84. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Washington, March 1, 1967.
Mr. President:
This thoughtful cable from Alex Johnson is the kind
Ambassadors should write but rarely do.
He conveys Sato’s anxiety that U.S.
détente with the U.S.S.R. could throw the Japanese position in Asia out of
balance.
It is parallel to Western European anxiety about the détente and the
non-proliferation treaty.
Basically, what Japan wants is a Communist China that is not so weak that it
is under Soviet dominance and not so strong that it threatens Japan. It
wants a Soviet Union not in open conflict with the U.S. but sufficiently
preoccupied with the U.S., China, etc., so that it must take Japan seriously
and doesn’t feel free to lean on it.
Japan wants our protection, economic ties, and friendship. From that base it
wants to build a position of leadership in Asia; trade from a position of
strength with both Communist China and the Soviet Union.
But it doesn’t want us buddying up too close to either Communist China or the
U.S.S.R.—especially the latter, because of its greater relative
strength.
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Attachment
Tokyo, March 1, 1967,
0930Z.
Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department
of State2
Copy of Tokyo 6126 From Alexis Johnson, March 1, 1967
- 1.
- I want to call attention to Sato’s statements re the Soviet Union (in Tokyo’s
6063).3 It
will be noted that he expressed fear that the Soviets might take
advantage of Chicom weakness to
take action against the periphery of China; that he placed part of
the blame for the rise of Mao on the Soviets (the rest of the blame
rested on Japan); that he warned against trusting the Soviets,
including the statements they make to us on the Chicoms, and in general, made clear
that he considers the Soviets, rather than Communist China, as the
major threat to Japan.4 This is the first time that
I have heard an expression of this kind from any Japanese leader,
and it is clear to me that he was deliberately and advisedly taking
advantage of an opportunity to make these statements.
- 2.
- We should, of course, not be surprised at this, as it corresponds
with historical and deep-rooted Japanese attitudes toward Russia,
whether imperial or Communist, while in the recent latest
developments in China, have the appearance of somewhat reversing
these historical Japanese attitudes, what Sato seemed to be indicating was that these
short-term trends do not change the underlying pro-China,
anti-Russia feelings of Japan. Although Japan is appalled at much of
what is now going on in Communist China and is worried at the
Chinese development of nuclear weapons, what Sato was saying was that a gain in
Soviet territories or strength at the expense of China would be a
source of deep concern to Japan.
- 3.
- We have recently had other signs of Japanese uneasiness over how
the U.S. attitude toward mainland developments might develop, with
some officials seeming to be concerned lest the United States might
be hoping for prolonged disorder as the optimum state of affairs. To
some extent this concern may reflect the worry that in the future
the U.S. might be tempted to take sides in the mainland imbroglio or
otherwise try to exploit the chaotic conditions there, and in the
process get bogged down in the kind of morass which engulfed Japan
in the late 30’s; however, the concern over Soviet expansionism
expressed by Sato seems to be
a much larger element in Japanese misgivings.
- 4.
- I believe that there are also several implications in Sato’s remarks with respect to
U.S.-Japanese relations. First, while on the one hand they welcome a
reduction in US-Soviet “tension” and the opportunity to improve
their own relations with the Soviets, they are concerned that
relations between the two “super powers,” the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
not “improve” to the extent that we and the Soviets face Japan with
fait accompli in matters concerning Japanese interests.
- 5.
- The schizophrenia of Japan on the nuclear proliferation treaty is
a good example. Military considerations, e.g., the fact that the
NPT requires Japan to renounce
its options while doing nothing to meet its immediate concerns,
which are the Soviet Union and Communist China, are in my opinion
only a part of the reason for Japan’s ambivalence on the NPT. Another important factor is the
Japanese hypersensitivity to any suggestion that the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. are moving toward a kind of “super-powers” club from which
Japan will be forever excluded. The drive toward parity with the
great powers has been one of the most consistent themes of Japan’s
modern history. In spite of its present attitudes on military and
nuclear affairs, an implied relegation of Japan to second-class
status because of her non-possession of nuclear arms would
ultimately constitute a powerful incentive to go after an
independent nuclear capability. These attitudes are, of course,
being nurtured by public statements coming from West Germany,
probably communicating even more forcefully in Japanese-German
consultations on the NPT. Thus, I
tend to agree with Ambassador Takeuchi that
while in the end Japan will probably have no choice but to sign the
NPT on whatever terms the U.S.
and Soviets are able to agree upon, we should not necessarily take
Japan for granted in this regard.
- 6.
- Fisheries is another area where Japan discerns tendencies in
U.S.-Soviet relations that are disturbing to it: not so much because
of their intrinsic importance, but because of their reflection of
what it discerns as tendencies in U.S.-Soviet relations. Japan, of
course, recognizes that there is a certain basic congruence of
U.S.-Soviet fishing interests in the North Pacific as opposed to the
interests of Japan; however, I
[Page 169]
believe that it does genuinely disturb them
when they think that we are using agreements already reached between
ourselves and the Soviets to demand similar concessions or more from
the Japanese.5 I am, of course, well aware of
these fishery problems, and there is no reason that we should not
bargain hard with the Japanese on them, but in devising our tactics
we should be conscious of these Japanese attitudes and recognize
that Japanese may well read more in the way of broad political
implications into them than we intend.
- 7.
- As opportunity offers, I will probe on Sato’s theme with him and also with Shimoda, who was former Ambassador
in Moscow as well as DCM in
Washington, and who now holds a key position in the Government of
Japan on these matters. However, in the meanwhile, I did want to
call the Department’s attention to Sato’s remarks and what I feel were the
implications, that must be taken into account in our relations with
this country.
