Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

368. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Spivy)¹

Honolulu, May 24, 1968, 0229Z.

DTG 240229Z. A. JCS 04864/062200Z May 68 (Notal).² B. CINCPAC 120141Z May 68.³

1. Ref A requested additional views concerning operations in Laos. Ref B provided the CJCS with an analysis of the effects of a bombing cessation and informed him of how the air campaign would be organized and managed to enhance our overall operations, including aerial reconnaissance.

2. Our current overt and covert military programs in Laos have been reviewed. Any radical change of ground operations in Laos at this time would be counter-productive. Deployment of U.S. ground forces of any significant size into Laos would be particularly undesirable. NVN still has the capability to overrun all of Laos in a matter of days if they choose and a sizeable deployment of US/FWF in Southern Laos might well spark such a reaction. Deployment of even a corps-size force in southern Laos on a permanent basis would not prevent a complete takeover of northern Laos by the NVN.

3. The cessation of all bombing and NGF in NVN would permit a sharply accelerated and unimpeded flow of men and supplies into Laos and SVN, resulting from the release of forces previously occupied in LOC and facility repair and in air and coastal defense. Since we would be deprived of the advantage of striking enemy resources at or near the source, it follows that to compensate for this loss we must increase our operations around the entire perimeter of SVN. Although your message addresses only operations in Laos to reduce the flow of men and materiel through that country, we need also to emphasize the restriction of enemy movement through the DMZ, along the SVN coast and through Cambodia.

4. The following is a resume of improvements and changes in Laos which would be desirable in event of cessation of all bombing of NVN:

A. Cessation of bombing in all of NVN will release presently available assets for intensifying the air war in Laos and SVN. A comprehensive and coordinated air effort using the additional resources should further inhibit the use of LOCs and staging areas in Laos. However it must be recognized that during the summer monsoon period visual bombing is largely ineffective in Laos. The following changes to operating rules in Laos are required to optimize the application of these air assets:

(1) Authority to attack targets of opportunity when located within 200 yards of a motorable road or trail should be expanded to 1,000 yards to provide strike flexibility in Zones II and III of Steel Tiger.

(2) FAC’s are required for strikes outside of the 200 yard limit in Zone II, and within all areas of Zones III and IV and Barrel Roll areas A, B and C. (Strikes may be made in Zone III if under MSQ 77 control.) These restrictions should be modified. If not, additional FAC aircraft and personnel will be required to provide control for increased strikes in Laos.

B. Improvements in the air supported Muscle Shoals anti-infiltration system can be realized by expanding the area for employing hand emplaced sensors. Presently spike teams are restricted to operations in the Prairie Fire area. Additionally, a reasonable increase of exploitation forces up to battalion size on a case basis should be authorized. This will give the teams greater staying power in the face of enemy opposition and increase the effectiveness of the combined indigenous/special force teams.

C. Leaflet drops in Laos should be increased and refined to obtain optimum exploitation of PLA as well as infiltrating NVA.

D. Employment of MSQ-77 radar bombing should be expanded to ensure all-weather operation. This can be done by locating an MSQ facility at Site 98 or other suitable location, to provide coverage over a wider area.

E. Comint and ARDF coverage of Laos and NVN should be increased to permit early warning of enemy intentions.

F. An additional program for consideration would be to expand guerrilla operations in Laos. MACV SOG has identified the Bru Tribe in the Annamite mountains as having a guerrilla potential.

5. The program for advisory and logistical support for RLG military units should continue generally in its present scope and an accelerated expansion of the program is not warranted. It will take years of training before FAR/FAN forces achieve operational competence. A rapidly expanded program would cause unfavorable political implications, tend to extend U.S. commitments and project a climate of escalation.

6. It is important that we continue the reconnaissance of NVN to provide maximum intelligence on movement of men and supplies. Reconnaissance over Laos should be increased to the level necessary to ensure adequate support of stepped up interdiction strikes in that area.

7. Increased authorization is required for intelligence collection in the Laos and Cambodian areas. This is particularly pertinent in Laos where U.S. military is severely restricted by the Geneva Accords. Present restrictions necessitate our operating through third country nationals over whom only limited control or influence can be imposed.

Warm regards.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 May–31 May 1968. Top Secret. Repeated to Westmoreland, General Beach (CINC–USARPAC), General Ryan (CINPACAF), and Admiral Hyland (CINCPACFLT). Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivy, Jr., was Director of the Joint Staff April 1, 1967–July 31, 1968.
2. Not found, but summarized below.
3. In this telegram, May 12, Sharp stated that if a bombing halt against North Vietnam was directed, “a major effort will have to be concentrated against Laos LOCs and the DMZ area.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 May–31 May 1968)