Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

143. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 27, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Alternatives on Chinese Representation in UN

You will recall that in your last luncheon meeting with Ambassador Goldberg there was a preliminary discussion regarding the future strategy and tactics of the United States on the Chinese representation issue at the coming 21st General Assembly. The discussion was inconclusive, and I indicated that IO was in the process of preparing a paper canvassing certain of the principal possibilities. Since then, the President has expressed his desire to find a way of handling the Chinese problem, including the Chinese Representation question at the next General Assembly, which would get the U.S. off the defensive.

This paper discusses the principal possibilities open to us at the General Assembly. None of them would, I believe, lead to Communist China’s taking a seat at the 21st Assembly. In the first place, it is not at all certain that any of them would receive the necessary support for adoption, particularly if the Assembly continues to uphold the requirement for a two-thirds majority. Moreover, even if an invitation to Peiping were adopted, it would be in the framework of a two-China approach. It is extremely unlikely that Communist China would take a seat as long as the GRC remained in the Assembly, and we believe it should be possible to persuade the GRC to continue to remain as long as its presence prevented the ChiComs from taking a seat.

We assume that for this year at least the Security Council situation can be controlled and that our principal strategy must be directed to the Assembly and only thereafter to other UN technical bodies where the question has arisen in one way or another in the past. The risk would nevertheless exist that Assembly rejection of any new approach or action that resulted in no real change in the situation, might well lead to increased pressure for action in some other UN bodies.

There are several ways in which we could alter our strategy in order to help place the onus for Chinese Communist exclusion on them, and to bulwark our support and protection of the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations. Although certain risks are attached to all of them, I believe that the best way to protect the GRC’s place in the UN is for the United States not to stand still. The risks of such a position are greater than any other. The following are several principal courses of action, listed insofar as feasible at this stage in descending order of preference. Some could be used in combination.

1. An Assembly declaratory resolution recognizing that there are now two successors to China’s seat in the UN, both of which should be represented in the Assembly.

Such a resolution would be one approach to a two-China conclusion. It would have the advantage over the study committee approach of being more manageable and less susceptible to being broadened to cover the questions of the other divided states. It would seek to preserve a seat for the Republic of China. If the Chinese Communists refused the seat offered them, as is likely, its seat would remain open and the Republic of China would continue its membership. Any subsequent pressure for a one-China solution should be manageable.

Such a declaratory resolution would seek to deal with the problem in the Assembly. Our strategy would be to defer dealing with the Security Council aspect until the situation in the Assembly had clarified. However, we can anticipate pressure and broad support for some kind of a General Assembly study of the Security Council problem in addition to the problem in its broadest aspect.

If, as we expect, both Chinas once again affirm their opposition to such a two-China approach, it is not clear whether the Assembly would decide to take formal action on it. Nevertheless, our objective of preventing the replacement of the GRC by Red China would have been achieved.

2. GA Study Committee.

Such a proposal would probably buy us another year. However, there are some difficulties with the study committee approach which carry risks for us. We would want the Assembly to deal only with the Assembly; the study committee would be likely to want also to deal with the Security Council aspect. There would be a real risk that the outcome of the committee study might be a one-China, one-Formosa solution or possibly even one China, and the wrong one.

Moreover, the problem of obtaining a satisfactory composition reflecting of sentiment toward both Chinas is a formidable one. We would also have to decide whether to participate in such a Committee, our tentative conclusion being that this would probably be necessary in order to protect our position.

In short, the study committee idea seems less manageable and more risky. We must recognize also that since Fanfani peddled this proposal broadly last year and it is therefore well-known, it is likely to be widely regarded as a time-buying device and less attractive than a substantive declaratory judgment by the Assembly in favor of a two-China solution.

3. Mandate to Secretary General or GA President to explore with Taiwan and Peking the possibility of a two-China solution.

This has a number of disadvantages. Such an approach could well be broadened into a negotiation of terms on which the Chinese Communists might be prepared to enter the UN. There might be a recommendation for the wrong China. Such an approach might be made very quickly and hence gain us little time.

4. Resort to the International Court of Justice.

This would obtain relatively little support in view of the general recognition that the problem is political, not juridical. Moreover, it would involve the Court in a highly contentious political matter which it is unreasonable to ask it to adjudicate. The outcome would also be uncertain.

5. Stick with the present strategy.

At the last Assembly the vote was 47–47 and the “important question” principle was upheld by a margin of seven votes. There have been some favorable developments in Africa and our present vote count indicates a slight edge in our favor.

We do not believe, however, that we can rely on this present vote count as the GA draws nearer. There are likely to be serious defections among our traditional supporters. The debate on China in our country has given rise to an expectation of greater flexibility in the US position. The recent Gallup Poll indicates that 56% of the American people would support Chinese Communist admission to the UN if this would improve US-Chinese relations.

Moreover, the political price that we would have to pay if we are to mount the extensive lobbying campaign required, particularly among such restive allies as Italy, Canada, Japan and Australia, would be prohibitively high. Finally, we cannot be certain that these tactics would succeed even with exhaustive lobbying.

6. Stick with present strategy but stop lobbying.

An important variant on the foregoing course would be for the US to maintain its previous position on the substance of Chinese representation but to desist from our traditional active lobbying. Of the courses mentioned, a passive attitude of this kind would do less damage to our relations with the GRC than taking any initiative toward a two-China approach but would give us the least control over the outcome.

Tactics

Various of our allies are prepared to work closely with us on new tactics. If we decide a new approach is desirable, there are two possible ways we can proceed:

1. We can decide to take the initiative, informing the GRC of the results of our analysis of the situation and attempting to convince it that its interests would be best served if we, in response to a number of approaches from our allies, informed our friends that we would be willing to consider a new approach to the Chirep question at the next GA. If the Chinese, contrary to our expectations, agree, or if we decide to go ahead over their objections, this would give us some control over the direction of new moves.

2. If we assume that it will not be possible to persuade the GRC of the correctness of our conclusions or that our relationship with the GRC is such as to preclude our taking the initiative, we could simply stand aside this year, making it plain to others (Canada, Japan, Italy, Australia) that they are free to submit whatever proposals they choose to produce a solution, but that the United States will maintain its present position and vote against any resolutions designed to open the way to the entrance of Communist China. In this way we would avoid any break with the GRC, and the burden would be on others to exhaust the possibilities for a solution.

The President suggested drawing on outside experts for advice on Chinese representation. I believe the IO Advisory Committee, the members of which are listed in the attachment² would be an excellent group to undertake such a task if we decide it would be useful. It has already expressed a desire to discuss the Chinese representation question, and it would be willing to make its views known privately if we so desire.

As you are aware, Ambassador Goldberg and I will be consulting with the Canadians in Ottawa on May 16. Since Canada has been pressing for discussion of Chinese representation and is clearly anxious to undertake some new initiative, we believe we could make good use of these consultations for a first exploratory discussion with Canada. These consultations also make more urgent the need for a decision on our part.

Recommendation³

That you convene an early meeting including Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Meeker, and myself for a preliminary discussion of Chinese representation, taking account of the analysis in this paper, with a view to arriving at a consensus which could be discussed with the President, if possible prior to our consultations in Ottawa.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown, and Betty Jane Jones of UNP. A checkmark on the source text indicates that it was seen by Rusk.
2. Not printed.
3. The source text bears no indication of Rusk’s reaction.