200. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Chinese Representation

Recommendation2

That you authorize me to try to persuade the Canadians to alter their present “one China-one Taiwan” proposal to one more acceptable to us, involving a UN General Assembly Study Committee.3

Discussion

The Canadian Cabinet has decided to consult with friendly governments immediately on the introduction of a United Nations General Assembly resolution which would ask the President of the Assembly to explore possibilities of a solution based on a seat for both the Republic of China and Red China in the Assembly, with the Security Council seat going to Peking. The Canadians say that without this opportunity, they would be obliged this year to abstain on the Albanian resolution, which provides for replacing the Republic of China by Red China in all UN organs. The Belgians and the Italians have also informed us of their intention to make a similar new move.

The Canadian shift makes a critical difference. If we lose the support of these friends, it is probable that the Albanian resolution will obtain a simple majority for the first time. We could probably still prevent its adoption by relying on the procedural device of requiring that such a resolution receive a 2/3 majority for adoption, but we will have suffered an important defeat.

I have urged Paul Martin not to do anything further about this until I have had a chance to raise the matter with you. He is proceeding with [Page 419] consultations with a few governments (UK, Italy, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) at once, but has agreed to defer submission of his proposal formally to the General Assembly for a short time pending consultations with us.

We could stand on our present tactics and oppose Canada’s new move; we do not believe they can be dissuaded. Canada and the Belgians have told us that unless they are able to pursue a new course, they no longer will oppose the Albanian resolution; others such as Italy, whose Government is under strong Socialist pressure, are likely to take the same position. In these circumstances, the necessary majority to prevent Red China replacing the GRC would be seriously undermined.

A second option would be for us to stand aside; let the Canadians and others go ahead as they see fit on the assumption the Canadian proposal probably would not get the required 2/3 vote in the face of Peking’s opposition. This has great risks since there are elements in the Canadian proposal, e.g. giving the Security Council seat to Red China, which we would not want the Assembly to endorse even by a simple majority.

We conclude, therefore, we must engage the Canadians next week with the safest countermeasure we can offer, i.e. establishment of a Study Committee to examine all facets of the Chinese representation issue and report back to the next General Assembly. There are admitted risks in pursuing this suggestion since we can not be sure of the composition of the Committee and more importantly, we can not guarantee what its recommendations will be. At a minimum, I would expect that this Committee would recommend some form of “two Chinas” solution, and that we would have to take a stand on this during the Committee’s work and subsequently at next year’s General Assembly.

We feel strongly that the present Canadian text prejudges the ultimate decision of the Assembly. I would like to make a major effort with the Canadians to move them from their present course to another which we could support. This would be the best protection for the GRC. The Canadians seem to have the bit in their teeth, and I am not certain how far we can get with them.

A shift to a Study Committee would be a less radical departure from past tactics than Canada’s “one China-one Taiwan” proposal, it would be more palatable to our close Asian allies, and while the GRC would oppose a Study Committee, it is less offensive because the ultimate solution would not be prejudged. It offers some flexibility on how rapidly subsequent Assemblies move towards a definite substantive decision.

I would also consult quickly with the GRC to assure they understand the reasons for our efforts with the Canadians and others.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs in the recommendation.

Dean Rusk
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow. Secret. The source text does not indicate the drafter, but Sisco’s November 4 memorandum cited in footnote 2, Document 195, which forwarded the draft memorandum to Rusk, indicates that it was drafted by Sisco and Buffum and cleared by Berger and Meeker. Sisco’s memorandum states that the proposal reflected a consensus of views reached at a meeting with Katzenbach, Berger, and Meeker and that Goldberg concurred. The source text was sent to the President with a November 5 memorandum from Rostow noting that NSC staff member Nathaniel Davis thought the proposal was probably the “best we can do” to avoid being in a minority.
  2. The source text indicates the recommendation was approved.
  3. In a telephone conversation on November 6, Rusk told the President that he would not object to setting up a study committee if it would mean defeat of the Albanian resolution. A study committee would “complicate” the issue for a year or two. Without that, the United States risked not being able to defeat the Albanian resolution. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Rusk, November 6, 7:10 p.m., tape F66.30, side B, PNO 1)