Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, November 23, 1966, 1515Z.

1515. ChiRep. Ref: State 88823.²

1. Herewith report of two-hour conversation with President Chiang four to six p.m. Nov 23. DCM Hummel accompanied me and on Chinese side were Madame Chiang, acting FonMin Shen, and interpreter Frederick Ch’ien. Conversation was relaxed and friendly throughout, even during Gimo’s most pointed remarks about US policy. Location was Gimo’s residence, not office, high tea was served, and absence of other top GRC officials who usually sit in on important conversations (Vice President, Secretary General, Chiang Ching-kuo) made for unusually intimate atmosphere.

2. After brief discussion of Eugene Black’s recent visit, for which Gimo expressed appreciation, I said that as GRC aware, we are now at very critical stage of ChiRep tactics in UN. Because of the possibility of divergence of views between our governments, Secretary Rusk had asked me to deliver a somewhat extended message, containing an explanation of where we now stand, how we got there, and our views of the next steps that need to be taken. I said I had been in close touch with FonMin Wei and acting FonMin Shen and we have had very helpful dialogues. My request to see Gimo therefore not any reflection on Embassy’s excellent relations with MOFA. However at this critical stage we felt it best to convey USG views directly to President Chiang. I said I had made an outline of points Secretary wished me to convey, as well as my own views, and I proposed to make six major points.

a. The history of the tactical maneuvers we have undertaken since Secretary’s visit to Taipei in July, in order to maintain the position of the GRC.

b. The reasons for our reluctant acquiescence in a simple type of study committee resolution.

c. A summary of US efforts to dissuade the Canadians, and since those efforts failed, to block the prejudicial Canadian resolution.

d. Our position on the Italian Study Committee resolution and our attitude toward the GRC reaction to that resolution.

e. The adverse consequences we see if the GRC decides to withdraw from the UN if that resolution is passed.

f. The effects on the US of a GRC withdrawal from the UN.

3. I then expanded on these points one by one, saying first that when Secretary Rusk was here in July he had assured President Chiang and others that GRC had no reason to worry about US support for Chinese position in UN. These assurances are still good today. Secretary had also said at that time US and GRC should concert their efforts closely on possible contingency tactics in case GRC position should be threatened in the UN. Until early November it seemed that the Canadians, in spite of their previous intimations that they were thinking of new moves, would adhere to past position. Then suddenly they told us they would introduce a new draft resolution, very objectionable to us, setting up a study committee and pre-judging the results of that committee’s deliberations in a preamble that in effect called for one China and one Taiwan. I said everything we have done since then in this study committee situation has been directed at stopping this very destructive resolution. I recalled that Under Secretary Katzenbach on Nov 8 had explained to Ambassador Chow reason why we felt obliged to go along with some kind of non-prejudicial study committee resolution in order to maintain votes on Albanian resolution. It had been our policy from the beginning, and it remained imperative, that we defeat that Communist resolution. Secretary Rusk had also explained to FonMin Wei and Ambassadors Chow and Liu on Nov 15 that we were far from enthusiastic about any study committee but that if victory were to be assured on the two most important resolutions, some kind of study committee resolution would have to be introduced. I reminded Gimo that Secretary Rusk had understood from FonMin Wei that GRC would stand firm and would be able to go along with a simple form of study committee, in order assist in preventing Canada’s harmful resolution from passing.

4. I said that our reasoning in this started from the premise that it was absolutely essential to keep GRC in UN. I said we had to take into account a trend of opinion among many nations in the UN that has been adverse to GRC interests in recent years and months, both among some ill-informed small new nations and also among some old established UN members who should know better. I said this trend was continuing, although it was illogical in view of present turmoil on mainland, excesses of Red Guards, and militant actions and statements from Pei-ping. In the face of this trend, and of Canadian initiative, USG no longer had power to muster a safe majority against Albanian resolution.

5. I said it was necessary, above all, to pass important question and defeat Albanian resolutions and that until destructive Canadian action we thought that there was probably a definite favorable, though narrow margin on both. After the Canadians began their maneuvering, several countries we had relied on hinted they might not be able to support US against Albanian resolution if no study committee resolution could be introduced. In order to assure enough votes on the major issues some new gesture was needed, although it should not, of course, undermine any vital GRC interest. I said we had to face the fact that we needed the cooperation of other countries in order to defeat the very bad Canadian resolution, and we have so far been successful in obtaining this cooperation. Canada has not yet introduced any counter-proposal. I emphasized that we now are reasonably confident that the order of voting will be first, important question, second the Albanian, and then a study committee. If we can get favorable votes on the first two, we will have definite protection for ourselves and for the GRC, and if we achieve this it will be because of the small concession we made in acquiescing in but not pushing, a simple study committee resolution. We had worked hard and successfully to assure that nothing in favor of two Chinas appears in the Italian resolution and we had been able to prevent other prejudicial language.

6. I said although we had failed to dissuade Canada from trying to pursue its course, we had effectively prevented other countries (Italy, Belgium, Chile) from going along with the Canadians. We believe that the simple study committee resolution now before the UN does not pre-judge the issue and does not undermine any major GRC interests. We do not like it and we know that it is an annoyance to the GRC. However, we believe that all of us should be prepared to suffer some minor annoyances in order to maintain vital interests, and particularly in light of the critical situation in the Far East. We understand and sympathize with the GRC’s strong views against any new procedure, and we appreciate that GRC feels it must oppose the study committee.

7. Gimo interrupted at this point with assertion that any study committee resolution implies the existence of two Chinas. He said if study committee resolution is passed this can mean nothing other than that there are two Chinas to be considered.

8. I repeated we understood that GRC must oppose any study committee and that there would be no problem caused between us by GRC efforts to defeat it. I said we are not going to lobby for it ourselves and we will not be sorry if it is defeated. However, I said, in order to win on the most important issues, which are in the first two resolutions, we were forced to commit ourselves passively to support a study committee. Secretary Rusk and I wish earnestly to appeal to you not to take your government out of the UN if study committee passes. In our view such a step would be rash and its consequences would be very adverse to all of us. Their full magnitude would perhaps not be apparent at first but must be carefully considered. I said we know Communist countries will oppose the study committee and Peiping can be counted on to object strongly. We are confident that Peiping will not cooperate with any study committee so long as the GRC remains in the UN and for this reason we believe that the formation of such a committee should be without serious risk to GRC. However, if GRC is out of UN, Peiping will move into the vacant China seat, if not this year then next year. Therefore in our view the departure of the GRC would have the same deeply hurtful effect as the passage of the Albanian resolution.

9. Secretary Rusk, I said, had received my report of my talk with Acting FonMin Shen November 21. He was surprised and dismayed at the statement that GRC would withdraw if study committee passed. Secretary Rusk believes that this would constitute a major victory for the Chinese Communists who would be able to pose as the sole representative of China. We believe that some naive countries would be impressed by ChiCom gain and would believe that ChiCom influence has been greatly increased. The departure of GRC from UN would inevitably tend to deprive it of the support, understanding, communication, and assist-ance which it has received from many nations and which it needs for fulfillment of its policies. The Secretary believes such a step would deal a body blow to the UN, and would cause severe problems for the US and for the Asian allies of US and GRC. It could be expected to encourage the most militant tendencies of the Chinese Communists and would come at a most inopportune time in a critical stage of the Vietnam war, when ChiCom policy decisions are believed to be hanging in the balance. In short, we are convinced that GRC withdrawal would have effect of helping our enemies and hurting us and our allies.

10. Finally, our own concern would be profound if GRC took this step which would have far-reaching adverse consequences for the US as well as for GRC.

11. I said these are Secretary’s views and he of course wants to have views of GRC. I suggested Gimo might wish to think over these points and give me his reaction later. I expressed hope that we could continue dialogue between US and GRC, concert our views, and work out a joint approach.

12. I then gave my own hope that after this difficult year in UN we might see a turn for the better. There might be more nations who would experience a revulsion against current Peiping statements and actions. I noted that Soviets were lukewarm in supporting ChiComs in UN this year and speculated that countries like Indonesia and Ghana might be able to come all the way over to our side on this issue next year. I said it is also conceivable ChiComs might take some extremely rash action that would destroy the support they presently receive from various other countries. Important thing is to get through this present year and to stand fast on the basic requirement. I said “If you can stand with us, we can win through”.

Gimo said GRC had already given serious consideration to most of these points, but he thanked me for outlining them clearly. He said GRC has thought of UN as something precious, and felt the obligations and anxieties of a founding member. He said that for this reason if GRC had to make any decision damaging to UN it would be only after careful consideration of consequences. GRC does not start only today in concern for and efforts to safeguard principles and Charter of UN; it started long ago. These efforts have been not only for the UN itself, or for GRC, but for the US also, and GRC will always be mindful of sacrifices in men and treasure made by US in WWII. I said USG also treasures its long and close association with GRC in good times and in bad.

Gimo said he fully understood what I had said, and that he appreciated sincerity of Secretary’s tactical efforts in the difficult problems of the UN. He said he was aware of the hard work done by USG in achieving present text of Italian resolution, and he understood the reasons for the US policy of passive acquiescence in a study committee. However, he said, whether the resolution passes or not is something the US can arrange.

I denied this emphatically, saying I wished it were true but that we simply do not have the power to ensure its defeat.

Gimo in characteristic fashion shrugged this off, saying that we are good friends, and so should not argue. Fact remains, he said, that “passive support” is in fact support, and that although USG says it is not lobbying, passive support has the same effect, as he had just seen a news report that after Amb. Johnson saw Shiina in Tokyo, the Japanese announced they would vote in favor of a study committee. This, he said, looked like lobbying to him.

I said Amb. Johnson had not asked for Japanese support of study committee but Gimo remained unconvinced, saying that although he had no report of substance of conversation he believed the events were more than coincidental.

Gimo said that while he understood what USG had tried to do to safeguard GRC position, to Chinese people in Taiwan, on mainland, and overseas, it will appear that a study committee if established shatters the GRC position, and therefore the GRC position with Chinese people cannot be safeguarded in this manner. He said it was up to the US to decide whether study committee resolution should pass or not. First two resolutions could be won, and USG has announced it will give passive support to the third. It is still in the realm of possibility, he said, for USG to maneuver to defeat the study committee and thus to reassure the GRC of the friendship and motives of the US.

I reiterated that we do not have the capability to defeat resolution, and that GRC cooperation and understanding is very important to us. I said that I thought that our friends in UN would understand quite well what we had to do in order to prevent serious reverse, and would understand we had simply chosen the lesser of evils, and had not modified our policy of full support for GRC.

Gimo said he and I were old friends, and we did not need to pursue this further, since we understood each other. He recalled that Secretary in July had emphasized the importance of upholding the UN and the UN Charter. He said the GRC was well aware of its obligations to uphold these fundamentals, and that he knew the US to be a major upholder to them. He said GRC believed that any damage to position of GRC in UN constituted damage to UN Charter and ideals because of GRC status as founding member. He said he had told Secretary that as long as any formula does not damage the legitimate position of GRC or of UN Charter, GRC will go along, but if anything damages these, GRC cannot go along.

I said we agreed with these principles, and with the importance of the Charter. I pointed out that the study committee resolution contains the phrase “in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter”, and that we believed this to be a safeguard for the GRC. I said USG certainly did not wish to harm the interests of the GRC, and that we did not believe the resolution had that effect.

Gimo said he fully understood USG goodwill and good intentions having this inserted in the resolution as a safeguard. However he wanted to make two points: (a) the US should not take an action that would cause Chinese people everywhere to have doubt of US basic policy, or to think US has shattered the position of the GRC or has given up the GRC. He urged that US think of these effects.

I said we agreed it was very important not to mislead anyone as to our intentions, and not to cause any Chinese to misunderstand us or to believe US was abandoning GRC, since this was not the case.

Gimo expressed hope that US course would be in accordance with this idea. He went on to his second point, (b), saying that to any ordinary Chinese the passage of a study committee was tantamount to a 2-Chinas formula. Even if the first two resolutions were to pass safely, assuring one more year for the GRC, it would be widely understood that next year or the year after the ChiComs would come in. He said that rather than be expelled in disgrace later, GRC would do better to leave now. He said that if the study committee resolution is adopted, then to the general public it would mean that the US has changed to a 2-China policy, and that US is ready to give up the GRC. Even if the GRC were willing to endure for the sake of the UN and the US, the Chinese people would not stand for a government of that sort.

Gimo said that USG should understand that GRC has been in a very awkward position for a long time, particularly since the Yalta conference when GRC gave acquiescence to a damaging fait accompli, brought about without any GRC consultation or knowledge. GRC had suffered the loss of Outer Mongolia, of Manchuria, and ultimately the mainland of China. Chinese have had many bitter lessons, and now if in the face of a study committee, GRC stays in the UN the Chinese people will be disillusioned with Chinese Government as well (Comment: presumably as well as with GRC’s allies). He said GRC can give up anything, and had even lost the mainland, but could not give up its legal position. After all, he said, “My government and to some extent myself must bear a heavy historical responsibility. If GRC stays in UN there would be no way to answer our responsibilities to our history, our people, and ourselves”. He said he did not intend to force his ideas upon USG, but it was clear that GRC could not acquiesce in seeing UN principles and UN Charter being destroyed, as well as destruction of GRC position. He said he had appreciated close US cooperation in the past decade or so and that he wished once again to thank USG for its assistance in maintaining GRC in Taiwan. He said he was not trying to force us into any course and would try to refrain from doing damage to US. He recalled that GRC had for many years kept US interests closely in mind. He said even if GRC were not in UN, GRC would be willing to cooperate fully with USG to defeat ChiComs. He said he believed US still had possibility of maneuvering to keep Chinese Communists out of UN even if GRC were not in, and therefore he believed GRC would not be doing damage to US interests.

I expressed appreciation for his generous sentiments in regard to past US assistance and cooperation. I said I wondered if some way could not be found to make clear to Chinese people everywhere that a study committee does not change policy of US or position of GRC. I said perhaps the committee would come up next year with a favorable recommendation and even if this were not the case, we should not take it for granted that there must be a disastrous result. I said I believed this could be explained so as not to damage GRC standing.

Gimo said it would be almost impossible to explain this. He repeated that US tactics in the UN were of course up to the US and that GRC without interfering would keep in close contact to discuss such tactics. However, he said, by far the best tactic would be the defeat of the study committee.

I said I would like to make a military analogy. I believed we were engaged in a very important central battle on the first two resolutions in the UN. The study committee question, while important, was somewhere off on one flank. The major cause, on the main front, was gravely in doubt, and in order to be sure of winning there we have had to take a little strength from the non-vital flank in order to bolster the main front. We have been forced to do this in order to insure against an unacceptable defeat. We earnestly hope that none of our allies would be so upset by the position on the flank that they would desert the entire battlefield.

Gimo said he understood the analogy and agreed that the issues as far as US was concerned were tactical. GRC would cooperate with allies as long as tactics were not harmful to GRC principles.

I said I also hoped for continued cooperation. I warned that it was not likely that in event of withdrawal from UN, GRC position could be maintained and protected, as Gimo seemed to think. I said I was not prepared to go into detail on consequences, magnitude could not now be predicted, but adverse effects would surely be more far-reaching than President apparently assumed.

Gimo again said that even if GRC not in UN, USG could find ways to keep ChiComs out. He observed that anyway GRC had caused many problems for UN.

I said GRC presence in UN had been invaluable in many ways. I recalled that study committee proposal in 1950 had come to nothing, and hoped that this time it could be sidetracked also.

Gimo said that things had changed greatly since 1950 and that GRC had made careful study of the problem. He closed the conversation by saying that we must try not to let this present serious issue prevent our cooperation on other issues.

Comment: Gimo gives every evidence of having thought his course through, and being determined to proceed, in sorrow rather than in anger. There are two imponderables, however: (a) precise nature and finality of walkout, and (b) possibility, rather remote, that senior GRC officials will be willing and able to persuade Gimo to change his mind. At this point I am bearish on the prospect for a reversal of decision, but not inclined to consider it entirely hopeless.

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McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 11:53 a.m. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House.
2. Document 212.