184. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- Time for Caution on our Part?
It is possible that the present mainland upheaval is sufficiently planned and controlled so that in a couple of months Peking’s affairs [Page 389] might not prove to be significantly altered, except for new faces in prominent places. However, without speculating further with inadequate evidence as to just what is going on, it seems just as possible that some real watershed in the Chinese scene may be reached. There is something awesome in the spectacle of the oldest civilization on earth methodically digging up its roots to the tune of raucous, uncivilized ballyhoo and bedlam. True, this spectacle could prove to be partly busy-work to cover up and to facilitate Lin’s and Mao’s attacks on the CCP party structure. In the process, however, the steam has obviously built up such a head that if deadly serious plans—whatever they be—should go awry, a drastic “out” might be sought.
The Asian communist people at State believe this is a time for considerable caution on our part. They particularly believe we should take strict measures just now against the possibility of our doing anything which might be interpreted as military provocation. I am inclined to agree. The boys at State are loath to put this idea into regular bureaucratic channels lest it touch off delaying debate as to just what is happening on the mainland. Hence if there is any merit in asking that our military and public postures be cautious just now, it may be a matter which should receive treatment from the top down rather than the other way around.
You may wish to consider bringing up at the Tuesday luncheon, or through other channels, the possibility of temporarily restricting the more provocative of our forward operations along the Chinese border and of our actions against shipping in the Gulf of Tonkin, during the immediate period of understandably heightened Chinese nervousness. I recognize that insistent Vietnam military requirements must still be overriding. We can hope that the chaos on the mainland may continue a while, and may prove to be in our interest in the denouement. Meanwhile we should try not to provide a way out for a Mao in trouble, should he sooner or later require a particularly devilish devil.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Jenkins Memos. Secret. Copies were sent to William J. Jorden and Donald Ropa of the NSC staff.↩