The new Wang was entirely different in comportment from his first meeting in July. To limited extent this may be attributable his settling in saddle and hence emergence his own nature as provincial, blindly dedicated cadre who has made good through intelligence and loyalty with “know nothing” contempt for reason or logic. I am inclined believe, however, temper of his approach largely set by direction Peiping and doubtless had ChiComs worried. Notable that our retaliatory actions per se scarcely mentioned by Wang. Instead he assumed posture of heady confidence combined with threatening warnings. Believe this is his character. This is not time to expect them mention our successes or their weaknesses, even if they saw chance needling us in process. (Not surprising defector Tung not mentioned, even to advance excuse of kidnapping charges.)

4. Particularly interesting is fact Wang readily admitted ChiComs supported “just” revolutions in other countries, implying all true communists should do so. He saw no inconsistency in this and coexistence line, since revolutions could not be exported, but inevitably arose indigenously in the face of local or foreign imposed oppression. In such instances, he maintained, communist support was “honorable.”

5. Wang pointedly denied both second and third Tonkin Gulf incidents took place, claiming we had concocted them as pretext more aggressive plotting against NVN. When I pointed out Wang had not denied first incident took place in international waters, Wang did not return to this point.

6. Wang made no response on subject NVN prisoners Laos, despite fact their assignment would come under his label of “honorable” support.

7. I believe at next meeting we should continue phraseology of confident great power, rather than swapping invective for invective, at least yet. If character of exchange is to alter for worse it should be of their making. At same time within this frame there is room for bluntness, and among other things we may wish indicate we not interested in elementary course in Marxist maxims in these serious talks.

8. Wang has penchant for ad libbing, and I may be forced to do more of this myself than has been necessary in past, although I have all along tried to tailor my remarks to the requirements of the moment.

9. Vientiane’s 491 to Department³ arrived after meeting.

Cabot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
2. Document 52.
3. Dated September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)