41. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Possibility of an Emergency Warsaw Meeting
Regardless of how Peking and Hanoi respond to our air strikes, I think we should consider the advisability of an emergency Warsaw meeting as soon as possible between Cabot and Wang. (A precedent: the [Page 76] Chicoms called for a special session in the Taiwan Straits build-up of 1962.)
The purpose of such a meeting would be to make clear to the Chinese once again that we have no desire to expand the war but are willing to do so if forced by their actions and those of Hanoi. I realize that we have tried to make this point in a number of ways over the past few months. However, our air strikes and our dramatic and visible build-up in Southwest Pacific may well combine, despite our best intentions, to communicate a significantly different message: one of U.S. determination to destroy the North Vietnam regime and even to strike Hainan and South China.
So far, the Chinese have appeared to be opposed to escalation of the conflict; they also appear to have believed that we are similarly opposed. Their relatively cautious pattern of response seems to bear this out. Once they conclude that our objectives have changed, however, this can produce a basic shift in their own thinking and actions. In such altered circumstances, they might well consider taking any pre-emptive actions available to them (i.e. air or naval attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin and a full-scale southward thrust of their own armed forces) on the assumption that all-out war was in the offing anyway.
In short, it seems to me imperative that where misinterpretation and miscalculation may well produce rashness rather than caution, we should move to use any channel of communication available to us. With such potential targets as Port Wallut so close to the Chinese border, the burden of communication rests with us. We have communicated to all other governments; we should not neglect our prime adversary.
The Warsaw channel was re-opened on July 29th; Ambassador Cabot is now in Washington. He could be thoroughly briefed and flown right back to Warsaw, if we decided to call such a meeting.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Cabot-Wang Talks. Secret.↩
- A note in Komer’s handwriting on the source text reads as follows: “Mac—I’m less concerned than Jim that Chicoms or Hanoi will misinterpret. Nor do I see merit in reassuring them just now. But I do see value in using Warsaw for communicating our real purposes. RWK.”↩