40. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1
- Your meeting with Sato2
I attach a good quick summary (Tab A) of the Sato meeting, prepared by my colleague, James Thomson (whom you may not have met but will see in my place at the dinner tomorrow night—in line with your policy of rotating White House invitations). Thomson’s memo gives some of the details around the main problem, but I repeat my own conviction that it is item 3 on Communist China and Taiwan, which is the heart of the matter. If Sato can take away a sense of your own realistic awareness that this problem will get bigger and bigger and that we want to go at it in close cooperation with the Japanese, that will be all he needs for the present. As I said on the phone, my own belief is that the key to UN strategy is that we should be prepared to press Chiang & Company not to be the first to quit when some ambiguous formula is put forward. Sato shares my opinion on this, so that if you do too, you and he can make music together.
I also attach (Tab B)3 another copy of the Secretary of State’s briefing memo in case yours is not right at hand.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Sato’s Visit, Briefing Book, January 11–14, 1965. Secret.↩
- President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met at the White House on January 12 at 11:30 a.m.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Civil aviation may have been discussed at the briefing on the current situation in Japan on January 9 in the Cabinet Room from 2 to 2:45 attended by the President, Rusk, Reischauer, William Bundy, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)↩