Office of the Historian

400. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

Honolulu, December 21, 1968, 0403Z.

210403Z. Threat in Laos (U). A. JCSM–650–68 of 30 Oct 68—Contingency Planning for Enemy Actions in Laos (S).2

1.
The renewed enemy offensive at Ban Tha Teng increases [our] concern over North Vietnamese Communist designs. The enemy’s new aggressiveness there further emphasizes that Laos represents two geographic [Page 787] fingers, one reaching south to Cambodia flanking northern South Vietnam; the other pressing against northern Thailand.
2.
The attacks at Tha Teng and the reported build-up against Attopeu and Saravane could presage a dramatic change of Communist policy; all three areas are west of the “de facto Geneva line” of the 1962 agreements. These latest maneuvers could lead to the acquisition of new territory in Laos, threatening Vientiane’s existing control in the southern panhandle. Additionally, the Bolovens Plateau is the key terrain for all U.S. operations plans in the panhandle. It is equally as important to the Communists.
3.
Thus far, the main strategic value of Laos has been as a corridor area. Communist forces are now increasingly active in areas which are of relatively minor import to the LOC/logistics system serving South Vietnam. In the event of reduced NVA participation in SVN, Hanoi could be expected to turn its attention westward.
4.
The following are likely enemy objectives:
A.
Seizure of the Bolovens Plateau.
B.
Coercion of the Royal Lao Government into abandoning Saravane and Attopeu.
C.
Expansion of operations in order to convince the United States that continued presence in Southeast Asia is futile.
D.
Enhancement of Communist efforts against a primary free world stronghold in SEA—Thailand.
5.
Current enemy actions in Laos could foretell an initial attempt toward achievement of all of the foregoing objectives. As the enemy’s intentions become more clear, it may well be that, as pointed out in Ref A, a complete reevaluation of U.S. position and strategy in Southeast Asia will be required. Hopefully, such a reevaluation would result in a favorable decision to implement the military actions outlined in Ref A.
6.
Very respectfully and warm regards.
  1. Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 2058. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan.↩
  2. See footnote 4, Document 392.↩