Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

321. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–3–68

Washington, August 1, 1968.

COMMUNIST CHINA’S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

The Problem

To assess the impact of Communist China’s political turmoil on its military establishment and to estimate the capabilities of the general purpose and air defense forces.

Conclusions

A. Communist China’s armed forces (known collectively as the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)) have been drawn deeply into the political turmoil that has afflicted China for the past two and a half years. The PLA has taken on heavy responsibilities for police and public security work and has acquired a wide variety of administrative and control functions in the economy and government.

B. The PLA has also undergone a heavy purge, especially of its top echelons. Line combat units have so far largely escaped the purges. The PLA itself has been divided at various levels and buffeted by the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Thus far the PLA has taken its cue from the political leaders of the country, but in general it has emerged as a moderate force loosely aligned with the government bureaucracy and others whose primary concern is with order, stability, and national security.

C. Political factionalism, the general deterioration of social order in China, and the many extra duties that have been imposed on the PLA have degraded Chinese military capabilities largely in terms of readiness, morale, and discipline. But in situations where China’s vital interests were at stake, many of the ill effects of the Cultural Revolution could probably be fairly quickly overcome. Units, equipment, and the command structure remain intact, and defensive dispositions are largely unimpaired. Thus the PLA could provide a strong defense of the mainland and would be capable of effective military operations should the exist-ence of the Communist regimes in North Vietnam and North Korea be threatened.

D. Conceivably the political, social, and economic situation could deteriorate to the point where the PLA’s combat effectiveness would suffer severe damage. On the other hand, a consistent trend toward moderation could enable it to regain full effectiveness within a fairly short time. On balance, we believe that the situation will not get so bad that the PLA would be unable to maintain a capability to function as a fighting force; nevertheless, much of its time and energy will continue to be diverted by nonmilitary activity and political stress. For the coming year at least, the power and authority of the PLA are likely to increase. Peking will be dependent on the PLA as the only effective instrument of control, and the military will probably play a significant role in the political reorganization currently in process.

E. Except for the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, there have been few developments in China’s general purpose and air defense forces of great significance during the past year. Positioning of Chinese forces has changed little and continues to reflect concern with defense. The Chinese have not given a high priority to equipment programs that would improve China’s ability to project its power over long distances outside its borders. The limitations of China’s economic and technical capacities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient in modern equipment at least until well into the 1970’s.

F. Nevertheless, the modernization program for the air defense and general purpose forces is moving ahead gradually on a fairly broad front along the following lines:

1. The Army. Chinese combat units vary considerably in quality and strength, but their firepower is increasing with the addition of more medium tanks and artillery. The levels of equipment the Chinese seem to be aiming at cannot be reached throughout the army much before 1975. No significant increase in the number of combat units is anticipated, although some increase in manpower might occur in response to the army’s assumption of widened civil responsibilities.

2. Air. A growing inventory of Mig-19 fighters, addition of better radar, and a slow deployment program for surface-to-air missiles are improving China’s air defense. We continue to believe that the Chinese will produce a new fighter, and we now believe that the chances are about even that it will be the Mig-21. If the Chinese do not intend to produce this aircraft, it would be four or five years before a fighter significantly more advanced than the Mig-19 could be available. There has been no significant change in the tactical strike and air support capabilities of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force.

3. The Navy. Production of R-class submarines and guided missile patrol boats continues, but at a slower rate than had been anticipated. Other types of patrol and torpedo boats are being turned out in considerable numbers and deployment of a coastal defense cruise-missile system seems to be picking up pace.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet states that it was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on August 1 except the FBI representative, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.