Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

334. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 21, 1968, 7–10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Boris Davydov, Second Secretary, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
• Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman

Shortly before the end of an otherwise social evening, Mr. Davydov asked me if I had read the January issue of Foreign Affairs. Assuming that he was referring to the Kissinger article, I replied “Yes”, and asked what he thought of that article. He said that it was the clearest exposition he had seen, but that the article which interested him most was Anatole Shub’s, which while primarily discussing Czechoslovakia, concluded by advocating a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. I told him that I had only read half of that article and had not reached the portion about China.

Davydov said that it was no secret that the Soviet Union was greatly concerned over the possibility of a U.S.-Chinese alliance. He said he could understand our desire to react to Czechoslovakia and he appreciated the ineffectiveness of any possible U.S. counter-move in Europe. Nonetheless, he stated, an attempt to form a U.S.-Chinese alliance would be extremely dangerous and he expressed the hope that I could make this point to anyone of influence I knew in the next Administration. (Davydov is aware of my current connection with Henry Kissinger.)

Davydov stated that any attempt by us to greatly improve our relations with the Chinese and move them towards an alliance with us against the Soviet Union would, of necessity, even if successful, take four to six years. During this period, any hope of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations would be completely impossible. Furthermore, Davydov claimed that we should not be as confident as Shub was—that the eventual victors in the struggle for power in China would be willing to enter an anti-Soviet alliance. He said that while Mao was capable of entering into an anti-Soviet alliance, he would not think that someone like Chou En-Lai would be willing to do so.

In Asia, Davydov thought the Soviet Union would attempt to counter a U.S. move towards China by increased efforts to induce Japan to give up its American alliance. In Europe, he could not rule out the possibility of Soviet use of military force. I asked him where military force could be used and he replied, Germany. I stated that I found it hard to take this seriously since military moves in Germany would at the least bring us to the edge of nuclear war. He replied that Western analysts were not the only ones who were impressed with the efficiency of the Soviet move in Czechoslovakia—that the Soviet military was also feeling confident as a result of their success.

Davydov again told me how distressed he was at Shub’s recommendation. He said he was aware that some American officials had wanted the USG to bluff a reconciliation with China in order to scare the Soviet Union, but that Shub was recommending not a bluff but a real reconciliation. While he described Shub as a brash young man, he gave weight to the fact that his article had been printed in Foreign Affairs. Davydov implied that Shub might be expelled from Moscow in retaliation for his extremely provocative article.

Davydov said that the Soviet Union had been confident that the Johnson Administration would not try to play the dangerous game of U.S.-Chinese reconciliation. He asked whether I could give him any indication of my estimate of the policy that the Nixon Administration was likely to follow. I told him that I was unable to even hazard a guess. He asked if we could discuss the matter further in the near future. (The conversation ended abruptly as it became obvious that Davydov’s seven-year-old son was over-tired.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential. Drafted by Davidson. The meeting took place in Davidson’s apartment in Washington.