Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

401. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 31, 1968, 0545Z.

11150. Eyes only for Godley from Sullivan. Ref: State 293220.²

1. Useful additional point for you to make in Prairie Fire meeting concerns marginality of effect which could be expected from MACV proposals. As we read current record of truck kills and interdiction effort on Ho Chi Minh Trail, air strikes are destroying approximately fifteen per cent of throughput. Even wildest Air Force claims do not exceed twenty per cent.

2. By inserting Prairie Fire teams under the trees in the two passes, it might be possible to raise the level of destruction a few percentage points, say to eighteen or nineteen per cent. Question has to be whether these few percentage points are worth the certain entrapments of teams, losses of lives and heavy propaganda risks.

3. Finally, it should be understood that neither of these areas can be serviced from current launch bases. Mu Gia will require a base in Thailand (probably NKP) and Ban Karai a forward site on the Bolovens Plateau. This makes this marginal effort a major peninsular move.

4. Ne illegitumi carburundum.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept. “Nodis” was handwritten on the source text.
2. In telegram 293220, December 30, Godley informed Sullivan, that the Department of Defense raised the issue of using Prairie Fire Teams in Mu Gia and Ban Karai pass areas. (Ibid.)