Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, September 20, 1968, 1903Z.

242120. Joint State/Defense message. Refs: (A) Taipei 4374;² (B) Taipei 4363;³ (C) Taipei 4130;⁴ (D) Taipei 4047;⁵ (E) Taipei 4044;⁶ (F) State 228356;⁷ (G) CINCPAC 250955Z Aug 68 (NOTAL), (H) CINCPAC 082315Z Sept 68.⁸

1. Reftels and other reports of USG officials’ conversations with President Chiang and MinDef Chiang Ching-kuo make clear importance GRC leadership has placed on obtaining at least a minimum USG gesture of concern for strengthening air defense capabilities in Taiwan Strait area. Defense Minister Chiang’s Sept. 3 remarks to Ambassador (ref B) pinned rationale for request for F–4’s on GRC’s assessment of increased threat to Offshores, with CCK estimate that threat would begin lessening in November. Other conversations, however, have not limited rationale exclusively to Offshores situation.

2. We concur entirely in Country Team and CINCPAC (ref H) judgment that GRC concern for possibility ChiCom attack on Offshores is unsubstantiated by any hard intelligence. At same time, we agree with Embassy recommendation (ref C) on desirability of some minimal positive response to GRC demarche, particularly in view actual and psychological effect of reduced MAP on maintenance GRC air defense capability.

3. We concur therefore in responding to GRC along lines of Country Team and CINCPAC’s recommendation (ref G). We believe that intermittent and temporary rotation of limited number of high performance fighters during remainder of 1968 should be sufficient to meet situation created by GRC representations in recent months. In any event, it is maximum possibility in view other requirements.

4. In making this gesture, it is essential that we ensure that GRC does not misconstrue our response as implying either (a) agreement with its estimate of the likelihood of a ChiCom attack or (b) any commitment to defend the Offshore Islands. Rather, our response must be within context of our intention and ability to meet our treaty commitment to defense of Taiwan and Pescadores. We also wish continue to avoid any increase in US military presence which suggests we regard Taiwan as permanent base.

5. We believe it appropriate that our response to President Chiang’s personal concern for this matter be conveyed to MinDef Chiang. In absence Amb. McConaughy, we leave to your discretion choice of channel for that purpose. Subject to Amcon Hong Kong’s comments (para 6 below), you requested make following presentation of US position, with details to be coordinated directly with CINCPAC:

a) USG has given close attention to assessments of current situation provided us by President Chiang and Minister of Defense. As we have previously stated, we would welcome receiving any indications GRC may obtain of increased Communist threat in Strait area, but on basis of evidence available to us, we cannot conclude that any significant increased threat now exists. We will, of course, keep this situation under closest scrutiny.

b) We appreciate, however, problems posed by reduction grant MAP, particularly for CAF, and wish to continue to work closely with GRC to make most efficient possible use of resources available to both sides. We have, therefore, carefully considered President Chiang’s requests in light of our mutual concern to maintain and strengthen air defense of Taiwan and Pescadores.

c) As already indicated by CHMAAG and Ambassador McCon-aughy, as well as by Secretary Rusk, we unable to provide squadron of F–4C’s to CAF as requested, not only because of high cost this aircraft in relation to limited MAP funds and already heavy burden GRC defense budget, but in view fact that existing undeferrable requirements for this aircraft already exceed availability of F–4C’s.

d) It also not feasible to provide US rotational F–4C squadron in Taiwan. We are prepared, however, to provide temporary and intermittent presence in Taiwan of high performance fighters at less than squadron strength during the remainder of 1968. We would anticipate that during this three-month period from four to eight such aircraft would be present for approximately six days a month for training with the 327th Air Division subject to agreement with the GRC for utilization of GRC missile, gunnery and bombing ranges and other related facilities such as emergency jettison area and air space for GCI training. We are prepared to discuss necessary arrangements for such deployment at earliest GRC convenience.

e) We would not wish to give any publicity to this temporary and intermittent deployment and believe that it should be treated in low key as routine procedure with GRC agreement that US respond to any public inquiries concerning this matter.

6. For Hong Kong—We do not believe that limited action we have in mind will evoke any significant Chinese Communist reaction, recalling that similar and somewhat more visible action in 1966 created no problem in this regard. Would appreciate your comments soonest, however.⁹

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Shoesmith; cleared by Kreisberg, Dennis F. Aughavin of G/PM–MASP, Barnett, Godley, Steadman, Lieutenant General Warren in DOD/ISA/OMA, Colonel Ridge in DOD/ISA, Major General Orwat in Joint Staff/J–5, and Brigadier General Banning in Joint Staff/J–3; and approved by Brown. Also sent to CHMAAG, USTDC, and Hong Kong, and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CSAF, CNO, CMC, CSA, 327 AD, and 5th AF.
2. Telegram 4374 from Taipei, September 5, reported that despite the concern manifested by Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo of a possible Communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu, there was little hard intelligence confirming any basis for this fear. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)
3. Telegram 4363 from Taipei, erroneously dated August 5, reported a September 3 conversation between McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)
4. Telegram 4130 from Taipei, August 16, reported receipt of a message from President Chiang asking if there had been any response to his August 2 request for a squadron of F4C’s. (Ibid., DEF 1 CHINAT)
5. Telegram 4047 from Taipei, August 10, reported an August 8 conversation between General Ciccolella and Chiang Chiang-kuo. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 4044 from Taipei, August 10, was a summary report of the August 8 conversation between Ciccolella and Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid.)
7. See footnote 2, Document 325.
8. Neither found.
9. Telegram 8800 from Hong Kong, September 21, agreed that the proposed deployment was not likely to provoke any significant Chinese Communist reaction. It noted, however, that this and other steps could have a cumulative effect and observed that the U.S. interest “in preserving status quo Taiwan problem” would be best served by avoiding any suggestion that, in the absence of indications of Communist preparations for hostile action, the United States was developing Taiwan into a U.S. operational base. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)