Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

286. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)¹

Honolulu, May 13, 1967, 0319Z.

130319Z. SLAM expansion. A. COMUSMACV MACCOC2 12796/180059Z Apr 67.²

1. Ref message proposed a two-phase extension of the SLAM concept. Phase I involves the employment of a reinforced ARVN battalion, Airborne or Ranger, to exploit intelligence gained by Prairie Fire assets. Phase II visualizes employment of an ARVN division-size task force in sustained operations against enemy bases in Laos.

2. As ref message points out, Prairie Fire forces are now encountering well-armed and well-trained company or larger sized NVA troops who are willing to fight to protect their supply bases and keep their LOCs open. This is to be expected when considering that Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons conducted continuous operations in the SLAM III area for almost six weeks. The results of Prairie Fire operations in SLAM III are impressive.

3. You propose the use of regular ARVN forces up to division size. A commitment of large RVNAF ground forces into Laos will almost certainly be opposed by a large commitment of North Vietnamese ground forces to protect their valuable base areas. Thus, a chain of requirements could be initiated of almost open-ended proportions, including the commitment of sizeable US ground forces to assist the beleaguered ARVN.

4. The commitment of regular GVN troops into Laos could not be done covertly. Indeed, it is improbable that the plan could be kept secret once GVN is consulted. Thus, there would be an overt violation of the Geneva Accords which would put Souvanna Phouma and his government in jeopardy. Consider it far preferable to maintain our ground posture in Laos by the use of non-regular, deniable ground forces. Serious consideration of the political complications is required before initiating overt operations which would move the battleground into Laos.

5. Our operations in Laos should be oriented primarily toward maximizing destruction of enemy facilities, base areas, LOCs, and, where feasible, his forces at minimum cost to US. Air power, both tactical and Arc Light, can do this for us when the necessary pin-point intelligence can be made available. Prairie Fire operations do this effectively and at low risk and cost. While in full agreement with the need for increased pressure against the enemy in Laos, it would appear more logical to substantially increase the numbers of Spike Teams and Hornet Force operations, thereby acquiring the necessary intelligence for bringing air power more fully to bear. Use of recon/intelligence Spike Teams is limited only by numbers of teams available and helicopter support. It is now permissible to use up to three Hornet Force platoons in one operation at any given time. There is no restriction on numbers of operations. Efforts to bring the three Prairie Fire battalions, now authorized, to full strength should be accelerated to the extent practicable.

6. Increasing Prairie Fire operations to pin-point enemy targets and then destroying such targets by the use of air power, appears to provide the most practical, as well as the most politically acceptable, means to increase pressures on the enemy at least cost and risk to our primary objectives in Laos and SVN. Action to gain JCS approval for use of ARVN regular forces in Laos is not planned at this time.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/Admin Files: FRC 72 A 2467, Laos (Laos 385) 1967. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to JCS, CINCUSARPAC, and Vientiane.
2. Not found, but the substance is described in the text.