Office of the Historian

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

Taipei, November 3, 1966, 1040Z.

1308. For Secretary and Berger from Bundy.2

1.
Outstanding feature of my visit here was subtly cool, though correct, reception by Gimo himself. Every single detail of the meeting was in this direction, including transfer from residence to formal setting of office, last-minute back and forth on time resulting in delay after arrival, last-minute exclusion of Hummel so that Ambassador had to take notes, and above all fact that conversation lasted only forty minutes and was terminated politely but with unusual firmness and even abruptness by Gimo. It was certainly in total contrast in warmth and length with any previous conversation I have had here with Gimo over many years.
2.
As to substance, while Gimo heard me out politely on Manila summary, and found communiqué satisfactory, he was notably curt on declaration, saying only that he “had to objection” to it. Even more significant, the main message that the Gimo wished to get across was that the ChiCom nuclear-missile test3 meant they would be in a position within six months either to employ or to threaten use of these weapons specifically in Vietnam. I of course responded that any such use would be a madness far beyond any irrationality now discernible on the mainland, since they must be aware of massive power that we could use in this event.
3.
In marked contrast, Chiang Ching-Kuo and C.K. Yen have been if anything more friendly and outgoing than in the past. CCK in particular talked most responsibly and interestingly about whole ChiCom picture and Soviet relationship. He made no attempt to tie the nuclear-missile test to Vietnam, and the only pitch I encountered on any of the other conversations was a fairly mild plea by the Foreign Minister for stepped-up mainland operations of a “commando” character.
4.
Trying to put these pieces of the puzzle together, I am inclined to think that Gimo is personally more upset by our repeated references to reconciliation themes, during the trip and specifically in the Manila declaration, than others here may be. But I would be inclined to go further and to suppose that Gimo’s coolness reflects to some degree sense of personal affront over our omission of Taipei from schedule, fairly perfunctory tone of President’s birthday message to him,4 and general feeling of personal neglect over long period of time.
5.
To the extent that Gimo’s reaction rests on substance, it is unavoidable. However, his personal state of feeling could become important if we should confront in the next month any necessity for a change of position in UN. For what it may be worth, this subject has not even been mentioned at any level in 24 hours of conversation here. They obviously do not want to get into any suggestion of change by me, although of course I shall have to indicate if asked tonight that we must and will keep situation under close review, with possibility of tactical change still present.
6.
In any event, I think we must consider some personal touch that involves our President directly. A letter reporting on Manila and the whole trip, with some reference to my visit, could at least help to ease the feelings, which are not wholly incomprehensible, of a crotchety old man who still has the power to make decisions that can affect our interests seriously.
7.
Ambassador concurs.
McConaughy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNDY. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 6:27 a.m.↩
  2. Assistant Secretary Bundy visited Taiwan November 2–3 after accompanying President Johnson on a trip to Asia and the Pacific, October 17–November 2, including the Manila Summit Conference October 24–25.↩
  3. The Government of the People’s Republic of China announced on October 27 that China had successfully tested a guided missile with a nuclear warhead. The text of the announcement as printed in the Peking Review, October 28, 1966, p. iii, is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 676–677.↩
  4. Dated October 17. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, China, 3/1/66–12/31/66)↩