333. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- The Revolutionary Committee and Its Conservative Influence
The attack on the institutions of provincial administration and control during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution left Peking with an enormous task of reconstructing party and government authority. Considerable progress has been made in building a formal framework, but effective government still eludes Peking in many areas.
In theory, the Revolutionary Committees inherited the functions and authority of the former governing bodies, but in practice authority in most provinces rests overwhelmingly with the military. Earlier political struggles have left a legacy of factionalism in the body politic which in some provinces, notably in Western China, results in persistent disruptive activity. The new committees are especially weak in the instruments of control—police, propaganda media, etc. Lawlessness continues to pose serious problems although less so as time goes by. In most of Eastern China at least the Army’s new get tough mandate has led to widespread arrests, mass trials, and often summary executions.
It took 20 months of wrangling to reach agreement on the selection of officials to run all 29 Revolutionary Committees. The first six committees were dominated by Maoist militants, but these have all given trouble and members have already been purged in four of them. With one or two exceptions, the 23 committees later formed have been headed by conservatives—military officers or “rehabilitated” old-line party officials. Military officers head 19 of the 29 provincial committees, and in 13 their first vice chairmen are also military men.
Although the Revolutionary Committee as an institution was originally created as a “provisional authority,” official pronouncements indicate a general consensus that something built around the Revolutionary Committee will take on permanence as an institution of government. The committees are viewed as a core of a new structural form for the party and their conservative influence is likely to be strong in the revitalization of the party life.
The struggle between those who were on opposing sides during the Cultural Revolution is likely to be bitter and will pose a major obstacle to [Page 726] rebuilding the power structure. Recent reports of investigation into the “class backgrounds” of party cadres being considered for key posts reflect the intensive political infighting which can be expected over the personnel issue.
Almost every day that passes, however, brings added indication that something like pre-Cultural Revolution “normalcy” is returning to at least Peking’s style. In other words, conservative provincial power realities are being reflected in Peking. Attached is one of the more interesting of these indicators.2 The contrast between Chou En-Lai’s speech on the observation of Albania’s Liberation Day and the Albanian presentation is interesting. The latter appears anachronistic—more suited to the Cultural Revolution climate of some months ago. In Chou’s remarks, he all but ignores Mao’s thought and the Cultural Revolution, and completely ignores Vietnam.
I am beginning to think that the time may be near when we might profitably give another signal (a minor but clear one) to Peking that it has policy alternatives in our regard, when and if it is seriously ready to meet some of the prerequisites. I think the presentation at the February 20 meeting must be prepared with special care. It may be, too, that we could quietly tidy up the FAC regulations. The somewhat larger but still modest economic package contemplated some weeks ago, died with the added burden of the Czechoslovak invasion. I plan to discuss FAC again at State, unless you see fit to deflect me.