Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

226. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, December 30, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Instructions for 132nd Warsaw Talks

Discussion

1. Attached at Tab A² are the draft instructions we have prepared for the 132nd Warsaw meeting with the Chinese Communists scheduled to take place January 11, 1967.

2. We have broached no major new themes in the current instructions. Paras 2–4 reiterate general US policy in Asia and toward Peking. Paras 5–7 discuss our policy in Southeast Asia and the Manila Conference. Para 8 expresses the hope that Peking will subscribe to the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Paras 9–10 discuss communication with and travel to Communist China. Paras 11–17 include a major review of our position on the Americans still being held by Peking. Paras 18–24 respond to anticipated ChiCom accusations against the US for provocations and alleged incidents against ChiCom territory and ships. In Para 26 we suggest that the next meeting take place between March 22 and April 12.

3. The major contingency we have allowed for is that Peking will take the initiative to move the talks or to suspend them. Paras 27–34 provide guidance for Ambassador Gronouski in dealing with several alternative actions the Chinese might take. I call your attention particularly to the proposal in Para 32 that we offer to hold a higher-level meeting (at the Under-Secretary level) with the Chinese in the event they move to suspend or break the talks. A memorandum on this proposal is attached at Tab B.

Recommendation

A) That you approve the draft instructions except for Para 32 on an Under-Secretary level meeting. (This would permit dispatch of the instructions without delay, in the event you wish to deliberate further on the desirability of Para 32.)³

or

B) That you approve the draft instructions to Amb. Gronouski, including paragraph 32. (The instructions in either case would be cleared with the White House.)⁴

Tab B⁵

IMPLICATIONS OF A HIGHER LEVEL SINO-US MEETING

1. The basic purpose of suggesting a higher-level (Deputy Under Secretary, Under Secretary or Secretary) meeting with the Chinese Communists, in the event of a move by the latter to suspend the Ambassadorial level talks, is to further assure that world public opinion unequivocally understands that the breakdown in communications is the responsibility of the Chinese. We strongly doubt Peking would agree (they publicly denounced a suggestion by Senator Mansfield earlier this year for a US-ChiCom Foreign Minister conference). Acceptance by the Chinese would strengthen the impression Peking may be most anxious to avoid, that the ChiComs are acting in collusion with the US.

2. In the unlikely event that the Chinese would agree, the talks would serve to provide a mechanism capable of restoring the suspended lines of communication between the Chinese and ourselves. In addition, there is the possibility—however slight—that the talks, on their own merits, could further our communications with the Chinese in terms of peace in Southeast Asia and increased understanding of the basic premises of our China policy.

3. The announcement that the US had proposed such a meeting, and in greater degree the holding of such a meeting if it in fact took place, would have important repercussions in a number of areas of primary concern to the United States.

(a) US Domestic—Such a move would probably be favored by a majority of Americans, as reflecting the Administration’s efforts to increase contacts with Communist China and to seek a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

(b) World Public Opinion—It should increase the credibility of our China Policy and our desire for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, and effectively place the onus on Communist China for not only the suspension of the Warsaw talks but for China’s overall isolation as well.

(c) The Soviet Union—The US initiative to “up-grade” our communications with China would probably increase the uncertainty of the USSR over what the US is up to with China. This would be true even if Peking rejects the proposal.

(d) The Republic of China—The US move would tend to be interpreted by the GRC as containing the seeds of a US deal with Peking at the cost of Taipei and as further evidence to support their suspicions that the US is prepared to “accommodate” the communists. A great deal of this potential damage to GRC confidence can, however, be avoided by frank discussions in advance of our motives and by disclosure of the bulk of the substance of the meeting if it takes place. This formula has worked well in respect to the Warsaw talks.

(e) Other East Asian Governments such as the GVN, Thailand, etc.—Same as (d) above, only to a lesser degree.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg.
2. Attached at Tab A is a copy of telegram 111764, January 3, 1967 (Document 228).
3. Rusk approved this recommendation on January 2 with the handwritten note, “W/o par 32 at this point. DR.”
4. Under “Recommendation” all the text in parentheses was written in by hand as was all except the first two words in recommendation B.
5. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Richard H. Donald of EA/ACA on December 21.