Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

394. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McConnell) to Secretary of Defense Clifford¹

CM-3776–68

Washington, November 20, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Status of Air Interdiction in Laos (S)

1. During our meeting on 18 November, you requested a report on the status of our interdiction program in Laos.

2. (S) During the summer interdiction campaign in North Vietnam a strategy of impeding logistic flow by heavy saturation of selected LOC choke points was initiated. The terrain in the southern panhandle of NVN was particularly suitable to such a strategy as all logistics destined for Laos and SVN had to be channeled through approximately six key points.

3. (S) This same strategy is desirable but not as easily adaptable to the geography of Laos. There are few roads from NVN through Laos that can be entirely closed by aerial bombardment, due to more readily available by-passes and alternative routings. Consequently, in order to realize an effective degree of interdiction, it is necessary to commit a large number of attack and Arc Light aircraft against the entire LOC network. These strike forces (approximately 12,000 sorties per month) will operate in a closely integrated air campaign, the concept of which was forwarded to you on 16 October as “The Northeast Monsoon Plan.” This plan was initiated on 15 November 1968.

4. (S) The Northeast Monsoon Plan prescribes a concentrated, intensified air campaign designed to bring maximum pressure against the enemy LOC in Laos. The essence of this plan is a quantitative increase in sorties and qualitative improvements through further improvements in responsive command and control systems, strategic placement and coordinated monitoring of seismic and acoustic sensors (Igloo White), use of improved air munitions, and integration of other reconnaissance and intelligence resources. The requirement for improved air interdiction munitions in support of the campaign was submitted by CINCPAC, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to you by JCSM–668–68, dated 7 November 1968.² A significant increase in sorties began on 1 November (Enclosure);³ however, the qualitative improvement in munitions and sensors will be a gradual process as improved items complete development and test and reach production.

5. (S) Since the Northeast Monsoon Plan was not activated until 15 November 1968 it is too early to obtain a useful evaluation. The limited statistics in the Enclosure reflect the period 1–17 November 1968.⁴ This was a shakedown phase of the campaign and the results during this period cannot be considered criteria of effectiveness or potential. It should also be noted that the interdiction campaign is designed to destroy point and perishable area targets such as bridges, fords, truck parks, POL, and supply dumps as well as vulnerable road segments and trucks.

6. (S) MACV has a program for comprehensive evaluation of interdiction effectiveness in Laos. As the campaign progresses and a meaningful evaluation can be made, you will be informed.

John P. McConnell

1. Source: Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Laos 0385.1, 1968. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Clifford saw it.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. According to the first enclosure, “Sortie Rate Comparisons” from October 1967 through November 1968, attached but not printed, there were 5,119 sorties in October 1968 and a projected 12,000 in November 1968.
4. The second enclosure, attached but not printed, listed the types of targets destroyed or damaged during November 1–17.