Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

319. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 17, 1968, 1030Z.

3761. Subject: MAP aspects of Gimos’s July 15 conversation with Ambassador. Ref: A) State 201378;² B) Taipei 3730.³

1. During latter part of conversation reported Ref B, President Chiang turned to discussion of U.S. military assistance to GRC generally. After referring to the imminent ChiCom threat he considered to be posed to the Offshores, the Gimo observed that the defense capability of the GRC was “far from adequate” and needed to be expeditiously improved.

2. Stating that he was not making any formal request for increased military aid from the United States, he added that he hoped that all defense items, the supply of which had already been agreed upon by the two governments, could be delivered as soon as possible. He thought it urgent that Nike-Hercules and Hawk ground-to-air missiles be expeditiously supplied in increased numbers in order to help face the ChiCom threat.

3. Speaking of the MAP program in general, the President observed that U.S. military aid to the Republic of China during the next fiscal year was expected to fall below the U.S. fifty million dollar level. This, he said, was “too little”. Even with the favorable U.S. policy on credit sales, the total available would be “not adequate”. He expressed his hope that I would pass on these statements as “a casual remark”.

4. I promised to do so, but took the opportunity to review briefly the recent Congressional mood on military aid generally and to mention the other programs of the U.S. Government—such as expediting credit sales, aiding the GRC in its own military production capabilities, and transferring some used equipment from Vietnam and elsewhere—all of which should help to meet GRC needs.

5. When discussing the danger of imminent ChiCom attack on the Offshore Islands, President Chiang emphasized at several points the urgent need to revise Plan Rochester. I noted that TDC and MAAG, and CINCPAC were presently working with the Ministry of National Defense and other interested GRC agencies on the first draft of a prospective revision.

6. Mentioning the growing Chinese Communist Air Force capability, the President expressed his hope that by next year the GRC would have at least one squadron of the latest model high capability fighter planes—such as recently supplied Korea. (Later discussion revealed that the plane in question was the F4C Phantom.) I remarked that the F5 planes now in use and programmed in larger numbers, appear to be very appropriate, efficient and relatively economical for the GRC’s requirements. The Gimo responded that the F5 was good, and he appreciated our current efforts to make it available to the GRC but he wished to reiterate that he still felt that one squadron of the higher capacity fighters to lead the Chinese Air Force would greatly help the morale in his armed forces and the ability of the CAF to repel a Communist attack. He suggested that perhaps there should be some reallocation of resources, if necessary, to make this possible.

7. The President noted that while the GRC had not contributed troops to Vietnam, it was shouldering a major responsibility by tying down Communist troops on the South China coast. The level of military aid, he hoped, would be determined with this consideration in mind.

8. Comment: President Chiang’s remarks at this meeting were among the most direct that the GRC has thus far made about recent MAP cuts. For the first time, the GRC at a high level has officially labeled our anticipated Military Assistance Program as “not adequate”. By inference, the Gimo was apparently drawing a comparison between the level of U.S. military assistance to his own government and that being provided to Korea. The Gimo apparently was seeking by this means to underscore the significance he felt the U.S. should give GRC efforts in the Far East, including in particular its contribution in reducing pressures or potential pressures on the U.S. position in Vietnam by immobilizing large numbers of ChiCom troops opposite Taiwan Strait.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Document 318.
3. McConaughy reported in telegram 3730 from Taipei, July 15, that he had delivered Rusk’s message to Chiang, who had accepted the decision but urged that some of the reassurance reflected in the message be incorporated in some forthcoming high-level official speech. Chiang expressed continuing concern about a possible attack on the Offshore Islands and stated that the people of Asia did not doubt U.S. policy in Vietnam but were “haunted” by the memory of the 1946 Marshall mission to China. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)