107. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECTS
- (1) U.S. Policy on Travel to Communist Countries
- (2) Current U.S. Thinking on Outer Mongolia
- (3) Chinese Representation Issue at Current General Assembly
- (4) U.S.-GRC Consultation and the August 6, 1965 Sea Clash Between GRC and ChiCom Naval Units
PARTICIPANTS
- Chiang Ching-kuo—Defense Minister of the Republic of China
- Chow Shu-kai—Ambassador of the Republic of China
- James Shen—Director, Chinese Government Information Office
- William P. Bundy—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Calvin E. Mehlert—Interpreter
1. In response to a request made September 23 by General Chiang for a second opportunity to meet with Mr. Bundy, Chiang was invited to call at Mr. Bundy’s home at 6:30 September 26 for drinks. The meeting lasted until 8:15.
U.S. Policy on Travel to Communist Countries
2. After an exchange of greetings, Mr. Bundy said that he wished to inform Minister Chiang that the U.S. would announce in the near future a change in its passport policy which would permit doctors and public health workers to be issued passports with no restrictions as to destination of travel. Thus, doctors and public health personnel with legitimate cause for travel to Cuba, countries in Eastern Europe or Communist China, and who have reason to believe they would be admitted, would be issued passports. Mr. Bundy pointed out that this did not represent a change in actual practice, noting that Drs. White and Rosen had been issued passports for travel to Communist China, although in neither case had travel taken place. Mr. Bundy explained that the President feels that the humanitarian considerations involved should be separated from political problems. Mr. Bundy said also that this change would tend to take one issue away from those who criticize our policies toward travel to Communist countries as being too restrictive. He also noted that, if any travel should take place, it might produce useful intelligence; this, however, was secondary.
3. Mr. Bundy observed that, although the announcement will be worded in a general way, some people may take particular note of its applicability to Communist China and draw unwarranted conclusions therefrom. We do not anticipate that this will be a problem because 1) as in the case of news correspondents, there will probably be very little travel resulting from this announced change and 2) the U.S. attitude toward Communist China is clearly shown by our actions in the Far East and by the recent strong statement by Ambassador Goldberg at the UN on the Chinese representation issue.
4. Minister Chiang said that the travel of a few doctors was not in itself an important matter, but that such actions as this often are viewed as highly significant by people in the Far East who might see in it a dilution of American firmness toward Communist China. The timing, close to the opening of the General Assembly, was not too good.
5. Mr. Bundy replied that we also had had to examine carefully the considerations raised by the Minister, but in sum had concluded that 1) now was a suitable time for such an announcement and 2) this move would probably strengthen our overall position vis-a-vis Communist China. Mr. Bundy appreciated, however, that it might not to be appropriate to make the announcement during the Minister’s visit to the U.S. and [Page 220] said that he would look into the possibility of having it issued after the Minister’s departure.
Current U.S. Thinking on Recognition of Outer Mongolia
6. Mr. Bundy recalled the discussions which had taken place in 1961 between the U.S. and the GRC on the subject of possible U.S. recognition of Outer Mongolia. He wanted to inform the General that while we did not now have recognition of Outer Mongolia under active consideration we did review the problem periodically with special emphasis on two factors: 1) possible impact on the Sino-Soviet dispute of U.S. recognition of Outer Mongolia; and 2) possible intelligence benefits. The first factor did not seem important at this time, given the extremes to which the split between Peiping and Moscow has already gone. As far as the intelligence factor is concerned, this could become significant, and it is possible that in the future, perhaps a few months, this matter may come up for more active consideration.
7. General Chiang (apparently not understanding fully) replied that as the matter involved only intelligence collection and not the political recognition of Outer Mongolia, he saw no problem. Mr. Bundy said that the two matters in this case were inseparable. Chiang suggested that in that case this was a matter for our two governments to discuss. Mr. Bundy emphasized that in raising the issue at this time he simply wanted to be sure the GRC understood our exact state of thinking on a matter that had once been active between us.
Chinese Representation at the General Assembly
8. Mr. Bundy noted the importance of the African votes in the Chinese representation issue at the UN, complimented the GRC on its active foreign policy in Africa, remarked on how much he had learned about Africa during Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k’un’s visit to the U.S. earlier this year, and said that we regarded as astute the GRC handling of the recent problems with Mauritania and Dahomey.
9. Mr. Bundy said that we believe we have a favorable margin of about five votes, at this time, against a resolution calling for the seating of Peiping and expulsion of the GRC, and a margin of some 15–18 votes supporting the Important Question. Mr. Bundy emphasized the special importance of the closest liaison possible between us on this problem.2
[Page 221]U.S.-GRC Consultation and the August 6, 1965 Sea Clash Between GRC and ChiCom Naval Units
10. Mr. Bundy noted the general excellence of communication between us, and referred to specific proposals made during Minister Chiang’s visit for strengthening the mechanisms by which mutual consultation is accomplished. He referred to the August 6 GRC operation which resulted in a sea clash between GRC and ChiCom naval units and to which the attention of an element of the U.S. Seventh Fleet had been drawn. He noted that the U.S. had not been informed beforehand of this operation and indicated that the significance of such clashes for our Seventh Fleet made closer liaison on such matters important to us.
11. Minister Chiang noted in reply that this had not been an “amphibious operation” (as he had understood from an error in interpretation) but only an attempt at landing 16 men for intelligence-gathering purposes. Mr. Bundy remarked that the problem apparently lay in the fact that ChiCom naval reaction and capabilities had not been anticipated. General Chiang agreed and said that it would be possible to strengthen liaison in these matters.
12. Minister Chiang asked concerning the new U.S. Ambassador, emphasizing the importance of his arrival in Taipei as soon as possible. Mr. Bundy reviewed the factors which had delayed this matter and indicated that within a short time we expected to have more definite information.
13. On leaving, Minister Chiang expressed appreciation for the courtesies shown him by the Department of State during this visit.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–10 COMBLOC. Secret. Drafted by Mehlert. A Top Secret memorandum of conversation provided addenda to paragraphs 6, 9, and 12 of this memorandum of conversation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)↩
- The Top Secret memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 1 above stated with reference to paragraph 9: “Mr. Bundy informed Minister Chiang that the commitment made in May 1961, and reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk in 1964, concerning U.S. action were the Chinese representation issue to be raised in the Security Council still stood.”↩