241. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Ascendancy of Premier Chou and His Policies
Strenuous attempts in the past ten days to reverse the alarming trend toward anarchy in China can only be interpreted as an ignominious failure of Mao’s Cultural Revolution—at least temporarily, and almost certainly for the long run as well. However, this tactical backtracking, if it can be accomplished, may save the nation from literally breaking apart.
Mao appears consistently, at each stage of his grand design to restore purity and elan to the revolution, to have underestimated the strength of his opposition. The final blow was the relative unresponsiveness of the armed forces when they were called upon some three weeks ago to support the seizure of power by “revolutionary rebels.” (No significant Maoist successes have been reported for over two weeks.) For the most part the Army has stepped in merely in attempts to restore order, and not to further the fortunes of the Maoist revolutionaries.
Not surprisingly, there has been a steady decline in the prestige of Defense Minister Lin Piao, identified with the more extreme measures of the Cultural Revolution along with Madame Mao and Cultural Revolution head Chen Po-ta.
As usual, Premier Chou En-Lai, a moderate at least in domestic policies, has timed his moves with consummate skill. In the past week he has appeared to be virtually in charge in Peking, with important directives being issued in the names of Mao and Chou—even those which ex officio Lin Piao would be expected to sign. Chou’s recent confidence, and the reinstitution of moderate policies he has advocated for the Cultural Revolution, almost certainly mean that he believes he and his pragmatic policies now have strong, and perhaps predominant, support in the armed forces.
Increasingly demonstrable damage to China’s marginal economy, stemming from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, was doubtless foremost among other factors enabling Chou and his supporters to bring about the present attempted shift away from the Mao-Lin romantically [Page 524] unrealistic program to remake Chinese society. The inexorable demands of spring planting are a staunch support to Chou in his efforts to restore reason.
No one can say whether he can be successful. The very respect for the central government has been seriously damaged, and regional interests have become both more insistent and more confident.
The tremendous amount of resentment engendered in all segments of society in this turbulence may be long in abating. The chief disadvantaged group in Chinese society is the emerging younger generation who have a secondary or higher education. They were first flattered and drummed up to revolutionary ferver, and now are told that they have acted immaturely and should go home and keep quiet. They are not likely to do the latter.
Basically underlying the party dissention which exploded last year has been the choice between technological growth and restoring revolutionary elan. The Cultural Revolution may have insured that neither choice will be available for a time: the likely prospect is for a period of political weakness in which policies will be contradictory and indecisive.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VIII. Secret. Copies were sent to Jorden and Ropa. The source text was sent to President Johnson with a February 24 covering note from Bromley Smith; a handwritten “L” on the covering note indicates that it was seen by the President.↩