344. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
5187. 1. As we enter last few weeks of dry season without visible reduction North Vietnamese presence or activities, Lao are bracing themselves for another series of enemy attacks. This time there is somewhat less sense of panic than in February and a more careful measuring of circumstances. However, there is also an underlying worry and fatalism, which reflects a broad scale of uncertainties. Chief among these are apparent inability of friendly forces in South Vietnam to reassert initiative, especially in countryside and marks of diminishing support for war in United States.
2. All senior Lao military were gathered in conferences with Souvanna here in Vientiane for nearly three days of discussion this week. Basic thrust of their discussions concerned reorganization of staff and field commands, but sessions provided best opportunity in my experience here for political and military views to be brought into common focus. General Vang Pao, who attended all sessions, told Emboff he considered them most professional he has known. Fact that he and Phasouk (who spent only two days here) were present and active contributors to discussions probably had a lot to do with their realism.
3. Interspersed with his meetings with the generals, Souvanna had me in for a half dozen sessions, culminating in a seance yesterday afternoon which brought me, my AIRA, CAS Station Chief and photo-interpreter into conclave with Souvanna and his ten generals. Purpose of this session was to plan expanded bombing campaign against targets in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua provinces, including several which have been off limits until now. These strikes have been requested by Vang Pao, but I insisted on having Souvanna personally accept responsibility for targeting, so that he and Vang Pao and general staff could draw lines distinguishing between legitimate military objectives and civilian population centers.
4. As consequence this session, we came up with significant spread of targets which have been passed on to 7th AF. Latter has already advised us of their readiness to react to this request and we assume that air campaign will begin next week, weather permitting.
5. In addition requests for air strikes, Souvanna and his generals asked for expedited delivery of certain types equipment, particularly artillery [Page 671] and crew served weapons. Most of these are already en route, but we have submitted additional requisitions through appropriate channels. Only two items on which I boggled were 106mm. recoilless rifles and tank. Requests for both these items are obviously engendered by reports of enemy tanks and armored vehicles in Lao Ngam area and recent experience with same at Ban Houie Sane. Moreover, Vang Pao feels he would like to use 106’s against enemy artillery, if he can move guerrilla teams close to their batteries.
6. Since I have made negative noises about these two items and since they are not in our MAP program, we could probably finesse this request if we have to. However, if more PR76 or other tanks show up again in Laos, issue is sure to rise once more. Therefore, suggest Dept. take counsel with Defense and advise contingency views for our possible use.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, JCS, COMUSMACV, 7 AF, and 7/13 AF.↩