Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, November 21, 1966, 9:10 p.m.

88823. To Ambassador from Secretary. Refs: A—Taipei’s 1483; B—Taipei’s 1484.²

1. Request you make appointment with President Chiang as soon as possible to discuss with him personally our surprise and dismay at sudden GRC decision to withdraw from UN if Italian study committee resolution passed. While I leave exact language to you, I desire that in speaking to Chiang you cover these points:

2. When I was in Taipei last July, I made it clear to President Chiang that there is no need for the GRC to worry about the US policy of support but that it should join with us in focusing on contingency tactics should serious danger arise that might threaten the position of the GRC in 21st General Assembly. Until recently we had reason to hope that this danger would not arise and that need for new tactics would be avoided, at least this year. Unfortunately, early this month a decision by Government of Canada to embark on drastic new initiative on the Chinese representation question suddenly endangered our common position in GA. The Under Secretary fully reviewed the situation with Ambassador Chow November 8 and told him that we had as a result been required to support tactic of a study committee resolution phrased in such a way as not to prejudice the outcome of the committee’s work. I later personally explained reasons we felt these tactics necessary to both Ambassador Chow and FM Wei. Wei and other GRC reps have subsequently indicated to me willingness to go along with simple study committee resolution to head off the Canadians.

3. The principal reason that we have told Italians and others that we would support non-prejudicial study committee resolution is to keep ROC in the UN and prevent the passage of any resolution such as that sponsored by Albania.³ We were and are convinced that without this tactical change there would be a further erosion of support for US/GRC position on both Important Question and Albanian resolution. In our minds, the supreme objective is to assure that the Important Question passes and the Albanian resolution is defeated. After having fended off an Italian initiative last year only with difficulty, we faced this year the Canadian initiative and restiveness on the part of Belgium, Chile, Italy and others. Our support for study committee resolution was to prevent support building up for Canadian resolution. Our tactic was designed to cut the ground from under the Canadian resolution, which represented a new danger this year.

4. I am sure that Ambassador Chow and FM Wei have reported to you our vigorous efforts to divert the Canadians from introducing resolution calling for one China and one Taiwan and for seating of Peiping in the Security Council. We believe our efforts are succeeding. We have also sought to eliminate from draft resolution sponsored by Italy and others references prejudicing GRC interests. Here we have succeeded.

5. Study committee resolution which has now been submitted by Italy and others does not prejudge the outcome and does not undermine GRC’s basic position. I told FM Wei that we would not lobby for study committee resolution, although we will vote for it, and that we would strongly oppose a resolution like the one contemplated by Canada. This continues to be US position. There is, of course, no reason why GRC should not make its opposition to these proposals known in New York and we would understand if it did. But we ask most earnestly that GRC not take rash step of withdrawing from the UN if the study committee resolution passed. The Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist bloc will oppose the study committee resolution and Peking will refuse to cooperate with any such committee, so long as the Republic of China remains in the UN. But if the Republic of China withdraws from the UN, both Peking and its supporters will seize this opportunity to move into the vacancy. Thus withdrawal from the UN would accomplish the very results sought by the Albanian resolution.

6. Ambassador McConaughy has told me of the change in the GRC’s position on the study committee and of your intention to withdraw from UN should the Italian study committee resolution pass. I am surprised and dismayed at this. You will have given Peking a major victory which would enable them to pose as the sole representative of China in the eyes of the world. Withdrawal from UN would deprive GRC of international understanding and support on which it must depend in working toward fulfillment of its own basic policies. It would deal a body blow to effectiveness of UN and make position of US and GRC allies in Asia vastly more difficult. It would encourage Peking’s militancy at very time when important decisions with respect to Viet-Nam and future thrust of Peking’s policies may be in balance. GRC withdrawal from the UN would in short only help our enemies.

7. I would be misleading you if I failed to make clear in advance that the US would be most deeply disturbed by a radical action on your part which would have such far reaching consequences for the US as well as the ROC.

8. FYI: We do not wish you to raise the matter of a veto in the Security Council. If President Chiang asks about our stand, you should respond there has been no change in our previous assurances. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared by Sisco, Bundy, and Meeker; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.
2. See Document 210 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. On November 16, 11 countries including Albania submitted a draft resolution recognizing representatives of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and expelling representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. (U.N. Document A/L.496)