285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
191165. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Please pass the following message to the Foreign Minister:
“Dear Mr. Gromyko: I have given considerable thought to the oral demarche on Laos which Ambassador Dobrynin made to Ambassador Kohler on April 12.2
We do not, of course, accept the charges outlined in that demarche. To the extent that the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Laos have been impaired since the Geneva Agreements of 1962, these unfortunate and dangerous developments are a direct result of North Vietnamese refusal to accept the essential provisions of those Agreements. On more than one occasion we have called to the attention of representatives of the Soviet Union the refusal of North Viet-Nam to withdraw its military forces from Laos, to cease the intimidation of Laos and infiltration of men and arms into South Viet-Nam, the obstruction of the proper functioning of the coalition government of Laos in Pathet Lao held areas and the refusal of Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese elements to permit the ICC to function freely throughout the country. However, we do not believe that it serves a useful purpose merely to exchange charges about what has happened in the past. We believe that the Soviet Union and the United [Page 575] States have special responsibilities to Laos because of the circumstances in which the Geneva Accords of 1962 came into being. We believe, therefore, it would be more useful, in the light of our grave joint responsibilities for peace, to turn our common attention to the question of vindicating and enforcing those important agreements, and to do so as quickly as possible.
My government has always supported and continues to support what the Bucharest statement of July 7, 1966, calls ‘the strict observance’ of the 1962 Geneva Agreements.3 We believe that it is a matter of urgency to take whatever steps are necessary to restore and reaffirm them. Various suggestions have been made since 1964 about how to set such a process in motion. Action to this end might be initiated by the Co-Chairmen. The Laos Conference could be reconvened. The ICC could be strengthened and asked to take more active responsibilities. Or we could undertake other steps in the spirit of the Harriman-Pushkin agreement.
My government would welcome any opportunity, in any forum, to restore peace and stability to Laos. In particular, we would support the reconvening of the Laos Conference of 1962 in order to make the Laos Agreements an effective instrument of peace.
If other ways seem more promising to you, my government will give them serious consideration.
I will be pleased to discuss the question of Laos and related matters with Ambassador Dobrynin when he returns to Washington. Alternatively, if you prefer that these matters be discussed with Ambassador Thompson, we would be entirely agreeable. If you prefer some other procedure we will be glad to give any suggestion which you might have to make the most prompt and sympathetic attention. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Eugene Rostow, Unger, William Bundy, and Walt Rostow.↩
- See Document 280.↩
- For text of the statement issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, July 6, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832–834.↩