163. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
Taipei, July 5, 1966,
0645Z.
42. Uncleared draft resume. Secretary’s discussion of ChiRep with GRC.2
- 1.
- Secretary accompanied by Ambassador and Bundy July 3 and 4 discussed ChiRep situation separately with President Chiang and FonMin Wei Tao-ming who in one session accompanied by DefMin Chiang Ching-kuojo.
- 2.
- In first session with FonMin and other Foreign Ministry officers July 3, Wei presented in detail GRC analysis of ChiRep prospects which at this point indicates increased support for GRC position over 1965 UNGA vote. Wei counted Dahomey, CAR and Congo (Kinshasa) as sure to support GRC against background on basis first two cases of severed relations with ChiComs and in third case (Congo) of assurances recently conveyed by visiting Cabinet Minister that GOC would not permit repetition 1965 situation when delegate at UN disobeyed instructions. Wei described GRC also as encouraged by ChiCom policy reverses in Africa and in Afro-Asian world and by disadvantage to ChiComs which would result from current internal problems and Vietnam escalation. Wei also believes margin on important question may be increased as to as much as ten this year. Wei strongly and repeatedly urged US reach and announce early decision strongly support GRC ChiRep position using past tactics, said early decision would be instrumental maintain strength in GRC position while delay could cause doubt and confusion among GRC supporters. [Page 349] Wei believes lateness of introduction of important question resolution at last UNGA and shortness of time between votes on important question and on substance may have cost GRC some votes and he requested the US introduce at early point in session and strongly support important question resolution.
- 3.
- Secretary told Wei that although he hopes GRC assessment correct, US much less sanguine about prospect for making past tactic again produce desired result. Said GRC need not worry about basic US policy support but instead should focus on thinking on contingency basis about possible need for new tactics and what form such new tactics might best take. Secy said neither Canada nor Italy can be depended on to continue support past tactical formula and in case of Canada, likelihood of some new initiative in direction two Chinas formula very high. Pointed out that US unable deter such development.
- 4.
- In second session July 4, Wei expressed GRC doubt that defection by Canada, which he termed not major power, and by Italy, which he said without influence in key area which is Africa, would take away other votes from GRC. Wei also argued that Canada defection would not detract from such other Commonwealth support as GRC enjoys. Wei again expressed confidence in GRC estimate of prospects, again urged US at early date announce decision support GRC on past tactics. Wei stressed belief that GRC friends in Africa, who appreciative GRC efforts help them with economic development, would not desert them in showdown or make them a scapegoat for dissatisfaction with other US or Western policies.
- 5.
- At this session Secretary again spelled out US worry and concern that past tactics may not again produce desired result, reiterated that given attitude SYG, Britain, France, etc. some of whom have greater influence in key areas such as Africa than US is able to wield, need for contingency thinking is clear.
- 6.
- Secretary asked if GRC has recent information re position Indonesia and India. Wei and Vice FonMin Shen replied that GRC has been advised India would support but not lobby for ChiComs, and that contacts with Indonesians are being restored but abstention would be the best to be hoped for.
- 7.
- Secretary told Wei that many countries would support continuation GRC membership in UN. At same time, there is considerable sentiment in favor of opening possibility of ChiCom membership. If situation developed in this direction, with ChiComs unwilling to accept while GRC remained in, would be disaster if GRC felt it had to withdraw, thus leaving field open to ChiComs. Wei did not reply directly, but reiterated GRC confidence.
- 8.
- Secretary told Wei that USG would have great difficulty in giving commitment at this stage to any particular tactics on ChiRep, without better idea of prospect for successful outcome.
- 9.
- Secretary and Wei agreed important respective representatives keep in close touch and compare assessments in detail soon so that difficulties in estimates can be examined and effective action decided.
- 10.
- Final session with Gimo devoted mostly to other matters, but Secy brought up ChiRep, saying there is no question of our policy or of objective we wish to achieve. However, he said, situation could develop where there would be danger of turbulent and undisciplined GA overturning two-thirds vote requirement on important question. Said we must not be exposed to defeat on keeping GRC seat both in GA and in SC.
- 11.
- Gimo replied he had already given his views to Amb McConaughy, and that he thought so long as US insists on legality of procedures under UN Charter, particularly Art 18, the problem would not be serious. He said he hoped Secy while in Japan would not say anything to dampen prevailing Japanese enthusiasm for supporting traditional tactics in UN.
- 12.
- Secy said trouble was that President Chiang was honorable man, but that there were so many cynics in unpredictable UN that sound legal position might not suffice.
McConaughy