27. Transcript of a Teletype Conference Between the Ambassador to Laos (Unger) and Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Coup in Laos
PARTICIPANTS IN SAIGON
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Lodge
- Assistant Secretary Bundy
- Mr. de Silva
Secretary: We are ready. Please go ahead with latest situation.
Unger: See Saigon 2342 sent immediate for situation thru 1600. Since then I have seen Gen. Kouprasith and Siho just as they were preparing for scheduled 4:00 P.M. press conference. I told them U.S. could not accept or support action taken this morning, that USG supports Government of National Union under framework of Geneva Accords. I showed them Department press statement (ToSec 66).3 Generals taken aback, asked in effect what could be done. I pressed for release of detained neutralists. Generals stated Souvanna and Minister PTT Tiao Sisoumang “being released” and Min Interior Pheng Phongsavan missing, did not mention neutralist figures.
Secretary: Your 234 not yet received.
Would it make sense for us and others to urge the King to gather all the notables and tell them the time has come to put an end to so much nonsense, to send away all foreigners meddling in their affairs and to support a Government of National Union designated by him to run the country.
Give priority to transmission your 234.
(Vientiane’s 234 repeated Dept. 1146 then transmitted)
Unger: I asked whether Revolutionary Committee considered itself a government and they replied in negative. They indicated they did not know what action to take re Government of National Union, which I said is only Government we recognize, since they had already announced it dissolved.
[Page 50]They asked for advice and I said they must reinstate Government National Union. I added suggestion on strictly personal basis, they might explain to public they had acted because of concern over security to which Souvanna’s declared intention to resign had given rise. Now security restored, Government National Union reinstated, and question of Souvanna’s resignation will be handled in constitutional manner. Generals took this in, indicated only that they would consider some revision their intended statement and would be in touch with Souvanna.
I repeated before leaving that we could not accept or acknowledge group on basis of this morning’s action. If Souvanna resigned and King accepted, we would face new situation in which I did not know U.S. position but as of now we recognize only Souvanna as PriMin of coalition government.
Throughout conversation, both Kouprasith and Siho gave impression of being badly frightened little boys who now realize they have climbed too far out on limb and uncertain how to proceed or whether to draw back.
After my meeting with them Generals met press and distributed list of executive committee of Revolutionary Committee (by septel).4 Kouprasith subsequently issued statement that army, which has worked twenty years for independence, could not be instrument of coalition government which by its deficiencies and divisions had come to face stalemate and in this situation has risen to overthrow the (coalition), reestablish peace, improve the economic situation, bring happiness and democracy to the population. We proclaim our fidelity to the King and the population and we hope the population supports us.
I have now just come from seeing Phoumi to whom I made familiar arguments. He professed his disgust with infantile action of Siho (whom he primarily blames) and agreed to urge him and Kouprasith to restore situation to status quo ante. When I left him those two were waiting to see Phoumi and I hope he will live up to his promise and with good effect. He also promised try to reach Souvanna and explain his non-involvement in coup. Whatever responsibility Phoumi may bear for coup, he now seems to have decided to disassociate himself from Revolutionary Committee entirely.
All further circulation Vientiane now ruled out by curfew. Tomorrow morning I will try see Souvanna and Phoui Sananikone, believing latter bears considerable responsibility for Kouprasith and Siho actions. Will also try see Soviet Ambassador.
Unless Revolutionary Committee has reinstated Government of National Union tomorrow morning I am ordering Americans actually [Page 51] working in Lao Govt as advisers, etc. to remain absent from work and will seek avoid any action which appears to recognize or in any sense support Revolutionary Committee. This is in line with course of action agreed among 4 Ambassadors.
Secretary: International reaction may become crucial to General’s attitude. Do not hesitate to press United Kingdom, French, Australian Ambassadors to put aside niceties and make their position clear direct to Revolutionary Committee. Such contact cannot possibly confer recognition which is clearly a matter of intention.
Unger: Latest radio communique of Revolutionary Committee reports congratulations and sympathy from Kong Le to Kouprasith, stating his troops happy to join in coup. ICC, on other hand, has message via its PDJ team from Kong Le to British and Soviets saying Kong Le remains faithful to policy of neutrality under Souvanna Phouma. AARMA sent to contact Kong Le has not returned at this hour.
Secretary: Please reply our items one and two.
I plan to leave for Washington tomorrow morning as scheduled unless you have some urgent thought otherwise. In this situation you and your colleagues will richly earn the pay you don’t get and we shall be giving you all possible support. Congratulations on your handling thus far. Anything else? Assume you are reporting fully to Washington.
Unger: (Reply to item one).
If we can make contact with King, if situation not already rectified by then, and if King willing (which questionable) this could be done. Unclear, however, who are foreigners. Designation of new Government of National Union to replace present one of pre-coup situation would of course raise numerous very tricky questions involving Pathet Lao concept, etc. Revolutionary Committee which currently in charge Vientiane would also have to agree.
Secretary: I mean by foreigners the Viet Minh and assume the Government of National Union would start with Souvanna Phouma.
Unger: (Reply to item two).
I believe it important that GVN be advised against expressing support for action of coup group, particularly in dealing with FAR General Oudone Sananikone and other emissaries of Phoumi presently in Saigon. Similarly believe it important Thai Govt be cautioned against giving evidence of support for action against constituted Govt—action from which some of leaders at least now show some signs of wishing to retreat.
Secretary: This has already been done by Ambassador Lodge and General Khanh has shown full understanding and has agreed not to act without full consultation with US.
If you have nothing else we are departing this end.
[Page 52]Unger: Soviet Ambassador, whom I have not seen but with whom British in continuing contact, shares general unwillingness deal directly with Kouprasith. He makes much of his belief in Thai complicity.
Thanks for all support. It has helped having you nearby. We’ll do our damndest to work out problem. Bon Voyage.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Mar/June 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Unger was in Vientiane; Rusk was in Saigon. The date of the teletype conference is Saigon time, 13 hours ahead of Washington time.↩
- Telegram 234 to Saigon, sent also to the Department of State as 1146, April 19, 6 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩
- Dated April 19. (Ibid., POL 23–9 LAOS) See footnote 2, Document 22.↩
- Not found.↩