The situation is very fluid in Japan on this subject just now, and Ambassador
Johnson is anxious to receive your approval of a
U.S. position for purposes of negotiating the Sato visit communiqué.
At Tab A is a memo from the Secretary of State requesting your approval of a
negotiating position in the form of draft language for the Sato visit communiqué (Tab B).2
At Tab C is a proposed telegram to Tokyo explaining our position.
The Secretary’s memo sets forth the issues clearly. I believe it is not
essential that you read Tabs B and C at this time.
I recommend that you approve the Secretary’s recommendation in Tab A.
Tab A
Washington, October 27, 1967.
Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson
4
SUBJECT
- Visit of Prime Minister Sato
Recommendation:5
That you authorize negotiations with the Japanese Government of draft
communiqué language embodying:
- a)
- A commitment to enter into early negotiations for the return
of the Bonin Islands (permitting, however, United States
retention of the whole island of Iwo Jima as a military base);
and,
- b)
- Interim measures relating to the Ryukyu Islands which would
not commit us to return these islands,
on the understanding that these commitments would be
subject to final approval by you and Prime Minister Sato at your November 14–15
meetings.
Discussion:
The major issues we anticipate during the visit of Prime Minister
Sato will be twofold: First,
Japanese willingness to shoulder a greater share of the political and
economic burdens of regional responsibility; and second, our response to
Japanese desires for forward movement on reversion of the Ryukyu and
Bonin Islands.
In preparation for the Sato visit,
I stressed to Foreign Minister Miki in mid-September the actions we sought from Japan
as a contributing partner in the region and our inability primarily for
security reasons to make a commitment at this time on the return of the
Ryukyus. At Miki’s request, I said
we would give serious consideration to reversion of the Bonin Islands in
the near future but in this event Iwo Jima would have to be treated as a
special case.
The Japanese have responded very positively to my talks with Miki. Both Sato and Miki have
come out with strong statements of support on our Vietnam policies,
particularly on the bombing issue, and Sato during his two trips through Asia has begun to
exercise the regional leadership we seek from Japan. Furthermore, the
Japanese leaders have made concerted efforts to dampen down expectations
for immediate reversion of the Ryukyus, stressing the key relationship
of our military position on Okinawa to their own and regional
security.
Ambassador Johnson informs me that he expects
Sato to be helpful on both
increased assistance to Southeast Asia and on our balance of payments
problem, if we can be responsive to his desire for forward steps on the
Ryukyus and particularly the Bonins to help stem reversionist pressures.
Sato faces increasingly heavy
political and public demands to obtain substantial progress in the
resolution of these issues. His failure to obtain any significant
response from us will be politically damaging to him and could lead to
serious problems in our relations with Japan as well as with the local
populace in the Ryukyus. In the Ambassador’s views, the key factor will
be our willingness to enter into negotiations for return of the Bonins
and he has requested earliest guidance on this matter before undertaking
further talks with Miki.6
[Page 216]
On the other hand, the
Japanese recognize the complex problems inhibiting immediate reversion
of the Ryukyus, although they need to be able to show evidence of
forward motion in this area. We are therefore proposing (1) interim
steps which would not involve any further commitment on our part to
Ryukyu reversion, but would slightly change the public formula on
reversion and would provide for further identification of the Ryukyuan
people with Japan and (2) agreement to subsequent periodic review of the
status of the islands in light of the related security problems.7
At present the United States has few military installations in the
Bonins. Military personnel as of June 30, 1967 totaled 77 (33 Navy and
44 Air Force), plus 3 United States civilians and 55 foreign-national
civilians employed by the Navy. The principal installations are: (1) a
naval facility on Chichi Jima used to support patrolling operations in
the Philippine Sea; (2) a stand-by airfield on Iwo Jima capable of
supporting major operations; (3) a smaller airfield on Marcus Island;
(4) a weather reporting facility; and, (5) a stand-by nuclear weapons
storage facility (details on United States installations are
enclosed).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer to retain administrative rights
over the Bonins for contingency purposes and until the political status
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is resolved. As a fallback
position, they would agree to return all the Bonin Islands except Iwo
Jima and Chichi Jima, and to consult with the Japanese on the military
utility of these two islands to Japan and the United States. Since most
of the Bonin Islanders now residing in Japan had lived in Chichi Jima,
retention of this island would create serious problems in Japan.
Retention of the naval facility in Chichi Jima under the Security Treaty
provisions and of the whole island of Iwo Jima as an emergency stand-by
base could, however, serve to meet our contingency requirements. To
emphasize that return of the Bonins represents a step toward shared
responsibility for the region, it is also proposed to seek Japanese
agreement to assume larger defense responsibilities in the area, while
agreeing to our retention of other stand-by facilities as required.
Retention of Iwo Jima as a military base is also recommended because of
anticipated adverse public reaction in this country to its
[Page 217]
return. However, the Japanese
in preliminary talks with us have strongly resisted our retention of Iwo
Jima and suggested instead a United States memorial park on Mount
Surabachi. Ambassador Johnson is concerned that
retention of Iwo Jima could significantly detract from the value of
Bonins reversion unless we can make a strong case on security
grounds.
Secretary McNamara has reviewed
and concurs in the recommendation made above. If you approve this
recommendation, we also propose to undertake immediately the necessary
consultations with the Congressional leadership to obtain its reaction
before final approval is given to the draft communiqué during the
Sato visit.
