Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, November 15, 1966, 9:58 p.m.

85359. ChiRep. Ref: State’s 83437.² Following uncleared record of conversation, is FYI Noforn, and subject to revision on review:

1. GRC Foreign Minister Wei accompanied by Vice Minister Yang, Ambassador Liu, and Ambassador Chow called on Secretary November 15 to discuss Chinese representation. Bundy and Sisco also present. Principal impressions gained from conversation were (a) moderation of GRC presentation and muting of threat to withdraw and (b) distinct willingness expressed by GRC reps to go along with simple study committee resolution without prejudicial language in preamble.

2. Wei opened by saying that it was his purpose to convey to Secretary GRC position on recent developments in UN which have been cause for some emotion and much deliberation. GRC basic policy, Wei said, is to overthrow ChiComs and recover mainland and therefore GRC is opposed to any form of two Chinas. While GRC attaches importance to its UN seat, it attaches even more to this basic position. If anything along line of two Chinas should happen, this would seriously upset GRC basic position, GRC’s raison d’etre, and GRC’s role in Asia. GRC would rather keep its basic position than its UN seat. A UN seat on the other hand would be meaningless if its basic position were undermined.

3. The Secretary said he thought the GRC’s international standing was also important to its basic position. (He also later reminded Wei that it was our position that GRC’s position regarding the mainland cannot be settled by force.) As he had told Ambassador Chow November 10 (reftel), he said we attach the greatest importance to passage of IQ resolution and defeat of Albanian resolution. The Canadian move had been a great surprise and it was most harmful. We have tried for many years to keep the Canadians in line on the ChiRep question, but Canada is not a US puppet and the USG does not have decisive influence in the Canadian Government. Nonetheless we think we can defeat Canadian resolution.

4. Mr. Sisco described present tactical situation in the GA and what we know of discussions in progress between Martin and Fanfani. So far as we know, the Canadian-Italian consultations were still inconclusive. Sisco said there are two possibilities in the present situation: On one hand, a study committee resolution which contains sufficient substance in the preamble which would likely necessitate a 2/3 vote for adoption. From Chinese point of view advantage of this proposal would be that it unlikely to achieve a 2/3 vote. However, such preamble likely to have a two China formula in it. Other possibility is a study committee resolution which did not prejudge ultimate solution and probably would only necessitate a simple majority to adopt. Such resolution would have advantage of not prejudicing GRC position, although better chance for its adoption since only simple majority required.

5. Secretary said Communists would vote against any resolution with reference to two Chinas for the same reason as GRC. Other countries such as the UK would also be opposed and for this reason Canadian resolution might not pass. The Secretary added that, while we could probably defeat the Canadian resolution, a simple resolution for a study committee without substantive language in the preamble would be more difficult.

6. Ambassador Liu said that he had told Ambassador Goldberg that of all the texts of resolutions he had seen, he preferred the text of the US study committee resolution. He said however that it would be best to delete from it any reference to the People’s Republic of China and suggested that paragraphs two and three of the preamble be dropped. He also observed that the Italian resolution is not as harmless as it looks, noting that “China” is referred to without specifying which one. He hoped that the US would intervene with the Italians to bring about a non-prejudicial text.

7. The Secretary noted that he had already personally approached Fanfani on the IQ.³ He mentioned the difficult tactical decisions we face and said that frankly and on most confidential basis we would be content to see the Important Question passed, the Albanian resolution defeated, and no other resolution passed.

8. Vice Minister Yang pointed out that to introduce any resolution might confuse the GA delegates and undermine our position on the Important Question and the Albanian resolution and the Secretary agreed. The question was raised whether introduction of a third resolution should wait until after voting on the Albanian resolution. Mr. Sisco noted that if the Canadian resolution came after the other two, a substantial number of countries might favor it because of its two Chinas content, but we still do not think it would get a 2/3 vote. The Communists would be strongly opposed and he referred to the incident last year when Peking turned down an attempt to water down the standard Albanian formula.

9. The Secretary said present events on the mainland make this a particularly bad time for the international community to appear to encourage Chinese Communist militancy. However, some countries view Chinese representation as an important domestic political issue. The Government in Italy takes this view, as does Belgium. The nature of the political pressure in Canada is not so clear. The Secretary said that we would not lobby for Italian study committee proposal and we would strongly oppose the Canadian resolution. He suggested that the GRC should make its strong opposition to the Canadian resolution vigorously known in New York. Our support of study committee proposal had been made to protect 4 or 5 critical votes on the Albanian resolution. Canada, Belgium, Italy, and Chile had made it clear that they could vote against Albanian resolution only if some third proposal is put forward in the GA. Sisco added that Italians had told us that Fanfani study committee proposal made in Parliament under pressure of Socialists and that there was risk fall of Italian Government if it not put forward.

10. Ambassador Liu said that what concerns the GRC most is that if there is an untoward development, it might seriously affect the GRC’s basic position. If it “met reverse” GRC might have no choice but to leave UN. Secretary said he hoped GRC did not consider passage of a study committee resolution as cause for leaving UN. He noted that with the GRC having diplomatic relations with some 60 countries, as opposed to some 46 for the PRC, study committee formed on this basis would be long way from defeat. Secretary noted that we were not married to any precise language. We want to be in touch with the GRC on which type of resolution they would prefer. Ambassador Liu said the GRC was moving toward the US line of thinking, a simple study committee resolution.

11. There was some discussion of the concept of a study committee consisting of “wise men,” about which Ambassador Liu expressed doubt. Secretary suggested that some of GA past presidents might be good possibilities. It was agreed however that the more recent past presidents of the General Assembly would prove troublesome. Liu said Chinese strongly prefer committee of member states.

12. Vice Minister Yang asked whether, if the US draft resolution were tabled, we could pick up support from other countries on the Albanian resolution. Sisco replied that some countries, such as Denmark, might shift to abstention and he hoped we could get good vote on Albanian resolution as result. Yang observed stronger vote on Albanian resolution would have helpful influence on finding of study committee.

13. Before the meeting closed, the Secretary said he wished to make two points:

a. He reminded Minister that he had told Zablocki Subcommittee last March it is US policy to support position of GRC in UN and oppose membership of Chinese Communists.

b. He urged GRC to avoid rash moves which might leave it with only its basic position but without international understanding and support.

14. Following departure of Secretary and after lunch there was further brief discussion during which Ambassador Liu said he had been instructed by Taipei to tell Goldberg he authorized to cooperate with US. Since according to GRC information Canadians and Italians have been approaching other delegations, Liu urged that US approach them too, to avoid their becoming confused.

15. Sisco cautioned the Chinese that what the Secretary had said about our being content to see no third resolution passed was for their ears only. We were telling others that we prepared to support non-prejudicial study committee resolution and relations with other close friends and allies thus involved.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Bennett and cleared by Bundy and Sisco. Repeated to USUN and Tokyo.
2. Document 204.
3. Telegram 83743, November 12, transmitted a message from Rusk to Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani urging him to instruct the Italian Delegation in New York to co-sponsor the important question resolution and to agree that the proposals should be voted on in the following order: important question resolution, Albanian resolution, study committee resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM) On November 14, 15 countries, including the United States and Italy, submitted a draft resolution reaffirming the General Assembly’s 1961 resolution that any proposal to change China’s representation was an important question. (U.N. Document A/L.494)