Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State ¹

Vientiane, March 23, 1968, 0620Z.

5333. Ref: State 135397.²

1. I regard MACV proposal as part of its continuing two pronged campaign (a) to extrude itself from CINCPAC line of command, and (b) to encroach further with its high risk Prairie Fire operations which in practice have proved to have infinitesimal military value relative to political considerations.

2. Since Admiral Sharp and I see eye to eye on these matters, I find it useful to keep him in the picture, not only with respect to this particular set of operations, but in the overall introduction of value judgements to increasingly myopic proposals.

3. Secondly, if we permitted direct Saigon-Vientiane resolution of these matters, we would be deluged by a flood of proposals from MACSOG (which has nothing else to do) and which would require a lot of our valuable time batting down.

4. In practice, we have been able to work the current system quite satisfactorily. The last proposal cleared Vientiane, Honolulu and Washington in less than 24 hours. However, 36 hours later the “urgent” operation has not taken place because MACV has not accorded MACSOG high enough priority to merit an allocation of helicopters for this particular stunt.

5. You are doubtless aware that I regard MACSOG as a dubious organization of marginal value and that my views are shared by many senior military officers in Saigon, Honolulu and Washington. Perhaps under the new management in Saigon they will quietly disappear. At any rate, we hope Dept will do all possible to keep them off our backs, because they distract time and energy to no particular avail.

6. Therefore, I would recommend Dept continue to hold off JCS on this and other related questions at least until views of new COMUSMACV ³ are better known on whole range of cross border adventures and the relation such measures have to more mundane tasks within Viet Nam itself.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Dept.
2. In telegram 135397 to Vientiane, March 23, the Department of State agreed with Sullivan that coordination for Prairie Fire operations should not be limited to U.S. officials in Saigon and Vientiane. The Department agreed that Washington officials should have a role and was prepared to support Sullivan on that point. (Ibid.)
3. On July 2 General Creighton W. Abrams became COMUSMACV.