Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

83. Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson¹

Washington, June 8, 1964, 3 p.m.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

OTHERS PRESENT

• Acting Secretary Harriman, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Manning, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Special Assistant Sullivan, General Carter, Mr. Chester Cooper, Mr. William Colby, Mr. Michael Forrestal, Mr. Bromley Smith

The meeting began by pre-arrangement without the President. Acting Secretary Harriman, Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy arrived a few minutes late. They had been delayed by discussing with Secretary Rusk in Newport, Rhode Island, the recommendation to conduct an air strike with U.S. planes on a specified target in Laos. Mr. Harriman said both Ambassador Unger’s messages² had been relayed to Secretary Rusk. After discussing the pros and cons, Secretary Rusk favored going ahead with the strike although he considered the decision to be an extremely close one. Mr. Harriman said that he, Mr. Johnson and Mr. William Bundy believed that the arguments for the strike were stronger than did Secretary Rusk. They were firmer in their belief that the President should authorize the strike today.

Mr. Harriman said the purpose of the strike would be to convey a message to Hanoi. Unless we take some action to convince Hanoi that we are serious, negotiations with Ho Chi Minh will not be productive. Secretary McNamara agreed.

Mr. Harriman said he did not think the strike would be as harmful to our relations with Souvanna as Ambassador Unger thought. If we attack a specific target we won’t lose Souvanna by his giving up his position.

It was clear that Ambassador Unger had written his cable 1559 (copy attached) without knowing specifically what was planned in connection with the escorted aerial reconnaissance and the air attack.

Secretary McNamara said he disagreed with Ambassador Unger who had proposed that T–28s be used to take out the antiaircraft battery. He said that T–28s flown by Vietnamese would not be able to destroy the target. In his view, if another U.S. plane were knocked down, we would have to respond by some military action, not necessarily an air strike.

Secretary McNamara noted that he was not satisfied with the way the reconnaissance flights had been carried out by the Navy. He had asked the task force, for example, why the U.S. planes had expended only seven rockets. He referred to Ambassador Unger’s comment about the military³ and asked the State Department to make clear to the Ambassador that the U.S. Government is working together and that Defense is not operating unilaterally. He noted that he had agreed that napalm should not be used because of the excessive political cost involved in its use.

In response to a question, Mr. Harriman opposed delaying the strike in order to allow time for Ambassador Unger to talk to Souvanna before the strike. Souvanna has to be against such an attack publicly, and, therefore, it would be better to tell him after it had taken place. Privately, he will not be as strongly opposed as he will have to be in public.

Mr. Forrestal asked what would be risked if the strike were delayed for 24 hours, as had been mentioned by Mr. McGeorge Bundy following a telephone conversation during which the current situation was summarized.⁴ The general response was that nothing would be gained by delaying the attack because we would learn little during the next 24 hours that we do not already know. Secretary McNamara pointed out that the attack had already been delayed 24 hours.

General Carter recommended that the air strike be stood down on the grounds that it is a precipitous action based on the normal desire to retaliate against the shoot-down of two U.S. planes. He did not see it as part of a scenario which was aimed at seeking to improve the situation in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated this was Director McCone’s view.

Secretary McNamara disagreed sharply, saying that Director McCone had told him flatly at 1:30 PM on Sunday⁵ that he was for an air strike in Laos. General Carter said he was not at the Sunday meeting but that he had been told that the Director disapproved of the attack because it was not part of a longer range plan to deal with the existing situation but rather an action taken out of sequence. Secretary McNamara crossquestioned General Carter as to Mr. McCone’s view, saying that the Director may have changed his view, but as of Sunday, he had joined with all the others in recommending Presidential authorization of the specific air attack in Laos.

Secretary McNamara said: “Suppose we decide not to make the strike? What would we do if we cancelled it?” Mr. Sullivan pointed out that Canadian International Control Commission (ICC) representative Seaborn would be in Hanoi on June 15.⁶ The message he is to convey would not be appropriate if we had not acted in some way in response to the shootdown of our reconnaissance planes. He, in effect, would be going to Hanoi with a broken stick.

There was discussion of low-level reconnaissance of North Vietnam as a possible alternative. The general view was that such reconnaissance would not be safe.

General Wheeler recommended strongly that the air attack be authorized. He opposed any delay and said that we had no other plan to respond to the shoot-down.

Secretary McNamara said we do not have to recommend the air attack but that no other action we can take to convey a message to Hanoi is comparable to an air attack. The possibility of some of our planes being shot down was a real one but the possibility that there would be a catastrophe was one chance in a million. The risk of not doing anything is greater than doing what is proposed. We must put additional pressure on Hanoi now.

In response to a suggestion that Laos and South Vietnam are separate issues, Alexis Johnson said the relationship between the problems in the two countries is exemplified by two chess boards, some plays being made on both boards.

Secretary McNamara said he and Deputy Secretary Vance had talked to several Senators during the day, including Senators Saltonstall and Russell. They had encountered less opposition than they had anticipated.

Secretary McNamara said a perfect attack would consist of hitting the antiaircraft battery and losing no U.S. planes. If the fighters miss the antiaircraft battery but no planes are lost, we can consider the attack successful. If the antiaircraft battery is hit and a plane is lost, we can consider the attack satisfactory. In the event of any of the above results, no further reconnaissance measures will be flown for the time being and no further retaliation would be undertaken. With respect to public information, we would announce only that a reconnaissance mission had taken place. If the Communists say our planes fired, we would say that the Communists fired on our planes and we merely returned the fire.

Following a discussion of whether the air attack fitted into the existing Laos scenario, Mr. William Bundy described the attack as providing only a bump in the upward curve of the military actions proposed in the scenario.

Secretary McNamara said we must make a reply to North Vietnamese military pressure by means of an attack or by some other means.

With respect to Ambassador Unger’s views, it was pointed out that he was looking at the picture in a Laos framework. The air attack was visualized as a signal to Hanoi covering our total Southeast Asia policy.

With respect to whether the reconnaissance pictures we had obtained had been worthwhile, Secretary McNamara said they had been very useful, but that we could do without them, as we had during the past two years. He emphasized again we had one, not separate problems, in Vietnam and in Laos. Aerial photographs of the specific target and the surrounding area were circulated and examined by the group. It was pointed out that the antiaircraft battery to be attacked was 7/10 of a mile from a village.

Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Harriman said that we need to reconsider previously discussed courses of action in the light of the current situation.

Mr. William Bundy pointed out that the papers in the gray folder had not been discussed with the President. He had prepared a paper listing the diplomatic actions⁷ for the immediate future and it was his understanding that our current objective was to string out as long as practicable any diplomatic conference involving Laos.

At this point (3:45 PM) the President joined the meeting.

Mr. Harriman said the State Department, including Secretary Rusk, agreed that the air attack should be made although the decision was a close one. The risks involved in the attack were offset by the absolute requirement to send a firm signal to Hanoi.

The President asked that Ambassador Unger’s cable be read to the group (No. 1559). Secretary McNamara said that before the message was read, he wanted to point out that when Ambassador Unger had sent the telegram he did not know of our plan to launch a single retaliatory attack.

The President, referring to a paragraph in Ambassador Unger’s message, asked whether we had agreed to keep secret the fact that we were sending fighter escorts with the reconnaissance planes. The answer was that we had not said we would not send escort fighters, but we had probably not made clear to Souvanna what we would do following a shoot-down of an unarmed reconnaissance plane.

Mr. Forrestal then read 1559 and 1562 (copy attached).

Secretary McNamara noted that we had already reduced our reconnaissance flights from ten to one. In reference to Ambassador Unger’s opposition to suppressive attacks on antiaircraft batteries, he said that we were not doing this except in the one specific case now being recommended. He repeated his flat statement that the antiaircraft battery could not be destroyed by Vietnamese pilots using T–28 airplanes, as Ambassador Unger believed. The T–28s would be lost to ground fire if they tried to attack an antiaircraft battery and the Vietnamese pilots had insufficient inability to deal with the targets.

The President repeated some of Ambassador Unger’s comments to the effect that we were abandoning the Geneva Accords and violating them in a way which we had not done previously, despite Communist violations over the past two years. The President asked how we answered the accusation that an air attack would violate the Geneva Accords.

Mr. Harriman said the Communists had broken the Geneva agreements. We had sent in reconnaissance planes to obtain information which the ICC could not get. This information was very important to us because we needed to know how the Communists were violating the Accords and whether they were initiating a buildup with a view to capturing the Mekong River cities. We were invited to carry out reconnaissance missions by Souvanna who was not asked to agree to fighter escorts but did not oppose our sending in fighter escorts when we told him we were. We have to get a message to Hanoi to convince Ho Chi Minh that we are serious, that we haven’t backed down, and that we are not scared off by attacks on our planes.

The President asked whether the gains in taking out the antiaircraft battery are sufficient to offset world criticism that we are violating the Geneva Accords. Secretary McNamara replied that he did not think the air attack violated the Accords. Others present agreed that Communist violations of the Accord had altered the situation. In addition, we had sent in reconnaissance planes on a peaceful mission. These planes had been shot at. Therefore, we were entitled to reply to the hostile action taken against our peaceful planes.

The President said Ambassador Unger felt that if we launched such an attack the Souvanna Government would fall. Others disagreed that Ambassador Unger had made this point. The telegram was re-read in an effort to clarify exactly what Ambassador Unger had said.

Secretary McNamara said the ICC had failed to carry out its duty of maintaining peace in the area. The Pathet Lao forces had advanced. Souvanna had agreed to aerial reconnaissance by U.S. planes and did not object when we told him that we were going to send in fighter escorts with our reconnaissance planes. He repeated his view that the legal situation consisted merely of the Communists firing on escort planes and our returning the fire.

The President asked whether anyone present was bothered by the charge that if we took out an antiaircraft battery we would be violating the Geneva Accords. He was bothered. Everyone acknowledged that the Communists had violated the Accords. If we go on further we will be throwing to the winds the Geneva Accords. In addition, we may lose Souvanna. The Communists are not expected to be responsible, but we are responsible people.

Mr. Harriman pointed out that if we decide not to make the air attack proposed, we would be criticized because we didn’t respond to the hostile actions of the Communists.

The President asked: “What happens after the antiaircraft battery is attacked?” Mr. Harriman referred to a list of nineteen military actions from which we could choose.⁸ One such action was the movement of an additional carrier to the seas off South Vietnam.

The President asked whether the air attack might not “blow” the meeting proposed by the Poles. Mr. Harriman responded that it might, but if we took no military action now, we would obtain no concession from the Communists at the Poles’ meeting.

Secretary McNamara said he saw no possibility of obtaining any concessions from the Communists during the Poles’ meeting. The question is how to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Laos but one thing he was sure we must not do is to show any weakness in the face of hostile Communist actions.

The President asked what we do if they knock down a bunch of planes. Secretary McNamara said we have to take some military action. He doubted that we could push the Pathet Lao back to where they were before their recent attack, but we must take some military action, such as the air strike, if we are to prevent further deterioration in our position in the area. Mr. Harriman said he did not write off completely the Polish talks which might help halt Communist aggression. He acknowledged that this was not very likely.

Secretary McNamara, noting that it was 4:30 PM, said that if the decision was to halt the mission, he must send a cable immediately because the planes were authorized to take off at dawn unless otherwise notified.

The President asked Mr. Harriman if he would recommend the air strike if it meant losing Souvanna. Mr. Harriman and the other State officers replied “no,” they did not recommend the strike if it meant losing Souvanna, but they did not think we would lose Souvanna if the attack took place. They added that Ambassador Unger did not know our full plan when he talked to Souvanna, and, therefore, some arguments he could have used he did not use. A cable giving him the full picture would be sent immediately.⁹

The President said that even if Ambassador Unger knows all about the plan, he very much doubts that the Ambassador would agree that it was a good thing to do.

The President asked what would happen if the strike were delayed for 24 hours. Mr. Harriman replied that damage would not be great but it would reveal a certain amount of indecision on our part. Secretary McNamara said the decision was a political one and not a military one. The air attack was one way of affecting any negotiations with Hanoi.

The President was brought a note and he left the room. In his absence, Secretary McNamara said we cannot go on as we now are. We can take an entirely different course but we cannot continue talking tough and acting weak as we are now doing. He said he was even ready to give up Southeast Asia but now we must back up the words we have already spoken about our firmness of purpose. He had been concerned ever since the President’s Los Angeles speech¹⁰ which conveyed the thought that we were going to act firmly in Southeast Asia. We must be careful not to convey an impression of strong action when, in effect, we are not so acting. If we do not make the proposed air attack, we should change the very strong message which we have asked Seaborn to convey to Hanoi.

Mr. Harriman asked Secretary McNamara to repeat his statements to the President upon his return.

The President returned and Secretary McNamara re-stated his view. He was deeply concerned about the inconsistency between our words and our action. Ever since the Los Angeles speech, he has been concerned that we had no plan to back up the words contained in that speech. He said there has been much tough talk by Secretary Rusk and by himself. He referred to the Rusk interviews in New Delhi¹¹ in which the Japanese were told of our firm intention to prevent the Southeast Asia situation from deteriorating further. It is most dangerous, especially with the Chinese, to have our adversaries conclude that we talk tough but act weakly. He does not oppose cancelling the air strike, but if we do, we must change our talk immediately. The President is not responsible for creating an impression of tough talk but his advisers are. We must change our talk and our present inconsistency.

Mr. Harriman said the air attack was the only way that we could signal Hanoi. If we don’t send this signal, the situation will deteriorate in Southeast Asia. Souvanna may object publicly to our action but he will not be too unhappy in private. One day later we will know little more than we know now. There are fewer risks in going forward than in not acting.

The President said Secretary McNamara may have made a point in his remarks about what we have been saying in speeches. However, we are not now deciding what to put in a speech, but we are talking about something much more important, namely, an action involving an attack on an antiaircraft battery in Laos. We are here considering whether this action should be taken. Ambassador Unger’s cable distressed him because he thought what we had been doing and were planning to do was done with the consent and knowledge of the Laos Government. He asked why the air attack was to be launched from Saigon rather than from an antiaircraft carrier. He wanted to know why an attack from Saigon would not be justification for the Communists to attack South Vietnam. What we do on the high seas is our business, but to attack in Laos would give the Communists a basis for launching an attack in South Vietnam.

General Wheeler said the North Vietnamese had no air force, and, therefore, whether we attack from the sea or from Saigon made no difference insofar as retaliation by the North Vietnamese was concerned. Any Communist aircraft which could attack South Vietnam would have to come from Communist China. Communist retaliation is very unlikely.

Secretary McNamara responded by saying that we were planning to attack from South Vietnam before we could use U.S. Air Force pilots who, in his opinion, are better prepared for the kind of attack proposed. He criticized the June 7 Navy operation from the aircraft carrier, saying that the reconnaissance planes were split into two groups, they came in over their target too high, and they apparently used Sidewinder air-to-air rockets when they should have used only air-to-ground missiles. General LeMay had said that he felt the Navy task force missions had not been as efficiently planned as the Air Force would have planned them.

In response to the President’s question, General Carter said he had earlier recommended strongly against the air attack. He added, however, that this was his judgment and CIA did not have an agency view on the policy decision. He recommended that the air strike be delayed for 24–48 hours if for no other reason than to acquaint Ambassador Unger with the reasons why the attack was being launched. He said his personal view was that the air strike was motivated by a desire to retaliate against the loss of our planes and did not fit into a plan aimed at improving our situation in Southeast Asia. He repeated, however, that this was a question of judgment and acknowledged that he had no alternative proposal to suggest which would have the effect of letting Hanoi know that we were serious about our position in Southeast Asia.

The President said that we should go ahead with the mission but that he had doubts about the action.

Bromley Smith ¹²

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Colby and Cooper prepared a separate although substantively similar memorandum for the record of this meeting, June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with President, 1 May–31 Oct, 1964)
2. Reference is to telegram 1559 (Document 82) and telegram 1562 from Vientiane, June 8, in which Unger reiterated his opposition to armed reconnaissance and a retaliatory strike against a Xieng Khouang anti-aircraft site. Unger suggested that attacks by Lao Air Force T–28’s would be “infinitely preferable” to deployment of U.S. jets. Unger was also concerned about international reaction to plans to employ napalm in the attack, since it had not been used before in Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
3. Apparent reference in telegram 1559 (Document 82) to Unger’s statements that the operation “risks becoming a military exercise for its own sake, running rapidly out of control.”
4. No further record found.
5. June 7. For a record of the meeting, see Documents 80 and 81.
6. A brief report of Seaborn’s meeting with Pham Van Dong on June 15 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 525–526.
7. Dated June 8 and entitled “Diplomatic Action Concerning Southeast Asia.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. II, Memos (A), 5/64–6/64)
8. Harriman is apparently referring to a paper entitled “Illustrative Military Moves designed to Demonstrate U.S. Intention to Prevent Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam”; see the Attachment to Document 71.
9. Document 84.
10. Reference is to the President’s remarks at the University of California at Los Angeles, February 21; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pp. 303–305. An extract is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 959–960.
11. Rusk was in New Delhi for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s funeral, May 28–30. Rusk’s interviews have not been further identified.
12. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.