Tab A
Washington, January 11, 1965.
Memorandum From James C. Thomson,
Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson
Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato
Prime Minister Sato (pronounced
“Sah-toh”) is a tough-minded, pragmatic anti-Communist. He entered
politics in 1947, has held government jobs in communications, space,
science, and technology. He became Prime Minister last November
(succeeding Ikeda).
Sato believes that the time has
come for Japan to play a larger role in world affairs. He wants to do
this in cooperation with the United States.
He has come to Washington in order (a) to get to know you personally, and
(b) to start up a frank dialogue with our top officials on the problems
of the Far East—particularly the problem of Communist
China.
We want to be forthcoming in terms of frankness on the subject of China.
We also want to press Sato hard on
the single issue where the Japanese can help our cause and theirs right
away: a Korea–Japan settlement this spring.
If he comes away from Washington with a firm sense that we accept the
Japanese as full partners (on an equal footing with our European allies)
and that we will take them into our confidence on long-term planning,
Sato will consider his visit a
success. If some progress can also be made on the several issues (mostly
economic) that cause friction between the U.S. and Japan, this will be
an added plus for us both.
The attached briefing paper from the Secretary focuses on the points that
have emerged from our advance exchange of memoranda with the
Japanese.
Here are the most important points:
- 1.
-
Good news for Sato: There are three specific
items on which you can show our friendly intentions. (a) On
the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), you can tell him that we are
willing to broaden the scope of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee to include
consideration of all aspects of the Ryukyuan people’s
welfare—as long as our administrative powers are unaffected.
(b) On the Bonin Islands, we accept
in principle a Bonin graves visit
(for the former inhabitants who now live in Japan). (c) On
the Saylor Amendment, you can tell
him that repeal of this amendment is
one of the Administration’s high priority items for the
present Congressional session.
[Page 65]
(A fourth item on which Sato will hope for some words of
encouragement from you is civil
aviation; you have been briefed on this
separately.)4
- 2.
-
Japan-Korea Settlement: State
calculates that a Japan-ROK
settlement will save us $1 billion over the next ten years
($600 million in Japanese grants and loans, the rest in
anticipated private investment). We are once again at a
point where a settlement is within reach. If we miss this
time, it will be very hard to get negotiations started
again.
Sato’s heart is in the
right place; but he needs a real push by you, perhaps along
the following lines: We fought the Korean War in the
interest of Japan’s security as well as our own. A viable
Korea is an essential buffer to us, doubly essential to
Japan. Nothing the Japanese could do right now, in 1965,
would advance the Free World’s interests more successfully
than a settlement.
- 3.
-
Communist China, Taiwan, and the defense
of the Pacific: Sato will want to talk very frankly about
our short and long-term views of how to live with Communist
China, how to keep Taiwan free, and what to do about the
defense of the Pacific. He will explain his own views that
politics and economics must be separated in dealing with the
Chicoms (i.e., that
Japan’s trade is logical and necessary and in the long run
can have some influence on the Chicoms). He is against recognition or UN membership but wants to keep
in close touch with us on the whole China problem in the
months ahead—so that Japan won’t be left in the lurch by
some unexpected U.S. move.
We should hear him out and agree that regular close
consultation on the China problem is essential to both
nations.
- 4.
-
South Vietnam and Southeast Asia:
Sato will want an
equally frank exchange of views on the prospects for Free World
policies in South Vietnam and neighboring regions. He supports
our efforts to keep Vietnam free but is deeply worried about the
outcome. (Japan has made a $1.5-million contribution in
non-military assistance to South Vietnam; it has also given
$500,000 to the Foreign Exchange Operating Fund in Laos.)