51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Mac—
September 17 Planning Lunch (regular members only) again took up question of how to cope with ChiCom nuclear explosion.2 Rowen gave a [Page 97] powerful counter-argument to the “temperate” approach proposed by the interdepartmental planning group chaired by Bob Johnson. Rowen saw many people taking an “excessively cheery” view, primarily because they were thinking too much in short-run terms. True, the ChiComs wouldn’t have much of a nuclear capability for a long time; true, they wouldn’t suddenly launch new aggressions simply because they had a rudimentary capability; true, there might not be any profound panic reactions from other Asians.
But the longer term implications, say over a 15-year period, were horrendous. Harry noted that the first Soviet nuclear explosion had occurred 15 years ago this month; look at the growth in Soviet power in the following 15 years. Even the first Soviet test might have affected Stalin’s decision to launch the Korean war. In any event, the staggering growth in Soviet capabilities over the last 15 years had had an immense effect on our policies, postures, defense budget, etc. Granted that China today has a much feebler resource base than the USSR had in 1949; on the other hand the ChiComs might be even more adventuresome once they went nuclear than the Soviets had been. There was no reason why the ChiComs could not develop even crude ICBMs in 15 years. As for the external effects of Peiping’s going nuclear, these would entail greatly increased pressure on us for new aid commitments, and major counter-efforts on the part of those Asians who felt themselves menaced. Most immediately, India could probably go nuclear in a year. As for the US, a growing ChiCom capability might be the deciding factor driving us into a $30 billion AICBM program or a huge civil defense effort. Yet another risk was that the ChiComs might be freer than we or the Russians in handing around nuclear technology; they had already hinted at this to Nasser.
What could we do? Rowen thought it technically feasible to destroy the two key ChiCom installations by a limited non-nuclear air attack. We could (a) handle this as a completely open matter and justify it at the time; or (b) seize on any opportunity created, say by a major blow-up in SEA; or (c) make a secret attack. In the latter case, it was quite possible that Peiping would prefer to say nothing about it. Such a spoiling operation would gain us a 2–5 year delay, and also deter ChiCom rebuilding. How valuable were 2–5 years? To Rowen they could be quite important.
What about reactions? The Soviets would approve privately, but might have to raise a to-do publicly. However, there was a chance we could bring them around in advance. The ChiComs might go for a tit-for-tat response, though it wasn’t clear where they could do so effectively. In the rest of the world there would be considerable fear—also some feeling that the US was punishing a smaller power for getting into the nuclear business. Was this necessarily bad, however? Moreover, initial fears might quickly turn to relief once the crisis seemed to pass.
[Page 98]Rostow suggested that if we and the Soviets had just moved toward some big arms control agreement (say an unlimited test ban), the fact that we were going in this direction would create an optimum atmosphere for US pre-emption to forestall nuclear proliferation by Peiping.
Bob Johnson’s rebuttal was that the Soviet-ChiCom analogy was weak; the ChiComs were a lot less further along today than the Soviets were 15 years ago. Moreover, the ChiCom explosion wouldn’t change much, except psychologically. The US would still have great nuclear superiority as a deterrent, and perhaps an effective counter-force capability. The ChiComs would have to take into account possible pre-emptive US action if they brandished missiles in a crisis or at the least assume a disproportionate US retaliation if ChiComs used nucs. He queried whether US decisions on civil defense or ALCBMs were so sensitive to a ChiCom capability as Rowen indicated. (I commented that the more likely problem was that a ChiCom capability might trigger Soviet CD or ALCBM programs, which in turn might trigger us.)
Johnson found the stimulus to proliferation the strongest argument for pre-empting the ChiComs. But we should look at what other options we had besides pre-emption. Various arms control and propaganda programs, as well as new US commitments, could greatly limit the ChiCom impact. Moreover, would pre-empting the ChiComs prevent proliferation by other powers? Countries such as Israel would have their own reasons for going nuclear regardless of what China did. Finally, a one-time attack wouldn’t do the job. It would only buy us some delay. To repeat the performance two or three times would be very difficult for the US.
Harriman’s contribution was that we ought to have serious discussions with the Soviets on the ChiCom nuclear problem right after the election.
It was also brought out that the ChiComs already have overwhelming conventional superiority over their neighbors. So would other Asians be materially more scared of ChiCom power than they are already? Rostow and I mentioned the “precedent” problem. Would preemption of ChiComs encourage Nasser to take out Israeli nuclear facilities? Would it encourage the Soviets to play similar games?
Rostow questioned Rowen’s proposition that the ChiComs might become much more aggressive once they had A-bombs. With nuclear weapons comes caution. The Soviets advanced less after they had gone nuclear than before. They were more cautious in the 1959–61 Berlin crisis than in 1948–49. As soon as the ChiComs got nuclear weapons, they’d have to worry lest we might be more inclined to use nucs against them in a local conflict. So a ChiCom nuclear capability might actually operate to make the ChiComs more cautious. Others present thought Rowen had taken the best case for our pre-emptive capability, and the worst case for [Page 99] what the ChiComs would do if we didn’t pre-empt. Rowen gladly conceded the point.
Rostow summed up by saying that if the ChiComs attacked in SEA, then we had an overwhelming case for pre-emption. As to the other case, we should keep looking at it, particularly in the context of whether we could arrive at a broader modus vivendi with the Soviets about Germany, arms control, etc. If we and the Soviets could isolate the ChiComs in this way, by getting world opinion on our side, then the reaction to pre-emption would be considerably less. However, WWR didn’t see Khru-shchev prepared to go this far for quite a while yet.
There was an interesting aside when WWR asked Helms his view. Dick said he had raised this question several times at the White House and had been told to “keep his mouth shut.” He pointed the finger at me and I said that I’d in effect been shut up too, but that you seemed to have no objection to PG discussion. I suspect that several of those present concluded that some planning was probably afoot on this matter. If so, or if there ought to be, the best cover for it might be simply to put out the word that we’ve taken a negative decision on the matter.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing—China. Top Secret. A marginal note in Bundy’s handwriting reads: “Very interesting. McGB.“↩
- Rostow’s report of the meeting is in a memorandum of September 21 to Rusk. (Ibid.) A paper by Robert H. Johnson entitled “Some ‘Unorthodox’ Approaches to the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation,” drafted on May 28, was sent to Planning Group members with a September 11 memorandum from Rostow. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Chronological File, Schedules and Briefing Material) Rostow’s memorandum states that a memorandum by Henry Rowen of the International Security Affairs Office in the Department of Defense was to be circulated. A copy of Rowen’s paper, entitled “Doing Something About Communist China’s Nuclear Program,” September 15, was sent to Rostow on September 16. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, China)↩