147. Memorandum of Conversation1
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964
SUBJECT
- Laos
PARTICIPATION
-
U.S.
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Stevenson
- Ambassador Kohler
- Mr. Tyler
- Mr. Taylor—BTF
- Mr. McIntyre—BTF
- Mr. Akalovsky
-
U.S.S.R
- Mr. Gromyko
- Ambassador Dobrynin
- Ambassador Fedorenko
- Mr. Smirnovskiy
- Mr. Falin
- Mr. Sukhodrev
The Secretary recalled his brief private conversation with Mr. Gromyko the other day2 on the subject of Laos and said he wanted to make a [Page 301] few further comments. In the course of that conversation, Mr. Gromyko had indicated that we should await the discussions among the three Laotian factions and see how they proceeded. We now gathered that Souvanna Phouma had sent a message to Souvannavong suggesting discussions, but we had no information as to the latter’s reaction. The Secretary wondered whether Mr. Gromyko knew anything about Souvannavong’s reaction and also what his own estimate was of the prospects for such discussions.
Mr. Gromyko replied he had no information.
The Secretary expressed the hope that the three factions would be able to establish effective contact and that progress towards the full implementation of the 1962 Geneva accords would be made. Our position, which we had repeated on numerous occasions, was that all those involved in Laos, and particularly the signatories of the Geneva accords, should strictly comply with those accords. Perhaps the first move in that direction could be discussion among the three factions, which we hoped would bring concrete results.
Mr. Gromyko said that Soviet Union had always welcomed discussion of internal questions between the three Laotian parties. Unfortunately, the other side, i.e., the rightists led by Phoumi Nosavan, and in part also Souvanna, did not want to cooperate with the third party. One recent example of this was the designation of the Laotian delegation to the UN, which had been made without agreement among the three, who had different positions on this matter. The Soviet Union believed that the rightists were to blame for the situation in Laos. This was the Soviet appraisal of the situation, an appraisal which the Soviet Union had always regarded to be correct and which it continued to maintain. As far as the U.S. was concerned, the Soviet Government had believed and continued to believe that it would be best if the U.S. withdrew from Laos all of its forces, both military and para-military, and particularly the air force now stationed in that country. Such an action would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko continued that there was no need for convincing the Soviet Union of the necessity of implementing the 1962 accords. As he had told the Secretary both in Geneva and in New York, the Soviet Union considered that the accords should be fully implemented, and this remained Soviet policy. He said he was glad to hear from the Secretary that he was of the same opinion, but wished to point out that there should be no discrepancy between U.S. words and deeds.
The Secretary said he wished to state very clearly, without any possibility of misunderstanding, that there was no problem regarding the so-called U.S. military personnel in Laos; if many thousands of North Vietnamese military personnel left Laos and went home, there would be no U.S. personnel in Laos. We had withdrawn our personnel in 1962, but [Page 302] Hanoi had not; indeed, it had introduced many thousands of additional personnel in the last few months. The roads from Hanoi into eastern Laos were jammed with trucks carrying arms, personnel, and possibly some peaceful goods as well. The Secretary said he wished to stress that the following three factors were the chief obstacle to the implementation of the 1962 accords: First, there was continued presence, and in increasing numbers, of North Vietnamese personnel in Laos, something which was contrary to the agreement. Second, in contravention of the agreement, there was continued and increasing use of Laotian territory for infiltrating into Laos and South Vietnam. Finally, the ICC was not allowed to carry out its activities in the territory controlled by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese elements. All these were flagrant violations of the Geneva accords. Our policy continued to be one of seeking full implementation of the 1962 accords, and if Pathet Lao and North Vietnam were to accept such implementation, there would be no difficulty on the part of the U.S. or of the elements with which we have influence.
Mr. Gromyko said that regarding North Vietnamese military personnel, he could only repeat what he had told the Secretary a few days ago, but he did not see any point in doing so. The only observation he could add was that if the Secretary’s information were correct, all of Laos would have been overrun by now. Yet this was not the case and no one had been able to produce any concrete evidence of North Vietnamese presence in Laos. He suggested that we await the forthcoming discussions among the three factions in Paris and expressed the hope that they would be successful. He said the Soviet Union was not happy with the situation in Laos since it was not as it should be under the terms of the Geneva accords. The U.S. was informed of the Soviet views regarding the reasons for that situation. Mr. Gromyko then said that he had exhausted the comments he could make on this subject. Noting that there had been no prearranged agenda for this meeting, he said there were other topics he would like to raise.
The Secretary had no objection to moving to other subjects. He agreed that we should sound out the situation from the forthcoming talks among the three factions. He thought there was broad agreement between the two sides on basic policy. However, he also believed that it would also be useful if from time to time the two sides were to exchange information regarding the factual situation in Laos, inasmuch as sometimes small noises in Laos made big headlines in the papers, creating the impression of a big war going on there.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in S on December 9. The memorandum is part II of III. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.↩
- Rusk recounted this December 1 discussion in Document 146.↩