Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 12, 1966, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Hanoi-Peking-Moscow Impact on Laos; Tripartitism

PARTICIPANTS

• H.H. Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
• H.E. Sisouk na Champassak, Minister of Finance of Laos
• H.E. Khamking Souvanlasy, Ambassador of Laos
• The Secretary
• Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Ceremonial Affairs
• Mr. William C. Hamilton, Country Director Lao Affairs

The Secretary greeted Souvanna and, noting that Southeast Asia is an area of great preoccupation for us, said he would be interested in what Souvanna could tell us about what is going on in Hanoi.² After expressing his regret that he would be unable to lunch with the Secretary on October 13, because of his appointment with the President in New York,³ the Prime Minister stated that the Lao knew very little about what was going on at Hanoi. There had been no sign that North Vietnam wanted to initiate talks to end the war, in spite of great difficulties because of US bombing of means of communications and vital centers of North Vietnam. Evidence of the difficulty shows in a decline in North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao.

Unfortunately Communist China’s influence is increasing, replacing NVN’s influence on the Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought the Secretary would know of statements by Pathet Lao leaders (Souphanouvong, Singkapo, Sot) to the effect that Mao’s thought must be the guide of revolutionary people. This is surprising and worrisome for no such statements have come from North Vietnamese themselves.

The Prime Minister declared that direct Chinese Communist aid was coming to the Pathet Lao. North Vietnam is not in a position to supply the Pathet Lao with items they need because of their own internal troubles. All aid comes from China. The Lao have spotted a number of aircraft over the Plaine des Jarres, continued the Prime Minister. Since North Vietnam would use trucks and since they have no planes, these planes must be Chinese. Furthermore, recent intelligence shows that North Vietnamese troops in Northern Laos (Muong Sing-Nam Tha) have been relieved by Chinese Communist (Lu) troops. Souvanna said the RLG concern at the moment is to extend its zone of operations north of Luang Prabang.

At a later point in the conversation, the Secretary observed that perhaps the most important development in the area today is what is going on inside China. Did the Prime Minister feel that a more moderate leadership would emerge? Souvanna commented that only good can come out of the situation as far as the free world is concerned. There is strong opposition to the Red Guard among the people and the military. Even today, most Chinese people have lived under the former regime. They are traditionalists; we might almost say conservatives. The Red Guard had gone so far as to accuse the widow of Sun Yat Sen, which was a major blunder because she is greatly respected even within China.

Today Mao alone dominates the scene, Souvanna continued. He’s sick, however, and the Prime Minister wondered how long he will last. In 1961, he had needed to sit in an arm chair to ride in the elevator from the 1st to the 2nd floor. If Mao goes, the regime cannot hold. Lin Piao is sick also. Souvanna thought we must do something to help topple the regime, which he did not think would be too hard. “Should we use a stick or a carrot?” asked the Secretary. “Both,” replied the Prince. Souvanna said he had information that many Chinese were trying to leave China. There were perhaps two or three million Red Guard with a hard core of four to five hundred thousand. The rest followed from fear.

The Secretary asked Souvanna to do all he could to enlist the Soviets in support of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. He said it was his impression that the Soviet Union did not want a major conflagration in SEA. It was important to hold the Soviets to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. The Prime Minister responded that this is what the Lao are trying to do. This is why they strive to maintain the tripartite government. It does not disturb them to keep open the seats of the absent Pathet Lao. Souvanna thought that in the near future, if a complete diplomatic break took place between Moscow and Peking, the Soviet Union could then assume a more constructive, more positive role with respect to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Until there is such a break, Moscow hesitates. Moscow is still trying to bring China back into the Communist world. After a final break, he concluded, Moscow will have a different attitude.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton and Alex Toumayan of Language Services and approved in S on October 25. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book the meeting began at 3:05 p.m. (Johnson Library) A typed note on the source text reads “Part I of VI.”
2. On October 11 William Bundy sent Rusk talking points and biographic sketches for this meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS)
3. See Document 259.
4. Rusk and Souvanna also discussed U.S.-Laos relations as recounted in a separate memorandum. During this brief and general discussion, Souvanna reiterated his concern that the United States should bomb North Vietnamese troops in Laos, but should not talk about it. (Memorandum of conversation, October 12; Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS–US) Rusk and Souvanna also discussed North Vietnam’s reaction to a possible halt in U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. (Telegram 66984 to Vientiane, October 16; ibid., POL 7 LAOS)