343. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State 1
Vientiane, March 14, 1968,
0841Z.
5136. Ref: A. Vientiane 5123. B. AIRA Vientiane 00341 (notal).2
- 1.
- Fall of Pha Thi (Site 85) in Sam Neua Province opens a new time of troubles for Vang Pao and the Meos of Military Region II. The size of the attacking forces and their heavy supporting weapons are greater than anything friendly troops can muster in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, there is no alternative but to evacuate friendly troop units and their dependents in order maintain them intact for counterattack activity in rainy season. Ref A indicates dimension of refugee problem with which we are attempting to cope. A fleet of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft is engaged in this effort today.
- 2.
- It should be borne in mind that North Vietnam mounted attack of this size and intensity because it wished eliminate U.S. installation, which had become “attractive nuisance” for them. Consequently, this vast uprooting of human resources and abandonment of useful territory is direct result U.S., rather than RLG, operational interests.
- 3.
- Site 36, which is used as forward launch base for ARS helicopters, is another U.S.-dedicated activity which will doubtless also attract enemy attention. Although it is more heavily defended than Site 85, it is questionable whether it can withstand a determined assault by seven NVN battalions, the strength we feel enemy is probably able to deploy against it.
- 4.
- Faced with these prospects, Vang Pao has sent message to Prime Minister Souvanna and to me asking for maximum air strikes against a series of targets in Military Region II. Most of the targets are in or lie close to towns and other centers of civilian population which Prime Minister has previously asked us to avoid. I went over list with Souvanna yesterday and we agreed to have U.S. photo-interpreters examine prospects for carefully controlled strikes against a number of Vang Pao’s targets. We agreed to take joint look at photography as soon as my people can get target folders assembled.
- 5.
- Last evening subsequent to discussions reported para 4, Souvanna told me he had received disturbing message from Vang Pao which he interpreted as preparation for withdrawal from additional forward territory in Region II, raising prospect that north and east defenses of Vientiane plains would be significantly reduced in depth. Souvanna felt this was imprudent and hoped to dissuade Vang Pao from any such steps. He felt he needed assurances of air strikes as persuader for Vang Pao and again urged early meeting on subject.
- 6.
- Comment: Subsequent Embassy discussion with Vang Pao, who came to Vientiane for military meeting this morning, indicates Souvanna may have misunderstood his message. He reportedly was referring merely to location of new refugee centers rather than relocation of old. Of some possible interest to Embassy Bangkok was his thought of placing some of his Meo refugees in hills of Sayaboury, along Lao border with Nan province in Thailand.
Sullivan