Office of the Historian

105. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 23, 1965, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
    • Mr. Chester Cooper
    • Mr. Calvin E. Mehlert, Interpreter
  • Republic of China
    • General Chiang
    • Ambassador Chou
    • Minister Shen

General Chiang introduced the discussion by stressing the need for close collaboration between the U.S. and the GRC. He felt that a thorough joint study of the Chinese Communists was a necessary prelude to a common policy.

Although the United States had global responsibilities, he hoped that we could proceed on a common path with respect to the Chinese Communists. “Public relations are one thing”, but in our “serious discusions”, we should adopt a “joint policy”.

The Generalissimo felt that any joint studies that were undertaken should be “penetrating and sustained”. The Chinese strength on Taiwan should be used effectively to help with the problem of the Chinese Communists. It is now time “to put our heads together to work out a joint plan”. We may have different views, but we must find a common meeting ground. The Chinese Communists have an integrated policy toward both Taiwan and the U.S. and this means that we should have “an integrated policy”. This is the essence of President Chiang’s position.

Mr. Bundy agreed that the Chinese Communist problem is a critical one for both our governments. Although it is not the only problem the U.S. faces, it is a growing one. He also agreed that the two governments must consult and work together. We probably have difference in assessment “at least at the margin” both within our own society and between our two governments and this is an important reason for close consultation.

The U.S. has an immediate problem in Vietnam and Southeast Asia and we are fully aware of the hostility of Peiping to the Republic of China. Nonetheless, we cannot reach a decision that full-scale conflict with the ChiComs is inevitable. Our policy is to contain Peiping and [Page 216] attempt to avoid full-scale war. We have many alliances in Asia, but our closest ally is the Republic of China; within our own overall policy we desire to conduct the closest kind of consultation and partnership with Taipei.

We have kept the situation on the mainland under close scrutiny because if we ever felt that limited operations against Communist China could, in fact, be successful we would want to examine those carefully. Thus far we have not undertaken such actions—wisely. In any case, we are anxious not to undertake actions which will enlarge hostilities in Vietnam or lead to a full-scale conflict on the mainland.

Chiang reiterated his view that the basic question is how Chinese Nationalist strength can be used without touching off a wider war.

The meeting concluded at 11:25.

CLC
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. IV. Secret. Drafted by Cooper on September 24. The meeting was held in Bundy’s office.↩