Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

146. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/35

New York, December 3, 1964, 11 a.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, December 1964

SUBJECT

• 1962 Geneva Accords—Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • William J. Cunningham, FE
  • Mr. Edmund Glenn, Interpreter
• Foreign
  • Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi Nosavan (Laos)
  • H.E. Nou-Ing Ratanavong, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Laos
  • Mr. Khamchan Pradith, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Laos to the UN
  • Mr. Samlith Ratsaphong, Delegation of Laos to the 19th UNGA

Turning to the question of Geneva accords, General Phoumi said that it is now evident that the Pathet Lao has no intention of living up to them. He said that Laotian public opinion would not long tolerate a passive attitude by the government. If these violations continue, the government would be in a most difficult situation, one which would not fit into a framework of friendship with Peiping. General Phoumi said he would like to examine the matter with Secretary Rusk and other “high personalities” of the U.S. Government because so much depends upon the attitude of the United States toward this matter. He said “we see quite clearly that in seeking peace in Laos we can no longer count upon the good will of Peiping, the Pathet Lao and Hanoi.” General Phoumi said that a change would show Laos was “entering a new framework”, and he said he wanted to ask quite candidly whether “we should continue to follow the present line toward Peiping and Hanoi.”

The Secretary replied that it was important to insist upon complete and meticulous compliance with the 1962 Geneva accords. He noted that the North Vietnamese have violated these accords in a number of ways; he had in mind the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and the use of Laotian territory for purposes of infiltration to South Viet-Nam. He said he was convinced that if Peiping and Hanoi would leave Laos alone, the Laotians would be able to decide their own future, for themselves and to their satisfaction.

The Secretary said that he had recently sent a message to Souvanna Phouma concerning Soviet intentions in Laos.² He said that in conversations with Foreign Secretary Gromyko here in New York he had pressed for full Soviet support of the 1962 accords. The Secretary noted that the attitude of the Soviets toward the Geneva accords is a matter of considerable importance to us since we would regard their performance on them as an indication of the attitude Moscow would take toward a series of other accords it is interested in concluding with the United States. The Secretary said that Gromyko had suggested that the outcome of new talks among the three Laotian factions be awaited. The Secretary felt that Gromyko wanted to leave the impression that the Pathet Lao might take a different tack in these talks; we should try to find out if the Pathet Lao are prepared to move seriously toward implementation of the accords. If this does not occur, he said, we face a serious situation in Southeast Asia—one requiring grave decisions.

The Secretary said he was deeply concerned about the unity of countries under pressure from their northern neighbors. He hoped that the Laotians would use what influence they had among the Vietnamese to urge them to achieve internal political unity. He described the importance of such unity in the terms of rallying popular American support for the effort we are making in South Vietnam. He said that if the disunity now found in South Viet-Nam should occur in Laos, this would have a very bad effect. If, however, there were political solidarity in South Viet-Nam and in Laos, an American commitment might be called very necessary and successful. The Secretary mentioned that we have been “sending additional signals to Hanoi” in an effort to deter the North Vietnamese from some of their present activities in Laos. He said that some of the accusations made by North Vietnamese are false, but not all are false. Returning to the problem of domestic political unity in South Viet-Nam, he again stressed that the international impression of unity as well as the fact of unity is important.

In response General Phoumi said that he would like to begin with the last part of the Secretary’s statement. He said that unity in Vientiane is increasing. Of course, he said, it must be understood that there is no hope of unity with the Pathet Lao, despite any assurance that Gromyko may give Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma, however, [they] have drawn much closer together and Souvanna Phouma now sees through the Communists’ schemes. He said that it was quite clear that Peiping and Hanoi wish to destroy the 1962 Geneva accords. Souvanna Phouma also feels this way, and it is for this reason that he has thought of presenting the question to the United Nations. This also explained his desire to request additional American measures in Laos.

The Secretary said that we would be in touch with the Laotians in another ten or fifteen days after talks in Saigon have been completed. Hanoi and Peiping look upon South Viet-Nam as the main theater of action. If they should succeed there, Laos would be at their mercy. We must insist that Hanoi and Peiping change their attitude toward their neighbors and in this respect Laos is a thermometer of their intentions. Peiping could change its policies in Laos with a minimum loss of face since it could fall back on the 1962 Geneva accords. It is, therefore, important that we continue to insist upon the full compliance of Peiping with those accords. From a military point of view, Viet-Nam is the major problem, but from a political point of view Laos is very sensitive. General Phoumi said that he appreciated these considerations, but he said that Laos could carry on as it now is indefinitely; to do so might bring on serious changes. He said that it is clear that Hanoi and Peiping have a very negative attitude. The Secretary said that this is also our present estimate, stressing the word “present.” General Phoumi said that the present military situation in Laos is indicative of a desire on the part of the Pathet Lao and South Viet-Nam to advance rather than to retreat. He said that he hoped we were prepared to cope with the situation should eventual developments confirm these indications. The Secretary assured him that we would be watching the situation very closely.

General Phoumi said that there were a couple of other matters he wanted to discuss. Since the Government of National Union had been established, there had a break in liaison between the Laotian and the U.S. military at both the national level and at lower command levels. The Secretary said that he believed contact was now being maintained through the Embassy at Vientiane, and he said that he believed this was an adequate channel. In this connection the Secretary said he wanted to mention that our new Ambassador to Laos, Mr. Sullivan, was the personal choice of the Secretary and of President Johnson.³ He said that Ambassador Sullivan has a very deep commitment to Southeast Asia and he was sure that General Phoumi and the Laotian government would find him a very strong and able envoy. General Phoumi said that he knew Mr. Sullivan personally and had a very high opinion of him as well as of the retiring ambassador, Leonard A.E. Unger.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cunningham and approved in S on December 17. This conversation took place at the Beverly Hotel in New York City. Rusk was the head of the U.S. Delegation to the 19th session of the UN General Assembly.

   The conversation was recorded in four parts, and this was part III. Part I dealt with the military situation in Laos. In response to a question about recent Pathet Lao advances from Rusk, Phoumi answered that they could prove critical. Phoumi also praised the use of T–28 support and thought that it had proved the difference in the recent fighting. (Memorandum of conversation, December 3; ibid., POL LAOS) Part II was a discussion of Chinese representation in the United Nations. Part IV was a request for Phoumi to met with President Johnson. Rusk promised to see if it was possible, but it was not. (Both ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Dec. 1964)

2. Text transmitted in telegram 489 to Vientiane, December 1. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
3. In an October 19 memorandum to President Johnson, Dungan stated that Rusk, William Bundy, and Taylor recommended the early appointment of Sullivan as Ambassador to Laos. Sullivan was then a Special Assistant to Taylor in Saigon and had been involved in Southeast Asian issues for 2 years. The memorandum reported that Unger was an “excellent man, but has been on the firing line in Vientiane for several years.” Johnson approved the recommendation to appoint Sullivan. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XI, Memos, 10/64)