397. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain)1
Vientiane, December 3, 1968,
0553Z.
30553Z. Ref: CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68.2
- 1.
- Reftel proposes enlargement of Prairie Fire operating zone at Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. It has been examined here in considerable detail and with some anguish. It causes problems of a significant nature which have their roots in the very complex arrangements we have worked out for Prairie Fire over the years.
- 2.
- Fundamental to these arrangements has been the necessity to coordinate Prairie Fire operations on one side of the line and CAS guerrilla operations on the other. This coordination is important not only to avoid inadvertent fire fights between these different units operating independently, but also because the roles and missions of these units are basically different.
- 3.
- The CAS units have two distinct roles and never mix the two. They are either passive intelligence teams which deliberately avoid contact with the enemy or else they are special guerrilla teams which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes. It is our experience that these two types of operation can not be carried on in the same zone. The guerrilla actions always produce a reaction which would have the effect of sweeping intelligence teams out of their operating zone. Hence, we pick the areas for intelligence operations away from the areas where guerrillas operate.
- 4.
- Prairie Fire teams, on the other hand, combine both passive intelligence and active military operations. Even when the primary mission of the team is described as intelligence, we note that the mission usually involves at least one fire fight. Therefore, we consider them, on balance, to be essentially guerrilla rather than intelligence units.
- 5.
- As you may be aware, there is currently a special U.S. Intelligence Board action (involving CIA-State-Defense-JCS reps in Washington) which is assigning intelligence priorities in the Lao Panhandle. CAS Vientiane is under activities to measure North Vietnamese movements in critical areas. These involve certain points inside North Viet Nam and other points in Laos near the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.
- 6.
- Despite much juggling of operating zones to accommodate commando hunt bombing objectives, CAS has just completed a realignment [Page 781] of its intelligence teams in these critical areas to meet the Washington objectives. These teams operate in those same areas in which Prairie Fire has expressed an interest. For the reasons outlined above, it is not possible to mix Prairie Fire operations into this terrain.
- 7.
- On the other hand, at Washington request, CAS Vientiane has also established intelligence teams inside the Prairie Fire zone at the point where Route 1036 enters Laos. This is a precaution against the possibility that the North Vietnamese may decide to shift their pattern of truck traffic in order to take maximum advantage of shelter in North Viet Nam rather than exposing it to attack in Laos in the northern stretches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
- 8.
- This move into Prairie Fire territory has been coordinated with MACSOG, and causes little problem because Prairie Fire has not operated in this area for some time. If Prairie Fire currently has spare assets because it has terminated strata and other operations in North Viet Nam, this general area, which has been dormant for some time, would seem a logical place for them to be put to work. Although we would have to clear the matter with Washington, we would nevertheless be willing to entertain a request that the coverage of this particular territory be turned back as a Prairie Fire, rather than a CAS, responsibility.