Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 3, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Chinese Representation

PARTICIPANTS

• Canada
  • A.E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
  • Peter M. Roberts, Counselor, Canadian Embassy
• US
  • The Under Secretary
  • Rufus Z. Smith, Director, Officer of Canadian Affairs, EUR
  • Donald Morris, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary

Ambassador Ritchie opened the conversation by saying it seemed desirable to impose on the Under Secretary’s time once more in order, first, to provide the Department with the draft text on which the Canadian Government has been working as a possible early initiative on the question of Chinese representation in the UN and, secondly, to point out again that Canadian Foreign Minister Martin was scheduled to depart for Europe the following evening. His intent was to convey the Canadian thinking on this subject to the Department in as concrete a form as possible prior to Mr. Martin’s departure so that if the Secretary wished to consult personally with Mr. Martin he would have a more tangible basis on which to do it.

The Under Secretary responded that he had not yet had a chance to talk with the Secretary on this subject and it was difficult for him to say just when he would be able to. He pointed out that with the President leaving the next day for Texas it would be difficult to go into the question in depth with the Secretary prior to Mr. Martin’s departure. He therefore wanted to reiterate his hope that the Canadian Government would give us time to consider the matter further and an opportunity to discuss both the substance of the problem and questions of timing. He noted in this regard that the Secretary would also probably want to discuss the matter with the President.

When the Ambassador mentioned specifically that Mr. Martin would be leaving Ottawa the next day and would return on November 16, the Under Secretary remarked that he assumed of course that Mr. Martin would be totally out of touch even during the period of his journey. The Ambassador responded that one of the difficult points was that the Canadian Government would obviously want to talk before November 16 with other governments. He hoped therefore it would not be necessary from the United States point of view that his Government refrain from talking with at least some other counties. He said he was not speaking of widespread consultation at this point but had in mind a few key countries. (He mentioned specifically only the UK.) He said he was not thinking of active lobbying by Canadian representatives but certainly they would want to show the text of their draft resolution to some others.

The Under Secretary asked that the GOC at least give him a chance to talk to the Secretary before approaches were made to any other government. He would try to do it that evening or perhaps the following morning.

The Ambassador then turned to the substance of the Canadian proposal. He said there were two purposes which his Government had in mind. The first was to make it possible for the GOC and other governments which felt the same way to express a point of view on the subject of Chinese representation which, by their so doing, would accomplish the second purpose, namely to be able still to oppose an Albanian-type resolution. The Canadian Government had been working for some time on a draft of a resolution which would accomplish these two purposes and has come up with a proposal which would call upon the President of the General Assembly to carry out an investigation of the possible basis for an interim solution. (The Ambassador then handed the Under Secretary the text which is attached to this memorandum.)² He said the word “interim” had been chosen deliberately since it was recognized that the draft dealt with the de facto situation of two Chinas and did not attempt to present a long-range definitive de jure solution.

After an initial glance at the text, the Under Secretary noted particularly the provision for Chinese Communist representation on the Security Council. He said he was of course speaking off the cuff but it certainly seemed to him that this provision was hardly necessary in order to express the point of view Canada was trying to get across. The Ambassador responded that his Government has considered the point put did not see how the resolution would be acceptable to many other governments unless such a provision were made. The document, in his view, would otherwise not be a credible document.

The Under Secretary asked what the Canadians had in mind with regard to tactics. Would their resolution be pressed to a vote and if so, when? after consideration of the “important matter” question? after a vote on the Albanian-type resolution?

The Ambassador responded that certainly they had in mind that such a resolution would be put to a vote but as to timing he could not say at this point. The Under Secretary stressed that tactics and substance quickly become intertwined.

The Ambassador remarked that the GOC did not expect that the Chinese Communists would welcome the Canadian resolution all that warmly, but at the same time he thought the Chinese Communists would not be able to maintain that the Canadian proposal was entirely unreasonable. He argued that the real problem for Canada and for certain other governments was how to continue to oppose an Albanian-type resolution. The alternative to something like the Canadian proposal would be to abstain on the Albanian resolution.

The Ambassador reaffirmed that the Canadian proposal had been drawn up only after Cabinet-level consideration, although he could not be certain that the Cabinet had considered the detailed wording of the draft. He asserted that his Government regarded the proposal as a positive approach and as the best means of preserving the real interest of Taiwan. Throughout their consideration there had been a continuing effort to meet what they knew were the real concerns of the United States, and he wanted to reiterate that he would be available to discuss the matter at any time.

The Under Secretary reiterated that he would take the matter up as soon as possible with the Secretary. He nevertheless wanted to say now it seemed to him there were many ways of skinning a cat and that the Canadian draft was not the only way of meeting the problem. There were many other courses which ought to be considered. The Ambassador wryly remarked that there were indeed many ways to skin a cat but a cat, after all, had only nine lives.

In parting, the Ambassador stressed again the urgency of the matter and indicated his Government felt a need to begin consultation with other governments very shortly. He understood the plan was to approach the British the following Monday (November 7).

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in U on November 7. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Katzenbach’s office.
2. The text of the proposal is not attached. A copy is attached to the November 4 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk cited in footnote 2, Document 195. The proposal included a preamble suggesting an interim arrangement in which both Chinese Governments would be seated in the General Assembly and the People’s Republic of China would have China’s seat in the Security Council, and it requested the President of the General Assembly to explore the possibilities outlined in the preamble as the basis for an interim solution.