369. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1
Vientiane, May 30, 1968,
0847Z.
6924. For Admiral Sharp from Charge Hurwitch. Subj: Tactical Air Requirements for Laos. Ref: A. JCS 9149 DTG 152301Z May; B. State 172328 May 28; C. Vientiane 6896 May 29.2
- 1.
- It has occurred to me in reviewing history of messages concerning our tactical air problems in Laos that you may not have full background of situation which led to our pleas for augmentation of tactical resources to support our counter-insurgency operations.
- 2.
- Hard facts are that in past year we have been getting our air on targets less than 50 percent of the time we ask. TACAIR response to roadwatch team reports has, on average, run about 45 percent. If 10 to 20 percent of these failures can be ascribed to weather, this means that 35 to 45 percent of the time there were just no aircraft. Situation has improved somewhat since reduction in air operations in North Vietnam freed jets to conduct more strike sorties in Laos. I know that our respective staffs could juggle the statistics endlessly, but my conviction is that we are still not getting all we need on daily basis.
- 3.
- Seventh AF has usually responded well to our crisis requirements, such as present buildup at Site 36. However, we believe that many of these last-ditch, crisis situations might have been averted if we had sufficient strike resources on daily basis to hit enemy troops, staging areas, and supply bases before our positions are placed in jeopardy.
- 4.
- To cover adequately existing targets and to respond quickly to new, we estimate that in north Laos we require as daily minimum nine A–26 and twenty-six A–1 sorties (with flare ship support). In south Laos we need thirty A–1 sorties per day, four of which would be for infils/exfils, the balance for tactical targets. (We boosted our earlier estimate of requirements in south Laos based on developing tactical situation over past six months, identified hard targets, and estimate of required daily sortie rate.) Our minimum copter requirement is estimated to be 700 hours per month (200 hours in north Laos, 500 hours in south).
- 5.
- We believe that in addition to the tactical requirements above, we will probably continue to need, from time to time, concentrated strike efforts to meet fast-breaking tactical situations, such as occurred at Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) and Site 36. We would expect, however, that fewer such “surge” operations would be required if we receive our minimum daily sortie requirements.
- 6.
- You already have general outline of our TACAIR needs but I wanted to be sure that you knew more of the background of our requirements in order to formulate “revalidation” recommendation requested by JCS. Question of adequacy of US air support looms large in future of our counter-insurgency operations in Laos.
Warm regards.
Hurwitch