Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, November 2, 1968, 1908Z.

266124. Joint State/Defense. Ref: A. State 242120;² B. Taipei 4806;³ C. Taipei 4822;⁴ D. CINCPAC 191150Z, Oct. 68 (NOTAL).⁵

1. Despite President Chiang’s personal involvement in GRC request for F–4C squadron, we do not think Country Team recommendation Para 3 Ref C advisable. We agree with Country Team observation that Chiang’s interest may be motivated more by reasons of prestige and desire to obtain some reaffirmation of US defense commitment, than by anticipated military needs. We do not believe, however, that present circumstances or specific issue Chiang has chosen make it advisable or appropriate for President to be responsive to such interest.

2. You are requested therefore to convey to MinDef Chiang following USG response to President Chiang’s specific requests:

(a) USG has given most careful and high-level consideration to President Chiang’s request that F–4C squadron be provided GRC. USG fully shares President Chiang’s desire maintain and improve air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores and wishes to continue consult closely with GRC on best means of meeting that priority requirement within resources available to both sides. In view strict limitation on grant MAP funds, USG unable on that basis provide F–4C squadron to CAF. Moreover, the USG cannot advise purchase by GRC in view of exceedingly high costs of F–4C aircraft and the resultant impact such purchase would have on GRC defense budget. Further, other less costly additions to the air defense system are more readily available in the near term, e.g., F–5’s and package of 34 F–100’s.

(b) With respect to President Chiang’s request that USAF station F–4C squadron on Taiwan on permanent basis, USG does not consider that at this time the situation relating to air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores would justify such deployment, particularly in view of current operational requirements. Proposal to provide temporary and intermittent presence in Taiwan of high performance fighters through remainder of 1968 was made after careful study in an effort to be as responsive as possible to GRC’s concern. If GRC does not believe this would serve our mutual defense purposes, USG would of course not wish proceed further with plans for such deployment.

3. At time you convey our response to MinDef Chiang, we believe it would be useful to provide him opportunity for detailed review of points previously made to him and President Chiang by Ambassador and CHMAAG. For that purpose, suggest you consider a joint representation to include CHMAAG and COMUSTDC. Additionally, based on General Warren’s conversation with the President, it appears that he may not be fully informed on aircraft characteristics and performance. In your conversation with the MinDef, it is suggested that you invite his attention to the fact that the US has provided three squadrons of F–104G interceptor aircraft, and in June of this year provided seven additional F–104G’s to maintain the air defense capability which President Chiang discussed as the basis for his F–4 request. In this regard, these have a MACH 2 speed and are designed to support the very air defense mission which apparently constituted the basis of the President’s concern.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Admiral Shepard, Colonel Ridge, and Lieutenant General Warren of DOD/ISA, Brigadier General Glick and Colonel Mayland of the Joint Staff; and approved by Winthrop Brown. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CHMAAG Taiwan, COMUSTDC, and Hong Kong.
2. Document 327.
3. In telegram 4806 from Taipei, October 11, Charge Dean reported that Chiang Ching-kuo had reiterated the GRC request for a squadron of F–4C’s and for the stationing of a U.S. squadron of F–4C’s on Taiwan as an interim measure. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT)
4. Telegram 4822 from Taipei, October 14, conveyed the Country Team’s recommendation that President Johnson send a letter to President Chiang reiterating the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan but explaining that other requirements made it impossible to provide a squadron of F–4C’s to the GRC or to station one on Taiwan. (Ibid.)
5. Not found.
6. Dean reported in telegram 5093 from Taipei, November 8, that he, accompanied by COMUSTDC Admiral Chew and General Ciccolella, had delivered the U.S. response to Chiang Ching-kuo on November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT)