Attachment
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY
1. It has been the U.S. official as well as public view since soon after
the Korean War that the Japanese forces buildup has been too limited and
too slow; that the U.S. should seek to persuade the Japanese to
accelerate the development of more modern and larger forces for more
complete and effective home defense and the assumption by Japan of its
proper share of regional security responsibilities; and that with the
growth of national pride and ambition the Japanese would probably
themselves increasingly desire larger forces and a more active military
role.
2. The Japanese defense forces have developed steadily in recent years
but remain very small in comparison with those of other major powers.
Reawakening Japanese national pride and desire for international status
appear not to have significantly increased Japanese interest in larger
forces or a Japanese overseas military role. If U.S. policies toward
Japan’s defense effort have been sound, they have at the least been of
limited effectiveness. Perhaps the policies themselves have been too
much based on longstanding habits of thought within the U.S. Government,
resentment over the small proportion of GNP increasingly prosperous
Japan devotes to the common defense, and desire to sell military
equipment to Japan. A new look at the matter seems in order as the
requirements of the Southeast Asian situation mount and the [Page 115] date when the U.S. and Japan
must reconfirm, alter or terminate their Security Treaty relationship
approaches.
[Omitted here are sections A. “Buildup of Japanese Home Defense Forces”
and B. “Adequacy of Japanese Forces in the Face of Current and
Prospective Threats.”]
C. Japanese Attitudes on Defense Questions
12. These continue to be mainly governed by (a) lingering antimilitary
sentiments growing out of Japan’s disastrous war experiences; (b) doubt
of the practical value of large Japanese forces—in view of the lack of
any clear threat to Japanese territory, U.S. treaty commitments to
Japan, and the desire to build friendly relations with neighboring,
formerly occupied countries; and (c) reluctance to accept the cost of
sizeable forces. With the passage of time, initial suspicion and
disapproval of the small, slowly growing Self-Defense Forces has given
way to acquiescence and grudging approval but little active pride or
enthusiasm.
13. For some time it has been expected that growing national
consciousness and desire for international status would render the
Japanese increasingly reluctant to rely on the U.S. for their security,
and more disposed to build up their own forces. It is becoming
increasingly clear that this is not happening. The JFY 1965–66 defense budget, submitted by
the reputedly more defense-minded Sato and approved last March by the Diet, barely covers
rising costs of the existing establishment, with minimum amounts for
force improvement, as in JFY 1965 and
1964. While there is evidence that anti-military sentiments are
continuing gradually to decline, there appears to be no greater
disposition than in the past to replace or supplement the U.S. deterrent
with expanded Japanese forces. Public attention remains firmly fixed on
economic gains. Developing national pride has led to increased demands
for “independent” Japanese foreign policies, but neither this desired
independence, the mounting scale of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam or
the deteriorating situation in Indonesia has significantly altered
Japanese defense policy, which remains basically unchanged from the
Fifties.
14. The CCNEs have had limited impact in
Japan, long accustomed to the nuclear weapons of its traditional enemy,
the USSR. Some Japanese have been influenced by them to favor an
expanded Japanese defense effort including nuclear weapons. Sato has privately expressed such views
and the JFY 1966–67 defense budget, the
first prepared by a cabinet of Sato’s own choosing, may noticeably reflect them. But
the general reaction has been largely undisturbed, with no disposition
to turn from butter to guns. With their strong cultural affinity for
Mainland China; knowing that for better or worse Mainland China’s [Page 116] vast population will be only a
few hundred miles away forever; doubting that Peking, whatever its
political ambitions, intends to attack Japan; and hoping still that
Japan can some day play a leading role in the development of Mainland
China, most Japanese are determined to avoid the development of a
confirmedly hostile attitude between Japan and China. A picture of China
and Japan pointing nuclear missiles at each other, against which neither
(but especially confined Japan) could effectively defend, has no appeal.
This attitude could change as the Chicom nuclear capability and Japanese nationalism grow;
but the prospect now appears to be continuing efforts to preserve a
tolerable, hopefully cooperative relation with Communist China, under
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, not to build up forces against it.
15. Elements in the U.S. may at some time question the wisdom of
maintaining U.S. defense commitments to a Japan which refuses to view
the Chicom aggressive threat in the
terms we do. If Japan, even while continuing to withhold diplomatic
recognition, persists in seeking friendly, productive relations with a
Communist China which has become even more hostile toward the U.S. than
at present, a situation could develop comparable to the one we now face
with Pakistan, whose rapprochement with Communist China is leading an
increasing number of Americans to question our continued defense
commitments to Pakistan. This danger is receiving and should continue to
receive close U.S. and Japanese Governmental attention.
D. U.S. Fundamental Interests Respecting Japan
16. The success Japan has achieved in its concentration on economic
growth and improved living standards has been a major Free World gain,
both for the proof it has provided of the workability of free political
and economic institutions in an Asian environment and the contribution a
burgeoning Japan has made to Free World economic strength. Continued
conservative, strongly Free World oriented leadership in Japan depends
on the maintenance of a high growth rate and rising living standards,
including costly improvement of public services (roads, parks, harbors,
sanitation, etc.), neglected for decades. A substantially larger
Japanese defense effort would divert resources from such politically
important Japanese domestic programs and overseas (mainly SEA) non-military aid, both directly in
U.S. interest.
17. With Japan’s defense effort only 1.1% of GNP, even doubling of that
proportionate effort would leave substantial resources for these
purposes. But as long as Japanese public attitudes on defense policy
remain essentially as at present, any government which proposed a sharp
expansion of defense expenditures would risk its early replacement, in
all probability by a more neutralist government less likely to ensure
Japan’s continued, effective Free World alignment. U.S. interest in
Japan’s remaining an active political and economic Free World [Page 117] associate is far greater than
our interest in the contribution expanded Japanese forces might make to
Free World military strength. And while Japan’s peaceful postwar
regeneration appears genuine and deep-rooted, we cannot exclude the
possibility that we would live to regret the re-establishment of
powerful Japanese forces at home and overseas. It is too early to
conclude that a nation which has glorified war to the extent Japan has
will not turn in that direction again. Nor should we overlook the fact
that, seeking the most efficient and economic means to achieve powerful
forces, a growing number of Japanese might be tempted by the nuclear
route.
18. As earlier noted,4
the greatest threat to Japan, and thus to U.S. interests in Japan, is
not that of military attack by any nation but of a deterioration in the
general climate of security and economic wellbeing in the Far East which
would leave Japan more and more isolated in a hostile environment,
strike at its trade with other Far Eastern nations, and threaten its
trade routes with the rest of the world. Faced by this threat, and
considering the political obstacles at home and abroad to a much
expanded Japanese military effort, Japan’s major contribution to Free
World security would appear to lie in the economic area, with U.S.
influence directed not to acceleration of the Japanese defense buildup
but to expansion of Japanese South and Southeast Asian economic aid and
investment. As the Japanese become more involved economically with other
Far Eastern nations they will tend to become more involved politically,
which could lead in time to defense involvement as well. But that must
develop spontaneously. There is little evidence that absence of U.S.
pressure would significantly reduce the pace of the Japanese defense
buildup, which over the years has proceeded at its own rate, influenced
much more by domestic Japanese political considerations than by our
urgings. The fact that our pressure is likely to become less rather than
more effective as Japanese national independence and self-determination
grow is added reason for not attempting to exert it.
19. There is another reason why we should consider carefully before
pressing the Japanese to accelerate their defense effort. It may not be
in our interest that the Japanese become exclusively and completely
responsible for home defense, leaving the U.S. with no defense role in
Japan. Retention of a real defense role for our Japan-based forces is
important in justifying the U.S.-Japan security relationship to Japanese
skeptics, in maintaining the credibility of our strategic commitment to
[Page 118] Japan, in providing cover
for the counter-offensive, intelligence and other activities our
Japan-based forces fulfill, and in preserving our influence in Japanese
defense planning now that Japan MAP has
been terminated.
20. Finally, we should stop judging the adequacy of the Japanese defense
effort by the proportion it represents of GNP. This standard has no
military validity; the adequacy of a defense establishment should be
judged against the threat which it is meant to counter, not against the
percentage of income applied to it. Moreover, the percentage of GNP
standard does not have the significance in Japan which it might in a
country with a relatively static GNP. Although the percentage of GNP
devoted by Japan to defense has not gone up in recent years, the defense
budget rose between JFY 1961 and JFY 1965 from $510 million to $860 million.
This sizeable increase should not be downgraded because the economy grew
during the period at so rapid a rate.
21. Looking objectively at our fundamental interests respecting Japan in
the late Sixties and early Seventies one might arrive at the following
conclusions:
- a)
- Japan’s practical ability to act will be much greater in the
economic field than in the military field. We should look to
Japan for a much expanded economic contribution and worry less
about its military contribution.
- b)
- The Japanese defense effort will be decided by what the
Japanese think they need; our ability to affect the issue will
remain minimal. We should continue to seek to influence their
defense planning in mutual defense consultations, once we have
clarified our own ideas on the subject, but we should not make
this such a major undertaking as to cut across our other
interests.
- c)
- If we make it plain to the Japanese that we will not exert
pressure for military expansion beyond what they themselves
think desirable this may give us greater leverage in encouraging
them to put out greater efforts in the economic aid
field.
E. Desirable Size and Structure of Japanese
Forces
22. Japanese forces most in Japanese and U.S. overall interest during the
remainder of the decade would seem to be high-quality air and naval
units, of approximately the present total size, to deter or repel
probing incursions or limited blockade or attack, supported by ground
forces clearly inadequate for defense against major attack but capable
of ensuring internal security, including the security of U.S. bases, and
of serving as a basis for possible later expansion for an overseas role.
This pattern would involve acceptance of current low army manning levels
(140,000) and assignment of any resources thus saved to modernization of
the ground forces, modernization and possible expansion of the air and
maritime forces, and formation of organized reserves, [Page 119] now completely lacking. The objective
would be Japanese forces able to deal decisively by themselves with
minor encroachments or attacks; clearly dependent on U.S. forces to
deter major attack; and capable of eventual expansion for overseas
service, if and as political attitudes in Japan and abroad alter to
permit this, almost certainly not before the next decade.
23. Such forces might include units trained for UN peacekeeping operations, the most promising initial form
of Japanese overseas military activity. Japan has military attachés
abroad, and the Japanese Government might even now be prepared to place
at the Secretary General’s disposal such attachés located near trouble
areas. This might provide the opening for dispatch, possibly as early as
1967 or 1968, of small Japanese forces to police boundaries and perform
other peacekeeping functions but not, for an indefinite period ahead, to
join with other Free World forces in anti-Communist, Viet-Nam-type
combat operations.5
24. Due primarily to the attractions of industrial employment and the
dwindling farm population (the traditional source of army manpower), the
number of applicants for the GSDF fell, despite aggressive recruitment
efforts, to 89,000 in 1963 and 69,000 in 1964, compared with 150,000 in
1962 and an average of 200,000 over the preceding 10 years. Because of
this shortfall, actual GSDF strength has remained over the past three
years at about 85% of authorized strength—140,000 instead of the
authorized 171,000. While the GSDF continues normally to consist of 13
divisions, some divisions are at only 50–60% of strength; available
manpower is sufficient for only 9 full-strength divisions. Conscription,
or even withdrawal of the right of all Japanese servicemen to leave the
forces any time they wish, including time of prospective or actual
combat, is politically infeasible.
25. A Japanese Government decision to stabilize the GSDF at 140,000, or
even a Japanese initiative to reduce it to 130,000 or 120,000 to achieve
better balanced overall forces against the threats facing Japan, would
therefore be a less radical change than might at first appear. Since
nearly 80% of GSDF funds go for personnel expenditures, reduction to
130,000 or 120,000 would free substantial resources for army equipment
modernization and diversion to the air and maritime forces, assuming
that the Government did not divert the resources to [Page 120] other purposes. It is pertinent to note
that the UK, admittedly possessing a far
larger navy and air force than Japan and a nuclear capability, maintains
only 80,000 troops in the British homeland—though another 47,000 on the
continent of course contribute, with other NATO forces, to British home defense. And not to be
forgotten is the economic contribution which released GSDF personnel
could make to the Japanese economy, key sectors of which are suffering
labor shortages.
F. Conclusions
26. a) The experience of recent years, during which a substantial revival
of Japanese national feeling and the CCNEs have occurred without significantly altering Japanese
public attitudes on defense questions, indicates that Japan will not
greatly expand its home defense forces during the remainder of the
decade but will continue gradually to improve their qualitative capacity
to deter and repel hostile incursions and limited blockade or
attack.
b) The U.S. should continue to support such improvement. It should also
continue to encourage Japan to rely on the U.S. deterrent for security
against major attack. Additionally, it should make clear to the Japanese
Government that although we remain ready and anxious to sell military
equipment to Japan, and to consult with and advise the Japanese
Government on defense planning questions, we consider the size and
composition of Japanese forces a matter for Japanese decision free of
any form of U.S. pressure.
c) Japanese public attitudes, combined with continuing fear abroad of a
revived Japanese militarism, will continue at least into the early
Seventies to prevent a Japanese forces contribution in Southeast Asia,
Korea or the Taiwan Straits. These attitudes will alter only through the
force of events and through political maturation in Japan and abroad.
The U.S. should seek discreetly to foster this political maturation,
recognizing that U.S. pressure, as opposed to free exchanges of
information, views and experience, will slow rather than hasten the
process. Japanese contributions to UN
peacekeeping operations may become feasible within two or three
years.
d) In discussions with the Japanese concerning the composition of their
forces the U.S. should:
- (i)
- support modernization of all three services to give Japan high
quality forces on the Swedish model with a sizeable ready
reserve—a hard nut to crack by any means short of major attack
and a sound base for possible later expansion for overseas
service;
- (ii)
- acquiesce in the Japanese Government’s apparent intention to
maintain an active ground force of only 140,000, deferring
efforts to achieve the authorized 171,000 strength until
Japanese public thinking favors larger forces;
- (iii)
- offer no objection should the Japanese Government wish to
reduce the active ground force to 130,000 or even 120,000,
provided [Page 121] that the
resources saved are devoted to modernization of the ground
forces, modernization and possible expansion of the air and
maritime forces, and formation of organized reserves;
- (iv)
- favor maintenance of the existing under-strength, 13-division
army structure to facilitate possible later expansion;
- (v)
- emphasize Japanese air defense, minesweeping, ASW and escort capabilities,
because of the importance of these capabilities to Japanese home
defense (including effective U.S. wartime use of Japanese
facilities) and because such forces (except air defense) are
likely to constitute the most feasible initial Japanese overseas
military contribution, aside from peacekeeping forces.
e) The U.S. position, in brief, should be one of readiness to consult to
the limit by security considerations with the Japanese Government on
defense planning questions; of welcoming larger, higher quality Japanese
forces and the assumption by Japan of overseas military responsibilities
as soon as public attitudes in Japan and abroad permit; of seeking
discreetly to foster the necessary development of those attitudes; but
of refraining from pressures of any kind on the Japanese Government to
move faster in these directions than it considers feasible and desirable
in Japanese national interest.
f) Every effort should be made as recommended in the Committee of
Principals document “Japan’s Prospects in the Nuclear Weapons Field:
Proposed U.S. Course of Action”6 to
discourage Japan from attaining an independent nuclear weapons
capability.
