349. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

SUBJECT

  • SEACOORD Recommendations2

The SEACOORD recommendations seem to me to be based on the assumption that we can take additional military actions in Laos, and that otherwise the situation stays the same.

That assumption is almost certainly incorrect. The enemy will certainly take steps to counter our ploy. They will attempt to destroy our forces introduced on to their supply line. And they may very possibly use our action as a pretext for an assault upon major Laotian cities.

In short, if we “hot up” the war in Laos we can expect with confidence that the enemy will do the same for he has consistently shown fewer inhibitions in Laos than we have shown. And he has the resources on the spot. Unless we are prepared to contemplate a major war in Laos with the overt commitment of American resources we had better be very careful, indeed, in deciding on the SEACOORD recommendations.

Marshall Wright 3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5EE (1) Laos, 10/67–12/68. Top Secret; Exdis.
  2. See the attachment to Document 345.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.