240. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Opposition to Mao
The situation in China is so confused as to defy brief description. The accompanying map2 is the best that can be done by way of indicating the province-by-province situation as of today, but it does not reflect the magnitude of the confusion. It shows that most of China is still in dispute, but the significant fact is that not a single province or municipality shown as in either the pro- or anti-Mao camp is without elements of significant opposition.
I strongly suspect that the Soviets have been instigating and aiding anti-Mao resistance in Sinkiang, Manchuria and possibly Inner Mongolia.
Ever since Mao’s call to “seize power” throughout the country, there have been numerous phony power seizures, so that it has been difficult [Page 522] for anyone to tell who are the “genuine revolutionaries” and who the “enemy.” Even local military units have difficulty in identifying which of competing rival groups actually have Mao’s sanction, and which authority in the confused military chain of command to respond to.
Much of this confusion arises from the fact that the revolution itself was artificial in its inception, inasmuch as Mao imposed it from the top. Its stated objectives have been too generalized and too vacillating to afford practical guidance for consistent action, even if major elements of the society desired to further its objectives.
Mao’s opposition has eagerly added to the confusion by promoting dissention, by offering economic incentives to workers and peasants, by walking off the job, and at times by feigning support. Peking complains that many groups have “used the name of revolutionary rebel organizations falsely.” Furthermore, there is continued resistance to the few “revolutionary” organizations which have received Peking’s blessing as genuine. It is possible that their control does not extend much beyond provincial capitals.
Mao still retains the initiative, and the opposition is not broadly organized except perhaps in Tibet, Szechuan and Inner Mongolia. The atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust, and—perhaps most of all—uncertainty, now pervades the entire unhappy country. Mao has unleashed forces which are not yet ready to listen to exhortations for moderation. The Minister of Security has called on genuine revolutionaries to “put an end to armed struggle” and to “stop using loudspeakers to insult their enemies.” However, typical provincial radio comment continues to say to all “demons and monsters” that the revolutionary rebels will “resolutely suppress you and smash your dogs’ heads.”
Mao’s grand design in foreign policy of two years ago has failed completely, and it now appears that his domestic economy may well be disrupted by the Cultural Revolution as seriously as it was by the Great Leap of 1958–59.