Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

257. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, May 5, 1967, 1223Z.

CAP 67379. Herewith a summary of a major USIB appraisal of Communist China’s military policy and non-nuclear forces.

I thought you would wish to read it over the weekend.²

Communist China’s military policy and its general purpose and air defense forces.

The problem.

To assess Communist China’s general military policy and to estimate the strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces through 1969.

Conclusions.

A. Whatever the outcome of the current political crisis, any Chinese leadership will probably continue to work towards a dominant position in Asia and great power status on the world scene. It will probably continue to be concerned by the danger of conflict with the US, and possibly with the USSR. Thus China will almost certainly continue to give high priority to improving its military capabilities.

B. Although the threat of force and its actual use beyond China’s borders are significant elements in Peking’s outlook, Chinese military strategy places primary emphasis on defense. With the possible exception of their nuclear/missile activities, we do not see in train the general programs, the development or deployment of forces, or the doctrinal discussions which would suggest a more forward strategy. At least for the short term, the high priority nuclear program is probably viewed by the Chinese as primarily for deterrence, though Peking’s successes in this field bring substantial prestige and political influence, particularly in Asia.

C. In our view, Chinese forces are capable of providing a strong defense of the Mainland and launching significant offensive operations in neighboring areas. Thus far the political turmoil does not seem to have affected these Chinese capabilities or military production programs in any significant way.

D. Under a broad policy of modernization, Peking is pursuing the following programs and objectives:

1. The Army. Improvement of firepower, mainly by supplying new tanks and heavier artillery. The Army’s organization and size has remained static: about 2.4 million men in 118 combat divisions of uneven quality and strength.

2. Air Defense. A growing inventory of fighters (MIG-19’s), addition of better radars, and preparations for production of the SA–2, probably as part of a point defense system for key target areas. Production of the MIG-19 continues (20–25 a month) and production of the MIG-21 is expected.

3. The Navy. Five R-class submarines have been produced and about 10 more will probably be built by 1970. A construction program for guided missile patrol boats began in 1966 and is proceeding at an estimated rate of 10 per year. The South China Fleet is being strengthened by deployment of patrol and torpedo boats and by expansion of shipbuilding and shore installations in South China.

E. Nevertheless, the limitations and demands on China’s economic and technological capacities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient in modern equipment at least into the early 1970’s. There is little prospect for a significant increase in the mobility of Chinese ground forces; the air defense system will still be unable to cope with a major air attack; fighters will be at least a generation behind the US and USSR. Naval capabilities will still be mainly limited to offshore patrol and escort.

E. The current modernization programs for conventional forces plus even a modest effort to produce and deploy advanced weapons systems will, in our view, put pressures on an already strained economy. Thus China will face an increasingly difficult problem in allocating scarce economic resources between civilian and military needs and with the military sector. Resolution of these problems may be a cause of continued dispute, both within the military and at the top level of national decision-making.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 8:30 a.m. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that President Johnson saw it.
2. The remainder of the telegram quotes in full the opening section of NIE 13–3–67, “Communist China’s Military Policy and Its General Purpose and Air Defense Forces,” May 3. A copy of the complete estimate is in the Central Intelligence Agency, NIE Files.