Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

396. Paper Prepared by the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

US NEGOTIATING POSITION CONCERNING LAOS

Summary

I. Objectives in Laos (Tab A)²

A. United States: Since 1962, the United States has consistently supported the aims of the Geneva Agreements of 1962 to perpetuate Laos as a neutral national political entity serving as a buffer between Communist and non-Communist Asia.

B. Hanoi: There are two views of NVN objectives with respect to Laos: (1) that Hanoi desires to control all of Laos; (2) that Hanoi’s interests in Laos are limited to its value in seeking to control South Vietnam. The evidence seems to support the second view.

C. China: The present Chinese leadership probably regards NVN as a transmittal belt for wars of national liberation in SEA. Peking will probably press Hanoi to move vigorously in Laos so as to facilitate Communist control of the country and broaden support for insurgent efforts in Thailand.

D. USSR: The USSR apparently continues to regard the Geneva Accords of 1962 as offering the best means of attaining its purposes, and has consistently reaffirmed its support for the Accords. The neutralist solution gives the Soviet Union considerable flexibility and interposes a barrier to Chinese expansion in SEA.

II. Implications in Laos of Various Political Settlements in SVN (Tab B)

The future of Laos in the post-war period will, to a large extent, depend on the type of settlement achieved in SVN; the most favorable terms for the US would be inclusion of provisions for a return to the Geneva Accords of 1962.

However, the future of Laos will be determined more by what NVN intentions are for Laos than by any particular kind of settlement in SVN.

III. Diplomatic Actions During Negotiations (Tab C)

A. US: The initial negotiating position of the US should consistently and publicly tie our goals of NVN withdrawal from SVN to our goal of NVN withdrawal from Laos and should link the withdrawal of US forces from SVN with compliance by all parties with the 1962 Geneva Accords.

If in the end we conclude an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of NVN and US forces from SVN without reference to a similar withdrawal from Laos and without agreement on implementing the Geneva Accords of 1962, we probably cannot expect more than a maintenance of the present division in Laos and a scale down or cessation of hostilities. This can be sustained only if we are successful in deterring North Vietnam by inducing Asian and other states to maintain intense and prolonged diplomatic pressure against further NVN expansion. The threat of US or Thai military actions can, to some extent, also deter further NVN expansion. A scale down or a cessation of hostilities must be part of this course, both because the RLG cannot sustain its present level of hostilities indefinitely and because it would be extremely difficult for the US to provide necessary tactical air support after fighting in Vietnam was stopped.

B. NVN: It appears likely that Hanoi will keep its military activity in Laos in low key during the Paris negotiations and confine its activity to controlling such Laotian territory as is necessary to conduct military operations in SVN.

IV. Possible US Military Actions in Laos During and After Negotiations (Tab D)

If Hanoi continues to confine its objectives to control of such Laotian territory as is necessary to support operations in SVN, the level of US/RLG military activity in Laos should not increase. If, during the course of negotiations, Hanoi attempts to extend its domination over Laos, a selective increase in US military actions might be required although we could not prevent Hanoi from capturing most of Laos.

V. Post Settlement Laos (Tab E)

A. Hanoi’s Objective: At a minimum, the DRV will wish to consolidate its control over the area it now holds in Laos, and solidify the trappings of an “independent” Pathet Lao. Maintenance of NVN/PL control of northern Laos and areas contiguous to NVN will remain more important to Hanoi than the maintenance within Laos of a large military force. Having waited out US withdrawal, Hanoi could be expected to use its ample resources to assist the Pathet Lao to press for full control of Laos.

B. Soviet Objective: The USSR probably sees support for a coalition government as the best way to both restrain expanding Chinese influence and to avoid a larger conflict, possibly involving themselves. There is some likelihood, however, that the Soviets would mainly follow Hanoi’s lead, accepting the risks.

C. Chinese Objective: The Chinese probably fear that a Laos buffer zone might turn into a semi-permanent block to the extension of Chinese influence. Accordingly, Peking can be expected to urge Hanoi to take over all of Laos rapidly, using whatever military forces are required.

D. The Lao Government: The RLG, as in the past, will remain almost totally dependent on outside support from its friends and restraint on the part of its enemies. There is good reason to hope that with adequate outside economic and military assistance, the RLG can be sustained as the recognized authority in areas under its present control.

E. US Objectives: US objectives in Laos could be achieved through a reaffirmation of the Geneva Accords. If we are not to create serious misgivings in Thailand, however, it may be necessary to underscore with our actions and military posture outside of Laos’ borders our determination to see that a neutral Laos is preserved in fact as well as in name.

VI. Recommendations

1. At Paris, continue to link DRV withdrawal from SVN to DRV withdrawal from Laos. At the appropriate point, state that US withdrawals from SVN will be contingent upon DRV compliance with the 1962 Accords.

2. With Souvanna, urge him to take the lead in both highlighting the Laos problem and possibly in calling for a reconvening of the 1962 Geneva conferees. At some point, we may wish to separate the Laos and Vietnam negotiations.

3. With the Thais, continue to reassure them of our interest and commitment to their country’s independence. Discuss with them organizing greater Asian support for Laotian neutrality.

4. With the Soviets, begin a dialogue to remind them of our responsibilities in Laos and to suggest the consequences of an attempt by Hanoi to take over Laos before or after a settlement in South Vietnam.

5. With interested Asian Nations, try to focus their attention on Laos (where they may be more sympathetic to us than on Vietnam), and try to get them to organize an “Asian solution” to the Laos problem.

6. With respect to military actions during negotiations, continue military operations at their present level but be prepared to intensify air and ground operations, accompanied by increased Thai activities in Laos, if Hanoi attempts to extend its domination.

[Here follows the remainder of the paper.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Laos EE (1), 10/67–12/68. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was apparently prepared by EAP as a part of the interagency reassessment of policy toward Laos described in Documents 392 and 389.
2. The Tabs, comprising 25 pages, were attached but not printed.