393. Airgram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Assessment of U.S. Policy for Laos
REF
There is attached the Country Team Assessment of U.S. policy for Laos in which I concur. The Summary of this Assessment is as follows:
Summary
Both wars in Laos (in the North/Northeast and in the Panhandle/Ho Chi Minh Trail area) have maintained their see-saw character during the past nine months. Political restraints operating on both of the contest-ants and their supporters make improbable the achievement of a decisive military victory by either side. The Lao political scene during this period has been relatively stable with nearly all of the major civilian and [Page 772] military power centers supporting Souvanna Phouma, who continued to enjoy US/USSR support as well. The enemy has signalled that it has been preparing for political competition should the talks at Paris lead to an end to military hostilities in Laos.
The wars constituted a substantial drain on the small Lao economy, both financially and from the standpoint of manpower. Some progress toward self-sufficiency was made, however, and the production of rice and lumber increased in the secure area. The U.S. continued to bear most of the economic burden of keeping Laos solvent, assisted mainly by Japan, France, Great Britain and Australia.
The outlook for Laos during the next twelve months is directly related to progress or lack thereof at the Paris peace talks. Lack of progress would probably not have significant effect upon the conduct and result of the wars in Laos. The economy would progress only in the secure areas and the economic burden for Laos’ friends would be about the same. The political situation would show signs of strain, however, as the Lao will to continue the war began to erode and the effectiveness of Souvanna’s neutralist policies called into question. To achieve its goal in Laos (a viable, neutral, independent buffer state whose existence will reduce the risk of direct confrontation between North Vietnam and/or China on the one hand, and Thailand on the other, thereby diminishing the possibility of further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia) the U.S. would need to reassure the Lao of the firmness of our policy and of our resolve to see them through. The U.S. would also continue its efforts to persuade other nations, particularly in Asia, to share the burden even more.
If the Paris peace talks were to achieve a cease-fire in South Vietnam but not in Laos during the next twelve months, we would not expect the basic character of the wars in Laos to change, despite the consequent increased availability of NVN troops for duty in Laos. This judgment derives from the assumption that the existing political considerations which deter the NVN/PL from moving dramatically to the Mekong, despite their probable, current capability to do so, would continue to operate in the new situation. This assumption would be reinforced if Hanoi, which has shown that it can be sensitive to world opinion, decided that agreeing to a cease-fire in Vietnam while at the same time stepping up military activities in Laos would be an unacceptably inconsistent public posture.
Although the economic situation in Laos would not be significantly affected by a cease-fire in SVN, the political pulse here would certainly quicken. The prospect of possibly imminent peace would goad the friendly Lao into a semblance of unity as they prepared to compete politically with the Pathet Lao. Significant Lao political elements (primarily rightists and military), however, would probably seek solutions that did not involve integration of the PL into the government. Various ethnic [Page 773] tribal groups would seek to assure that their interests were considered in any future arrangements. Every nation with an interest in Laos would reassess its policies. The NVN/PL for their part would take steps to refurbish their political position. They would propose political formulas for settlement which would, if accepted, considerably enhance their political power and prestige. Cessation of U.S. bombing in Laos would be one of their main goals and they could probably focus sufficient public attention on this issue to force the RLG to ask for cessation in return for a PL promise to enter into “serious” negotiations. In all, it would be an active, delicate and trying political period, which would demand of the U.S. the utmost in flexibility, resourcefulness, skill and energy. We would very likely continue to support Souvanna Phouma as holding out the best hope for the various Lao factions. We would take all steps necessary to ensure that the agreement bringing peace to Laos was based upon the Geneva Accords of 1962.
If the Paris peace talks were to end hostilities in both Vietnam and Laos during the next twelve months, pressures would be strong to scale down the opposing military forces. The Lao military would insist upon retaining at least sufficient force, including its guerrilla capability, to overcome decisively any Lao-based unrest. The most important international political problem would be that of ensuring that all NVN elements departed Laos and that means were devised to prevent any significant re-infiltration. Internally, the warring factions would agree upon a formula for settlement which would be fragile at best and might in fact result in only the appearance of a settlement. There would be a period of very difficult adjustment to the new circumstances. Lao economic prospects would brighten as the reduced cost of the Armed Forces, the release of manpower and increased production of foreign exchange earners and of import substitutes (lumber, rice, tin, etc.) augured for eventual basic self-sufficiency. Great flexibility and caution would be required of the United States during this period. We would have to eliminate activities that could be reasonably interpreted as violating Lao neutrality and yet retain sufficient presence to be able to assist Laos in the ways the agreement will require. The prospect of a “permanent” peace in Laos should not, however, lull our sensitivity to the enemy’s ultimate aim of taking over Laos and we should be prepared to reverse rapidly the reduction of RLG Armed Forces as well as of our own presence in Laos should the enemy reveal his disregard for the agreement. The retention of some bases in Thailand would be required for this purpose.
[Here follows an 18-page enclosure entitled “U.S. Policy Assessment—Laos.”]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 LAOS–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, DIA, London, Moscow, and Tokyo.↩
- This Foreign Affairs Manual requirement stipulated year end assessments from posts.↩
- Document 391.↩