Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

165. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 5, 1966, 0930Z.

50. 1. This is uncleared summary of major topics in discussions during Secy’s visit Taipei. ChiRep and exchange of resources under PL 480 are subjects separate messages.²

2. Gimo emphasized following points:

A. The major powers have a responsibility to assist in seeing that 600 million on China mainland do not remain indefinitely under Communist tyranny.

B. The GRC is determined to regain control of the mainland, but particularly in view of recent purges, and the restiveness that the purges show, GRC can afford to wait for an opportunity that will surely come.

C. Support to US in the Vietnam situation has first priority with GRC, and return to the mainland second priority.

D. In Vietnam, the ChiComs will probably not intervene in force, although they are undoubtedly now considering what to do to react to the raids on POL installations. They are in a dilemma: If they do nothing, they run a risk of losing control of Hanoi. On the other hand, they do not want to risk a frontal clash with the US.

E. If war goes on in present form US must consider what to do. It will not be advisable for US forces to go north of the 17th parallel, for if they did they would face serious guerrilla actions in North Vietnam, and if necessary the Vietcong would retreat all the way to China and continue fighting from Chinese sanctuary.

F. The US must cut the lines of communication between North and South Vietnam, and equally important, between China and North Vietnam. In view of dissension and division within Communist China, we should think what steps, perhaps military or paramilitary, to take to achieve the results we want.

G. The ChiComs are counting on weariness and on criticisms of US policy by US Congressmen and other prominent Americans to force a US decision to withdraw eventually, after a long war of attrition.

H. The ChiComs feel fairly confident; they know they have overcome serious problems in the past and they believe they can survive anything. The ChiComs believe that US will not send its troops to North Vietnam and that the US will not support a GRC return to the mainland. They are therefore confident they will be able to wait until forces of dissatisfaction in the US cause a withdrawal.

I. The GRC still believes the ChiComs are capable of airdropping enough troops on Taiwan to seriously cripple GRC’s military capability. Although the ChiCom troops would be wiped out, they would inflict enough damage so that ChiComs would not have to worry for some time about a GRC attack.

3. The Secretary made following observations:

A. US commitment in Defense Treaty is strong and well known. Even in statements by private US citizens on China policy there has been no suggestion that Taiwan should be turned over to ChiComs.

B. US determination to curb Communists is entirely firm. US has a million men overseas to do this, and has suffered 170,000 casualties since end of World War II, mostly in Asia.

C. ChiCom extremism combined with isolation has produced concern even among European Communist countries over how to curb Peiping. Soviets and Poles, among others, much worried over this. It is even possible (and the Gimo expressed agreement) that Sovs would welcome seeing Communist China split into regional Communist regimes.

D. However, the US believes that any attack on ChiComs likely to cause Sovs to bring Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 into force. On other hand, if ChiComs chose to enter into war on ground in Southeast Asia, Sovs possibly would not invoke that treaty.

E. The US will not allow indefinite continuation of “neither peace, nor war” situation in Vietnam; there will be “either more peace or more war.” US determination is clear, and is supported by majority of Americans.

McConaughy

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 6A. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Rusk.
2. See Document 163. Telegram 38 from Taipei, July 4, reported a proposal for an “exchange of resources” under PL 480 to support GRC aid programs in Africa. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 15 CHINAT)