362. Letter From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Country Director for Laos and Cambodia (Herz)1
Dear Martin:
Thank you for your letter of March 232 in which you asked for our comments and assessment of the contingency study which accompanied your letter. I have had the appropriate members of the staff go over the study and our collective views follow.
We all agree that the study is very well-organized, covers the essential points and is a reasonable and realistic assessment of the situation. This is all the more remarkable considering the pressure upon you and the haste with which it must have been put together.
We all share your dismay over the dismal state of the US military capability to react to a “Drang nach Western.” Nor are the prospects for enhanced capability encouraging. This plight of the military places even greater premium upon the political restraints currently operating to keep the Lao situation on reasonably even keel and should, therefore, make us all even more sensitive than heretofore to the serious damage that removing these political restraints would eventually entail.
Concomitantly, overt U.S. military operations in Laos would carry with them an undeniable US commitment to Laos—we would commit our prestige to the protection of all of Laos once having openly sent troops into the country. The advantage of our military posture in Laos today is that, were it to be unfortunately necessary, we could fold our tents and fade quietly away, for we have made no overt military commitment. These are the major points that I wish to make with respect to the study and ones that I trust will be constantly borne in mind by our top policy-makers when they are repeatedly badgered to acquiesce in seemingly simple US military operations in Laos.
Our remaining comments are keyed to the order of your study. With regard to your first assumption, we question whether the small forces maneuvering in open country would be highly vulnerable to air power. We think that these forces would undoubtedly move at night for the most part and we doubt that we could do them much damage, even with several squadrons of Sopwith-Camels all piloted by Red Barons.
You are right when you say that the US has no defense commitments to Laos. The Lao, however, regard the Geneva Accords as a vehicle for [Page 712] their protection, and in the event of a violation or threat of extinction, Laos would look to the signatory nations to honor their commitment to maintain Lao sovereignty, etc. Souvanna has made this point to us many times. As you recall, when Souvanna was asked not too long ago (when the NVN/PL seemed to be really pushing) whether in appealing to signatory nations he was not in fact asking for troops, he replied that the manner in which the signatory nations fulfilled their obligations was their affair.
Our reasoning is that if the enemy were to violate the Geneva Accords in a manner to threaten Laos’ survival, Souvanna would press hard within the Accords for meaningful Article 4 action. He would look to us primarily—and in light of our stated policy and interests, we would have to conjure up some sort of reply. Given the prevailing military situation, it seems that we would have to rely essentially upon political/psychological measures. If we failed and Laos were about to go under, we think that then and only then would Souvanna resign—as admission that the Geneva Accords upon which he had staked his basic policy were ineffective. But we do think that he would remain in place and play out the Accords to the end. This view differs in emphasis from that expressed in the last two full paragraphs on page 3 of the study regarding probable Souvanna actions. (We would expect Laos also to engage in a series of bilateral efforts to extricate itself—USSR, Thailand—in addition to the multi-national approach, but with little if any positive result.)
You have my 5692 regarding covert and overt use of Thai air assets.3
With respect to US military actions which might have some psychological value in the event Hanoi goes hog-wild, we like to keep the possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam dangling before military eyes—either as a real threat, or as a bargaining counter which brings them to the table.
Finally, I think that we all ought to recognize flatly that project 22 exists on paper only. Your study mentioned that many of the Thai units destined for this project do not even exist. We might just as well confess that the US forces of 138,440 “committed” to the project do not exist either—therefore, no Project 22. Moreover, since it has recently been compromised, I think it ought to be forgotten.
Of course, all these considerations may be altered in the next few weeks if we really get down to serious negotiations. At that stage, I think, as I have suggested to the IRG, that your efforts are better expended on relating Laos to the negotiating picture and seeing what advantages can be drawn from the strengths of the position we do have here, rather than reinforcing our weaknesses. That should be a truly educational exercise for the Pentagon and, perhaps, the White House.
[Page 713]We hang on bated breath to hear whether it’s true about you replacing Arch Calhoun in Saigon. I sincerely hope not. It would seem most upsetting to do that to you—and to us—at this moment.
All the best.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394, TS. Top Secret.↩
- Document 348.↩
- Dated April 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩