Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

322. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, August 3, 1968, 0910Z.

3967. Subject: Conversation with President Chiang on MAP matters. Ref: Taipei 3963.²

1. During call General R.H. Warren, Director Military Assistance ISA, on President Chiang on August 2, to my disappointment President did not take up matter of reduction level of GRC armed forces. Instead he concentrated exclusively on major pitch for one squadron F4C planes, following up original request made to me on July 15 (Taipei 3761).³ Gimo asked that decision be made by U.S. “within few weeks”, terming matter one of highest priority and great urgency.

2. Gimo asserted repeatedly that maintenance of GRC air superiority over ChiComs in Taiwan Strait area was an imperative necessity. He was convinced that air superiority once lost could almost certainly never be regained, even with later U.S. assistance. He recalled that air superiority had enabled GRC to emerge victorious in Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. Loss of air superiority now would have serious psychological and morale repercussions, apart from purely military considerations. Communists would be emboldened if they no longer feared GRC Air Force and almost certainly would embark on new aggressions, most likely against Offshore Islands or main island of Taiwan itself. If the Communists should achieve the capability of interdicting the supply lines between Taiwan and Offshores, consequences would be highly prejudicial to GRC defense.

3. Gimo observed that ChiComs already have three very disturbing capabilities which they are reserving mainly for use against Taiwan, viz.: short range missiles, submarines capable of operating effectively in Taiwan Strait, and MIG-21s. He asserted that ChiComs are now building MIG-21s in increasing numbers and balance of air power will soon be shifted in their favor if GRC Air Force not strengthened with some high capability ultra-modern planes, namely F4Cs. Gimo noted that while F5 remains principal reliance Chinese Air Force, it cannot match the MIG-21, and he feels a few higher performance planes are essential to spearhead CAF capability to counter MIG-21, threat and maintain deterrent posture toward ChiComs.

4. Gimo emphasized favorable geographical situation of Taiwan as central point along China periphery. Strength based on Taiwan can be readily redeployed either to S.E. Asia or to Korea. He would think of F4Cs on Taiwan as being an asset for overall allied position, and not solely for benefit or GRC.

5. Gimo said that GRC forces on Kinmen, Matsu and Taiwan itself directly tie down 500,000 ChiCom troops along coastal areas opposite Taiwan Strait and indirectly one million additional forces farther inland. The neutralization of this large Chinese Communist force could not be maintained if air superiority is lost. Also CCK and other air bases on Taiwan which would be essential for use of U.S. Air Force in event of general area hostilities could be readily knocked out by ChiComs if they obtained air superiority.

6. Gimo concluded that all these considerations added up to compelling need at earliest possible date for supplying GRC Air Force with squadron of F4Cs and he pleaded for an expeditious decision by Departments of Defense and State.

7. General Warren expressed sympathetic understanding of President Chiang’s interest in highly modern aircraft as a means of maintaining needed air superiority. At same time he pointed out difficulties related to funds, availability of planes, Congressional attitudes and undeferrable requirements of S.E. Asia and other high priority exposed areas. All of this made it unlikely that planes so costly and scarce as F4Cs could be allocated to GRC in present circumstances. However he promised to relay President’s request to Washington and see that it was carefully examined in Defense.

8. General Ciccolella in response to query from the President said he agreed with the President’s analysis of military situation and need for maintaining GRC air superiority. (He did not have opportunity to spell out his reasons for believing that delivery of F4Cs to GRC is not a realistic possibility at this stage. But he intends to elaborate his views fully to Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo next week.)

9. I told President Chiang that without debating merits of F4C request at this time, I felt compelled to express my strong misgivings at the development of a requirement so appallingly expensive that if filled it would leave little or no GRC resources for agreed high priority items of military materiel—many of which have already been programmed after careful planning. I felt there was need for maintenance of a balanced defense structure and that one exceedingly expensive new item should not be allowed to exclude many other high priority items which were essential to a balanced defense force structure. I said the pressing problem before us was to determine how to cover the most essential defense requirements for all services within the strict limits of U.S. and Chinese resources available for defense purposes.

10. The President replied that according to an old Chinese proverb, “First things first.” He considered that air superiority took priority over everything else and he would not himself go into the matter of priorities for competing items which in his view would not have the same urgency as the F4C.

11. At close of meeting, President made formal request that as an interim measure while F4C request is being considered, U.S. station one squadron of USAF F4Cs on Taiwan as a deterrent to ChiComs. While he would want these planes based on Taiwan, they would of course be available from this central point for use wherever needed in the East Asian area. (N.B., later in evening Minister Chiang Ching-kuo sent word to Gens. Warren and Ciccolella that Pres. Chiang had not meant to insist that any USAF squadron stationed on Taiwan must consist of F4Cs. Any type of plane chosen by USAF would be welcome.)

12. General Warren is telegraphing to Sec Def a supplementary report of this conversation, with a fuller summary of his remarks to President Chiang.

13. Embassy will submit analysis, comments and recommendations next week after I have seen Chiang Ching-kuo again and endeavored to get force reduction back on the tracks.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 CHINAT. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and to the Department of Defense.
2. In telegram 3963 from Taipei, August 2, McConaughy reported a conversation that day with Chiang Ching-kuo, who for the first time had intimated willingness to discuss the possibility of reduction of GRC military forces. Chiang stated that he had been holding important discussions with General Ciccolella in which he had recognized the need to review the strength of GRC armed forces; he thought modernization of military equipment might make it possible to maintain a high state of combat capability while decreasing force levels. (Ibid.)
3. Document 319.